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Zusammenfassung
Software wird zunehmend nebenläufig: Aufgrund von Parallelisierung, Verteilung
und reaktivem Verhalten werden zunehmend asynchrone Programmiertechniken einge-
setzt, also das Absetzen von Nachrichten und Tasks an entsprechende Puffer. Asyn-
chrone Programme sind weit verbreitet, in schnellen Servern und Routern, in eingebet-
teten Systemen und Sensornetzwerken, und als Basis der Web-Programmierung mittels
Javascript. Programmiersprachen wie Erlang und Scala haben asynchrone Programme
als fundamentales Konzept angenommen, um stark skalierbare und höchst zuverläs-
sige verteilte System zu entwickeln.
Die Korrektheit asynchroner Programme ist allerdings sehr schwer herzustellen:
Die schwache Kopplung zwischen asynchron ausgeführten Tasks macht es schwierig,
Kontroll- und Datenabhängigkeiten zu analysieren. Selbst kleine Design- und Pro-
grammierfehler können fehlerhaftes oder divergentes Verhalten hervorrufen. Da asyn-
chrone Programme typischerweise geschrieben werden, um zuverlässige, hochperfor-
mante Infrastruktur zur Verfügung zu stellen, besteht ein enormer Bedarf an Analy-
setechniken, um ihre Korrektheit sicherzustellen.
In dieser Dissertation stelle ich skalierbare Verifikations- und Testwerkzeuge vor,
um asynchrone Programme zuverlässiger zu machen. Ich zeige, dass die Kombination
von Counter Abstraction und Partial Order Reduction effektive Ansatz zur Verifikation
asynchroner System sind, indem ich PROVKEEPER und KUAI vorstelle, zwei skalier-
bare Verifier für zwei Typen asynchroner Systeme. Ich zeige auch ein theoretisches Re-
sultat, dass zeigt, dass ein Counter Abstraction-basierter Algorithmus namens Expand-
Enlarge-Check asymptotisch optimal für das Coverability-Problem von verzweigten
Vektoradditionssystemen ist, mit denen viele asynchrone Programme modelliert wer-
den können. Weiterhin präsentiere ich BBS und LLSPLAT, zwei Testwerkzeuge für
asynchrone Programme, die viele subtile Speicherzugriffsfehler aufdecken.
v

Abstract
Software is becoming increasingly concurrent: parallelization, decentralization, and
reactivity necessitate asynchronous programming in which processes communicate by
posting messages/tasks to others’ message/task buffers. Asynchronous programming
has been widely used to build fast servers and routers, embedded systems and sensor
networks, and is the basis of Web programming using Javascript. Languages such as
Erlang and Scala have adopted asynchronous programming as a fundamental concept
with which highly scalable and highly reliable distributed systems are built.
Asynchronous programs are challenging to implement correctly: the loose coupling
between asynchronously executed tasks makes the control and data dependencies diffi-
cult to follow. Even subtle design and programming mistakes on the programs have the
capability to introduce erroneous or divergent behaviors. As asynchronous programs
are typically written to provide a reliable, high-performance infrastructure, there is a
critical need for analysis techniques to guarantee their correctness.
In this dissertation, I provide scalable verification and testing tools to make asyn-
chronous programs more reliable. I show that the combination of counter abstraction
and partial order reduction is an effective approach for the verification of asynchronous
systems by presenting PROVKEEPER and KUAI, two scalable verifiers for two types
of asynchronous systems. I also provide a theoretical result that proves a counter-
abstraction based algorithm called expand-enlarge-check, is an asymptotically optimal
algorithm for the coverability problem of branching vector addition systems as which
many asynchronous programs can be modeled. In addition, I present BBS and LL-
SPLAT, two testing tools for asynchronous programs that efficiently uncover many sub-
tle memory violation bugs .
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Software is becoming increasingly concurrent: parallelization (e.g., in scientific com-
putations), decentralization (e.g., in web applications), and reactivity (e.g., for GUI
and web servers) necessitate asynchronous computations. Although shared-memory
implementations are often possible, the burden of preventing unwanted thread inter-
leavings without crippling performance is onerous. Many have instead adopted asyn-
chronous programming models in which processes communicate by posting messages/-
tasks to others’ message/task buffers—Miller et al.[94] discuss why such models pro-
vide good programming abstractions. An asynchronous program can involve either a
single process or multiple processes: a single-process asynchronous program executes
a series of short-lived tasks one-by-one, and each task may potentially buffering ad-
ditional tasks to be executed later. Since single-process asynchronous models ensure
quick response to incoming events (e.g., user input, connection requests), they have
been widely used to build fast servers and routers [71, 99], embedded systems and
sensor networks [58], and are the basis of Web programming using Javascript. On the
other hand, in a multi-process asynchronous program, each process handles messages
from its own buffer, and may communicate with other processes by sending messages
to others’ buffers. Languages such as Erlang and Scala have adopted the multi-process
asynchronous programming as a fundamental concept with which highly scalable and
highly reliable distributed systems are built.
Asynchronous programs are challenging to implement correctly. Writing correct
single-process asynchronous programs is hard since the loose coupling between asyn-
chronously executed tasks makes the control and data dependencies in the programs
difficult to follow. Writing correct multi-process asynchronous programs is also hard
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because of the large amount of nondeterminisms introduced by process interleavings
and message delays. Even subtle design and programming mistakes on the programs
have the capability to introduce erroneous or divergent behaviors. As asynchronous
programs are typically written to provide a reliable, high-performance infrastructure,
there is a critical need for analysis techniques to guarantee their correctness.
In this dissertation, I provide scalable verification and testing tools to make asynchronous
programs more reliable.
Verification of Asynchronous Programs The goal of verification is that, given an
asynchronous program and a property, check whether the property holds in the pro-
gram. As side effect, a verifier may provide a witness explaining why the property
does not hold in the program.
Asynchronous programs are notoriously hard to verify because they may contain
infinitely many states due to the unbounded number of contents in buffers. It is im-
possible for a verifier to naively examine all states to check a property holds, from the
algorithmic point of view.
In the dissertation, I show that the combination of counter abstraction and partial or-
der reduction (CntAbs+POR) is an effective approach to verify asynchronous programs
in which contents in buffers are unordered. Counter abstraction bounds the number of
contents of the buffers abstractly: given a pre-defined bound k, as long as a buffer has
no more than k contents, counter abstraction counts the contents of the buffer precisely.
However, if the buffer contains more than k contents, counter abstraction regards it as
if it contains infinitely many contents. Therefore, from the verification point view, the
size of the buffer becomes finite after counter abstraction: either from 0 to k, or infinity.
Counter abstraction provides a finite-state over-approximation of the behaviors of an
asynchronous program. Thus if the over-approximation can be easily proved to be cor-
rect w.r.t. a property, the original asynchronous program is correct w.r.t. the property,
too.
Once the state space becomes finite, partial order reduction comes into play to fur-
ther reduce the number of states to be examined, intuitively, by analyzing “impor-
tant” ones only. Partial order reduction is the key to make verification of asynchronous
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programs from possible to practical: I empirically show that the verification time on
realistic asynchronous systems is significantly reduced by partial order reduction tech-
niques.
In the dissertation, I present two applications following the CntAbs+POR approach.
I present (1) PROVKEEPER, a verifier for message passing systems, and (2) KUAI, a ver-
ifier for software-defined networks (SDNs). PROVKEEPER verifies provenance-related
properties on message passing systems such as browser extensions, ensuring correct
access control and information dissemination. KUAI verifies safety properties on SDNs,
such as no packet-forwarding loops, no black holes, and correct enforcement of mid-
dlebox policies, etc. I empirically show that both PROVKEEPER and KUAI are scalable
to verify realistic asynchronous systems efficiently.
Besides the above practical tools, I also provide a theoretical result about the expand-
enlarge-check algorithm (EEC) [47], which is a counter-abstraction based decision pro-
cedure for Petri nets [100] in which many asynchronous programs can be modeled [39,
45, 66, 67, 83, 112]. I extend EEC to branching vector addition systems (BVAS) [35], a
model that is more expressive than Petri nets, and prove that EEC is an asymptotically
optimal algorithm for both BVAS and Petri nets.
Testing of Asynchronous Programs When contents in buffers are FIFO-ordered in
asynchronous programs, precise algorithmic reasoning such as state-reachability be-
comes undecidable [16], even when there is only a single finite-state process (post-
ing messages to itself). Thus one cannot expect algorithmic tools that not only keep
the FIFO order requirement on contents but also prove the correctness of such asyn-
chronous programs. Instead, I choose to keep the FIFO order requirement but develop
efficient and scalable testing tools for such asynchronous programs. The goal of test-
ing is that, given an asynchronous program and a property, detect as many bugs as
possible that violate the property in the program. Testing is not required to prove the
property holds in asynchronous programs.
Sequentialization has been shown to be very successful for finding bugs in asyn-
chronous programs [4, 14, 49, 75, 76, 78, 79, 96, 103, 104, 116, 118]. The key idea of
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sequentialization is to define a bounding parameter to translate an asynchronous pro-
gram into a sequential program such that the behaviours of the sequential program is
a subset of the ones of the original asynchronous program. In other words, the se-
quential program is an under-approximation of the original asynchronous program: if
the sequential program is buggy, then the asynchronous program is also buggy. Since
testing of sequential programs is well-understood, any tools that work for sequential
programs can be used for finding bugs in asynchronous programs.
Two factors are considered as the keys to maximize the value of sequentialization.
The first factor is to show a bounding parameter is effective in the sense that under a
small bound, many interesting bugs can be found already in realistic applications. This is
important because (1) a smaller bound results in a smaller under-approximation which
is easier for a tool to analyze, and (2) many bounding parameters can be naively defined
in theory but are not scalable to find bugs efficiently in real applications. The second
factor is the capability of the underlying tools for sequential programs. After all, it is
the tools that perform the work for finding bugs.
In the dissertation, I present two testing tools BBS and LLSPLAT, keeping the above
two factors in mind. Bouajjani and Emmi introduced phase-bounding sequentialization
algorithm [13] for asynchronous programs. However, there was no empirical evalua-
tion to show the practical value of phase-bounding. I implement the phase-bounding
algorithm in the tool BBS and use BBS to test TinyOS [46, 58] programs, which are
widely used in wireless sensor networks. The empirical results indicate that a vari-
ety of subtle memory violation bugs are manifested within a small phase bound (3 in
most of the cases). From the evaluation, I conclude that phase-bounding is an effective
approach in bug finding for asynchronous programs.
The next contribution is LLSPLAT, a testing tool for sequential programs. LLSPLAT
combines concolic testing [52, 111] and bounded model checking [29, 31, 73, 92] to-
gether to gain better testing performance. I evaluate LLSPLAT with two state-of-the-art
concolic testing tools CREST [19] and KLEE [20] using 36 standard benchmarks. The
evaluation shows that (1) for the same time budget (an hour per program), LLSPLAT
provides on average 31%, 19%, 20%, 21% higher branch coverage than CREST’s four
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search strategies, and on average 21% higher branch coverage than KLEE, and (2) LL-
SPLAT achieves higher branch coverage quickly: LLSPLAT starts to outperform CREST
and KLEE after at most 3 minutes. In addition, I also evaluate LLSPLAT with the state-
of-the-art bounded model checker CBMC [73] using 13 sequentialized SystemC bench-
marks. The experiments show that LLSPLAT can find bugs more quickly than CBMC.
1.1 Outline
The rest of my dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2–4 present PROVKEEPER,
KUAI, and the complexity results of EEC, respectively, which show the power of counter
abstraction and partial order reduction for the verification of asynchronous programs.
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 present BBS and LLSPLAT, respectively, which enrich the tech-
niques for testing asynchronous programs. The first four contributions have been pub-
lished in [86], [88], [90], and [89], respectively. The work about LLSPLAT is currently
under submission.

Chapter 2
PROVKEEPER: A Provenance Verifier
for Message Passing Programs
2.1 Introduction
Controlled access and dissemination of data is a key ingredient of system security: we
do not want secret information to reach untrusted principals and we do not want to
receive bad information (indirectly) from untrusted principals. Many organizations re-
ceive private information from users and this information is passed around within the
organization to carry out business-critical activities. These organizations must ensure
that the data is not accidentally disclosed to unauthorized users, as the potential cost of
disclosure can be high. Moreover, in many domains, such as healthcare and finance, the
control of data is required by regulatory agencies through legislation such as HIPAA
and GLBA.
We present an abstract model of information dissemination in message passing
systems, and a static analyzer to verify correct dissemination. We model systems as
concurrent message passing processes, one process for each principal in the system.
Processes communicate by sending and receiving messages via a shared set of chan-
nels. Channels are unbounded, but can reorder messages. Sends are non-blocking, but
receive actions block until a message is available.
To track information about the origin and access history of a message, we aug-
ment messages with provenance annotations. Roughly, the provenance of a message
is a function of the sequence of principles that have transmitted the message in the
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past. Depending on the function, we get different provenance annotations. For exam-
ple, the annotation can simply be the sequence of principals. Whenever a principal
sends a message, we append the name of the principal to the current provenance of the
message. The provenance verification problem asks, given a message passing program,
a variable in the program, and a set of allowed provenance annotations, whether the
provenance of every message stored in the variable, on every run of the program, be-
longs to the set of allowed provenances.
Consider a healthcare system in which a patient sends health questions to a sec-
retary or a nurse, who in turn, forwards the question to doctors. An information-
dissemination policy may require that every health answer received by the patient has
been seen by at least one doctor. That is, the provenance of every message received by
the patient must belong to the regular language Patient(Secretary + Nurse) Doctor+.
We consider provenance verification for general provenance domains satisfying an
algebraic requirement. Static provenance verification is hard because of two sources
of unboundedness in the model. First, the provenance information associated with a
single message can be unbounded. For example there is no bound on the number of
doctors who see a health question before an answer is sent back. Second, the number
of pending messages in the system can be unbounded. We tackle these two sources of
unboundedness as follows.
We give a reduction from provenance verification problem to coverability in labeled
Petri nets, where tokens carry (potentially unbounded) provenance data. As a result,
we obtain a general decidability result for provenance verification problem, when the
domain of provenance annotations is well-structured [1, 41]. Specifically, we show
verification is EXPSPACE-complete for the set provenance domain, that tracks the set
of principals that have seen a message, as well as for the language provenance do-
main, in which provenance information is stored as ordered sequences of principals
that have seen the message and policies are regular languages. Our proofs combine
well-structuredness arguments with symbolic representations; we analyze coverability
in a product of a Petri net modeling the system and a symbolic domain encoding the
set of allowed provenances.
While our decision procedures reduce the verification problems to problems on
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Petri nets, our experiences with a direct implementation of provenance verification
based on existing Petri net coverability tools have been somewhat disappointing. Mostly,
this is because after the reduction to Petri nets, the coverability tools fail to utilize the
structure of message passing programs, in particular potential state-space reductions
arising from partial order reduction (POR) [51].
We implemented a coverability checker PROVKEEPER that is tuned for message
passing programs on top of the Spin model checker [59]. Our implementation uses the
expand-enlarge-check (EEC) paradigm [47]. The EEC algorithm explores a sequence of
finite-state approximations of the message passing program. Intuitively, the approxi-
mation is obtained by replacing the counters in the Petri net with “abstract” counters
that count precisely up to a given parameter k, and then set the count to∞. Since the
induced state space is finite for each approximation, we can use a finite-state reachabil-
ity engine (such as Spin) to explore its state space. Additionally, we use partial order
reduction, already implemented in Spin, to reduce the explored state space, allowing
local actions of different processes to commute.
Our choice of a message passing programming model with unbounded but un-
ordered buffers was inspired by the communication model in browser extensions, where
several components communicate asynchronously. Specifically, we checked the follow-
ing property of extensions. Most browsers have a “private mode” that allow users to
browse the internet without saving information about pages visited. Browser exten-
sions should respect the private mode and not save user information (or worse, upload
user information to remote servers) while the user is browsing in the private mode. We
checked this property and found that several widely-used Firefox extensions, includ-
ing some extensions whose purpose is to improve user privacy, do not properly handle
“private mode” settings. Among nine browser extensions using message passing, local
storage, and sometimes remote database accesses, we found five extensions store user
data even in the private mode. Thus, our experiments demonstrate that a precise static
tool can be useful in detecting privacy violations in this domain.
One can view our result as a general compilation procedure from a provenance
verification problem for a program P to a safety verification problem for an instru-
mented program P ′. The instrumentation P ′ adds some counters to P but keeps the
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patient {
var p1, p2, p3;
while (true) {
choose
P1: [] p1 = HQ; send(ch0, p1);
P2: [] p1 = AR; send(ch0, p1);
P3: [] recv(ch1, p2);
P4: if (p2 == HA) p3 = p2;
}
}
secretary {
var s1, s2;
while (true) {
S1: recv(ch0, s1);
S2: if (s1 == HQ)
S3: send(ch2, s1);
S4: else {
S5: s2 = AA(s1);
S6: send(ch1, s2);
} }
}
}
doctor{
var d1, d2;
while(true) {
D1: recv(ch2, d1);
D2: d2 = HA(d1);
D3: choose
D4: [] send(ch1, d2);
D5: [] send(ch2, d2);
}
}
Pa#ent' Secretary' Doctor'
ch0'
ch2'
ch2'
ch1'
FIGURE 2.1: Medical system example
other features (e.g., complex control flow and data structures) the same: program P ′
is safe iff P satisfies the provenance properties. After the reduction, we can harness
any verification technique that has been developed for the underlying class of pro-
grams (e.g., abstract interpretation or software model checking). Our experiments use
a simple dataflow abstraction, but other abstract domains could be used for more pre-
cision. We chose message passing programs for our presentation as they capture the
essence of provenance tracking: concurrency, unbounded provenance information, and
unbounded channels. This focus allows us to settle the complexity of provenance veri-
fication without mixing it with the complexity of features in the programming model.
2.2 Example
We motivate our results by modeling a simple online health system described in [8],
which allows patients to interact with their doctors and other healthcare professionals
using a web-based message passing system. In the system, users have different roles,
such as Patient, Secretary, and Doctor. Patients can ask health questions and receive
answers by exchanging messages with their doctors.
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For simplicity of exposition, we describe a subset of the functionality of the system
as a message passing program. (In Section 2.6, we modeled the entire system as a case
study.) Intuitively, a message passing program is a collection of imperative processes
running concurrently, one for each principal in the system. In our example, each role
(Patient, Doctor, etc.) is modeled as a different principal. The processes run by the
principals have local variables, and in addition, communicate with each other by send-
ing to and receiving from shared channels. We assume shared channels are potentially
unbounded, but may reorder messages. Message sends are non-blocking, the execu-
tion continues at the control point following the send. Receives are blocking: a process
blocks until some message from the channel is received.
Figure 2.1 shows a simple implementation of the system, written in a simple imper-
ative language. We have three principals: Patient (modeling the set of patients using
the system), Secretary (modeling secretaries who receive and forward messages), and
Doctor (modeling the set of doctors using the system). The choose construct nondeter-
ministically chooses and executes one of its branches. A send action sends a message
to a channel, and a recv receives a message from a channel into a local variable.
There are four kinds of messages in the system. The patient can send a health ques-
tion (HQ) or an appointment request (AR). The healthcare providers can send back a
health answer (HA) or an appointment confirmation (AA). The principals communi-
cate through shared channels ch0, ch1, and ch2.
The patient process runs in a loop. In each step, it nondeterministically decides
to either send an HQ or an AR to ch0, or to receive an answer on channel ch1. The
secretary process runs a loop. In each step, it receives a message from channel ch0.
If it is an HQ, the message is forwarded to doctors on channel ch2. If it is an AR,
the secretary answers the patient directly on channel ch1. The doctor process receives
health questions on channel ch2. It computes a health answer based on the received
message (the assignment on line D2). It can either reply directly to the patient (on
channel ch1), or put the answer back to channel ch2 for further processing.
Figure 2.1 also shows a possible message sequence for a health question, where the
patient sends a health question to the secretary, the secretary forwards it to the doctor,
and the doctor looks at the message several times before replying with a health answer.
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q0 q1 q2 q3Patient
Secretary Doctor
Doctor
FIGURE 2.2: Complemented finite automaton for provenance property.
We omit an accepting sink to which all unspecified edges go.
We capture the flow of messages through the principals using provenance annotations
with each message; the provenance captures the history of all the principals that have
forwarded the message. While in Section 2.3 we give a general algebraic definition
of a provenance domain, for the moment, think of a provenance as a string over the
principals. When a message is initially assigned, e.g., on line P1, the provenance is the
empty string ε. After the patient sends the message, the channel ch0 contains an HQ
message with provenance Patient. When the message is forwarded to channel ch2, its
provenance becomes Patient Secretary. Finally, when the message is sent back on ch1,
its provenance is a string in the regular language Patient Secretary Doctor+, indicating
that it has been sent originally by the patient, seen by the secretary next, and then seen
by the doctor one or more times.
The provenance verification problem asks, given the message passing program, a vari-
able v, and a regular language R of provenances, whether the content of v has a prove-
nance in R along all program executions. In the example, we can ask if the provenance
of variable p3 is in the set
ε+ Patient Secretary Doctor+, (2.1)
capturing the requirement that any health answer must be initiated by a health ques-
tion from the patient, and must be seen by a doctor at least once, after it has been seen
by a secretary.
Notice that the example is unbounded in two dimensions. First, the channels can
contain unboundedly many messages. For example, the patient process can send un-
boundedly many messages on channel ch0 before the secretary process receives them.
Second, the provenance annotations can be unbounded: a message in channel ch2 can
have an unbounded number of Doctor annotations.
We show the provenance verification problem is decidable. The first observation
Chapter 2. PROVKEEPER: A Provenance Verifier for Message Passing Programs 13
patient {
var p1, p2, p3;
while (true) {
choose
P1′ [] p1 = 〈HQ,q0〉; 〈ch0, HQ,q1〉++;
P2′ [] p1 = 〈AR,q0〉; 〈ch0, AR,q1〉++;
P31 [] if 〈ch1, HQ, q〉 > 0 (for each q ∈ Q)
p2 = 〈HQ, q〉; 〈ch1, HQ, q〉-;
P32 [] if 〈ch1, HA, q〉 > 0 (for each q ∈ Q)
p2 = 〈HA, q〉; 〈ch1, HA, q〉-;
P4′ if (p2 == (HA, ·) ) p3 = p2;
P33 [] if 〈ch1, AA, q〉 > 0 (for each q ∈ Q)
p2 = 〈AA, q〉; 〈ch1, AA, q〉-;
P34 [] if 〈ch1, AR, q〉 > 0 (for each q ∈ Q)
p2 = 〈AR, q〉; 〈ch1, AR, q〉-;
}
}
FIGURE 2.3: Translation of patient. We have simplified some state-
ments for readability: the actual translation performs a case split over
p1 in lines P1′ and P2′, and performs the check on line P4′ after each
statement P3i.
is that, if we ignore provenances, we can keep a counter for each channel ch and each
message type m, that counts the number of messages with value m that are currently
in ch . A send action increases the counter, a receive decrements it. We can then show
that the transition system of a message passing program is well-structured [1, 41]: an
action that could be taken in a state can also be taken if there are more messages in the
channels. Formally, we give a reduction to Petri nets, an infinite-state well-structured
system with good decidability properties.
In the presence of provenances, we have to be more careful. Unlike a normal Petri
net, now the “tokens” (the messages in the channels) will carry potentially unbounded
provenance annotations. However, given the regular setR, we only need to distinguish
two provenance annotations that behave differently with respect to a deterministic fi-
nite automaton A for R. So, we keep more counters that are now of the form 〈ch,m, q〉:
one counter for each combination of channel ch, message type m, and state q of A. The
state of the automaton A remembers where the automaton would go to, starting with
its initial state, on seeing the provenance annotation. Similarly, for each variable in the
program, we distinguish the contents of the variable based on the message type m as
well as the state q of the automaton.
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Figure 2.2 shows a deterministic automaton accepting the complement of the lan-
guage in (2.1). Using this automaton, we describe the reduction to a well-structured
system as follows. Let Q = {q0, q1, q2, q3, q4} be the set of states of the automaton (q4
is the omitted sink state). We have a set of integer-valued counters 〈chi,m, q〉, for
i= 0, 1, 2, m ∈ {HQ, HA, AA, AR}, and q ∈Q. For example, the counter 〈ch0, HQ, q1〉 stores
the number of HQs in ch0 for which the automaton is in state q1. Figure 2.3 shows the
translation of the patient process. The send actions are replaced by incrementing
the appropriate counter. For example, the action send(ch0,p1) in line P1 is replaced
with incrementing the counter 〈ch0, HQ, q1〉, the state of the automaton is q1 because the
principal Patient takes the automaton from its initial state q0 to the state q1. The re-
ceive action non-deterministically selects a non-zero counter and decrements it, while
storing the message and the state into the local variable.
After the translation, we are left with a well-structured system. Verifying the prove-
nance specification reduces to checking if there is a reachable configuration of the sys-
tem in which v contains a message whose provenance automaton is in a final state.
This reachability question can be solved as a coverability problem on the well-structured
system, which is decidable. In fact, we show a symbolic encoding that gives an optimal
algorithm.
2.3 Message Passing Programs
Preliminaries A multiset m over a set Σ is a function Σ → N with finite support (i.e.,
m(σ) 6= 0 for finitely many σ ∈ Σ). By M[Σ] we denote the set of all multisets over
Σ. As an example, we write m = Jσ21, σ3K for the multiset m ∈ M[{σ1,σ2,σ3}] with
m(σ1) = 2,m(σ2) = 0, and m(σ3) = 1. We write ∅ for the empty multiset, mapping
each σ ∈ Σ to 0. Two multisets are ordered by m1 ≤ m2 if for all σ ∈ Σ, we have
m1(σ) ≤ m2(σ). Let m1 ⊕m2 (resp. m1 	m2) be the multiset that maps every element
σ ∈ Σ to m1(σ) +m2(σ) (resp. max{0,m1(σ)−m2(σ)}).
For a set X , a relation  ⊆ X×X is a well-quasi-order (wqo) if it is reflexive, transi-
tive, and such that for every infinite sequence x0, x1, . . . of elements fromX , there exists
Chapter 2. PROVKEEPER: A Provenance Verifier for Message Passing Programs 15
i < j such that xi  xj . Given a wqo , we define its induced equivalence ≡ ⊆ X ×X by
x ≡ y if x  y and y  x.
A subset X ′ of X is upward closed if for each x ∈ X , if there is a x′ ∈ X ′ with x′  x
then x ∈ X ′. A subset X ′ of X is downward closed if for each x ∈ X , if there is a x′ ∈ X ′
with x  x′ then x ∈ X ′. A function f : X → X is called -monotonic if for each
x, x′ ∈ X , if x  x′ then f(x)  f(x′).
A transition system TS = (C, c0,→) consists of a set C of configurations, an initial
configuration c0 ∈ C, and a transition relation→⊆ C ×C. We write→∗ for the reflexive
transitive closure of→. A configuration c ∈ C is reachable if c0 →∗ c. A well-structured
transition system is a TS = (C, c0,→) equipped with a well-quasi order  ⊆ C × C such
that for all c1, c2, c3 ∈ C with c1  c2 and c1 → c3, there exists c4 ∈ C with c3  c4 and
c2 → c4.
2.3.1 Programming Model
Syntax We work in the setting of asynchronous message passing programs. For sim-
plicity, we assume that the programming language has a single finitely-valued datatype
M of messages. A channel is a (potentially unbounded) multiset of messages support-
ing two actions: a send action (written ch!x) that takes a message stored in variable x
and puts it into the channel, and a receive action (written ch?x) that takes a message m
from the channel and copies it to the variable x. Let C be a finite set of channels.
A control flow graph (CFG)G = (X,V,E, v0) consists of a setX of message variables,
a set V of control locations including a unique start location v0 ∈ V , and a set E of
labeled directed edges between the control locations in V . Every edge in E is labeled
with one of the following actions:
• an assignment y := ⊗(x), where x, y ∈ X and ⊗ is an uninterpreted unary opera-
tion on messages;
• an assume action assume(x = m), where x ∈ X and m ∈M;
• a send action ch!x, or a receive action ch?x, where x ∈ X and ch ∈ C.
A message passing program P = (Prin, C, {Gp}p∈Prin) consists of a finite set Prin of
principals, a set C of channels, and for each p ∈ Prin , a control flow graph Gp.
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Intuitively, a message passing program consists of a finite set of processes. Each
process is owned by a named entity or a principal. The processes have local variables
which can be updated using unary operators, and communicate with other processes
by asynchronously sending to and receiving messages from the set of channels C.
We shall use the notation v
a,p−−→ v′ to denote that the CFG Gp of principal p has an
edge (v, v′) ∈ Ep labeled with the action a. Given the set {Gp}p∈Prin of CFGs, we define
XF = unionmulti{Xp | p ∈ Prin}, V F = unionmulti{Vp | p ∈ Prin}, and EF = unionmulti{Ep | p ∈ Prin} as the
disjoint unions of local variables, control locations, and control flow edges, respectively.
Semantics We now give a provenance-carrying semantics to message passing programs.
Let U be a (not necessarily finite) set of provenances. We shall associate with each mes-
sage in a message passing program a provenance from U .
Let P = (Prin, C, {Gp}p∈Prin) be a message passing program. A provenance domain
U = (U,, ψ) for P consists of a set U of provenances, a well-quasi ordering  on U ,
and for each principal p ∈ Prin and for each operation op ∈ ⊗ ∪ {!, ?}, a -monotonic
function ψ(p, op) : U → U . A provenance domain is decidable if  is a decidable
relation and ψ is a computable function. We assume all provenance domains below are
decidable.
Since channels are unordered, we represent contents of a channel as a multiset of
pairs of messages and provenances. A configuration (`, c, pi) consists of a location func-
tion ` : Prin → V F mapping each principal to a control location; a channel function
c : C → M[M× U ] mapping each channel to a multiset of pairs of messages fromM
and provenances from U ; and a store function pi : XF →M×U mapping each variable
to a message and its provenance.
Define `0 : Prin → V F as the function mapping p ∈ Prin to the start location
v0p ∈ Vp and c0 : C → M[M× U ] as the function mapping each ch ∈ C to the empty
multiset ∅. Let pi0 :XF→M×U be a mapping from variables in XF to a default initial
value m0 fromM and a default initial provenance ε from U .
The provenance-carrying semantics of a message passing programP with respect to
the provenance domain (U,, ψ) is defined as the transition system TS(P) = (C, c0,→)
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where C is the set of configurations, the initial configuration c0 = (`0, c0, pi0), and the
transition relation→⊆ C × C is defined as follows.
For a function f : A → B, a ∈ A, and b ∈ B, let f [a 7→ b] denote the function
that maps a to b and all a′ 6= a to f(a′). We define (`, c, pi) → (`′, c′, pi′) if there exists
p ∈ Prin and (`(p), a, `′(p)) ∈ EF such that for all p′ 6= p, we have `(p′) = `′(p′); and
1. if a ≡ y := ⊗(x) and (m,u) = pi(x) then c′ = c and pi′ = pi[y 7→ (⊗(m), ψ(p,⊗)(u))];
2. if a ≡ assume(x = m) then c′ = c, pi′ = pi, and pi(x) = (m, ·);
3. if a ≡ ch!x then pi′=pi and if (m,u)=pi(x), then c′ = c[ch 7→ c(ch)⊕J(m,ψ(p, !)(u))K];
4. if a ≡ ch?x and there is (m,u) such that c(ch)(m,u) > 0 then c′ = c[ch 7→
c(ch)	J(m,u)K] and pi′ = pi[x 7→ (m,ψ(p, ?)(u))].
Intuitively, in each step, one of the principals executes a local action. An assignment
action y := ⊗(x) transforms the message contained in x by applying the operation
⊗ and transforms the provenance of x by applying ψ, storing the new message and
its provenance in y. An assume checks that a variable has a specific message. Sends
and receives model asynchronous communication to shared channels. Send actions are
non-blocking, receive actions are blocking, and a channel can reorder messages.
Let P be a message passing program and U = (U,, ψ) a provenance domain. We
consider provenance specifications given by downward closed sets over U . Downward
closed sets capture the “monotonicity” property that holds in many domains. For ex-
ample, a security policy that holds when a given set of trusted principals looks at a
message, is also met when fewer principals look at it. Conversely, bad behaviors are
captured by upward closed sets.
The provenance verification problem asks, given a variable x of P and a downward
closed set D ⊆ U , if the provenance of the content of variable x is always in D along
all runs of the program. Dually, the specification is violated if there exists a reachable
configuration where the provenance of variable x is in the upward closed set I = U\D.
Such a configuration indicates a violation of security policies. We shall use the dual
formulation in our algorithms.
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2.3.2 Examples
We now give illustrative examples of provenance domains.
Example 1. [The Language Provenance Domain] Consider U = Prin∗, the set of finite
sequences over principals. Let (Q,Prin, q0, δ) be a deterministic finite automaton, and let  be
defined as u  v iff δ(q0, u) = δ(q0, v). Let ψ be the function defined as ψ(p, !)(u) = u · p, and
ψ(·, ·)(u) = u for all other operations. Intuitively, the language provenance domain associates
a list of principals with each message: the sequence of principals who have sent this message
along the current computation.
A downward closed set D in the language provenance domain is a regular language that
prescribes a set F ⊆ Q of final states for the finite automaton A. The corresponding upward
closed set I is a regular language that prescribes a set Q \ F of final states for the complement
automaton A. The provenance verification problem asks, for example, if the provenance of the
message in p3 always belongs to the regular language Patient Secretary Doctor+ along all
runs of the program.
Example 2. [The Set Provenance Domain] Let U = 2Prin , the set of sets of principals. Let
 be set inclusion. Since the set of principals is finite, this is a wqo. Let ψ be the function
defined as ψ(p, !)(u) = u∪ {p}, and ψ(·, ·)(u) = u for all other operations. The set provenance
domain associates a set of principals with each message: the set contains all the principals who
have sent this message (potentially multiple times). An upward closed set I corresponds to a
set of sets of principals, such that if a set of principals is in I , each of its supersets is also in I .
As an example, suppose the set of principals Prin is divided into “trusted” and “untrusted”
principals. A downward closed set D specifies the sets all of whose elements are “trusted”.
As a result, the corresponding upward closed set I captures all sets containing at least one
“untrusted” principal. The provenance verification problem asks, given a variable x, if there is
a message stored in x along a run that has a provenance which is one of the sets in I .
2.4 Model Checking
We now give a model checking algorithm for provenance verification by reduction to
labeled Petri nets.
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2.4.1 Labeled Petri Nets
A Petri net (PN) is a tuple N = 〈S, T, (I,O)〉where S is a finite set of places, T is a finite
set of transitions, and functions I : T → S → {0, 1} and O : T → S → {0, 1} encodes
pre- and post-conditions of transitions.
A marking is a multiset over S. A transition t ∈ T is enabled at a marking µ, denoted
by µ[t〉, if µ ≥ I(t). An enabled transition t at µ may fire to produce a new marking µ′,
denoted by µ[t〉µ′, where µ′ = µ 	 I(t) ⊕ O(t). We naturally lift the enabledness and
firing notions from one transition to a sequence σ ∈ T ∗ of transitions.
A PNN and a marking µ0 define a transition system TS(N) = (M[S], µ0,→), where
µ→ µ′ if there is a transition t such that µ[t〉µ′.
The encoding of a PN N is given by a list of pairs of lists. Each transition t ∈ T is
encoded by two lists corresponding to I(t) and O(t). Each list I(t) or O(t) is encoded
as a bitvector of size |S|. The size of N , written ‖N‖, is the sum of the representations
of all the lists.
Let N be a Petri net and µ0 and µ markings. The coverability problem asks if there is
µ′ ≥ µ that is reachable from µ0, so µ0 →∗ µ′ ≥ µ. In this case, we say µ is coverable
from µ0.
Theorem 1. [82, 106] The coverability problem for Petri nets is EXPSPACE-complete.
In the usual definition of Petri nets, tokens are simply uninterpreted “dots” and
markings count the number of dots in each place. We now extend the Petri net model
with tokens labeled with elements from a decidable provenance domain U . A U-labeled
Petri netN = 〈S, T, (I,O),Λ〉 is a Petri net 〈S, T, (I,O)〉 that is equipped with a labeling
function Λ specifying how provenance markings are updated when a transition is fired.
Consider a transition t ∈ T . Let p1, . . . , pk be an ordering of all the places in S for which
I(t)(p) = 1. For each place p′ ∈ S with O(t)(p′) = 1, the labeling function Λ(t, p′) is a
-monotonic function Uk → U . We assume the labeling function Λ is computable.
A labeled marking µ is a mapping from places S to multisets over U , i.e., it labels
each token in a marking with an element of U . A labeled marking µ induces a marking
erase(µ) that maps each p ∈ S to ∑u∈U µ(p)(u) obtained by erasing all provenance
information carried by tokens. Fix a transition t, and let p1, . . . , pk be an ordering of the
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places such that I(t)(p) = 1. The transition t is enabled at a labeled marking µ if for
each p ∈ S with I(t)(p) = 1, we have erase(µ)(p) ≥ 1. An enabled transition t at µ can
fire to produce a new labeled marking µ′, denoted (by abuse of notation) µ[t〉µ′, defined
as follows. To compute µ′ from µ, first pick and remove arbitrarily tokens from p1 to pk
with labels u1 to uk respectively. Then, for each p′ withO(t)(p′) = 1, add a token whose
label is Λ(t, p′)(u1, . . . , uk) to p′. All other places remain unchanged. We extend the
firing notion to sequences of transitions, as well as notions of transition system, size,
reachability, and coverability to labeled Petri nets in the obvious way.
To prove the coverability problem is decidable for U-labeled Petri nets, we argue
that their transition systems (M[U ]S , µ0, ↪→) are well-structured in that the labeled mark-
ings can be equipped with an order that allows larger labeled markings to mimic the
behaviour of smaller ones, i.e. there is a wqo ⊆ M[U ]S ×M[U ]S that is compatible
with the transitions: for all µ1↪→µ′1 and µ1µ2 there is µ2 ↪→ µ′2 so that µ′1  µ′2.
To define a suitable wqo on labeled markings, we first compare the multisets on a
place. Intuitively, µ(p)  µ′(p) with µ, µ′ ∈ M[U ]S and p ∈ S if for every u in µ(p)
there is an element u′ in µ′(p) such that u  u′ in the wqo  of the provenance domain.
Hence, µ  µ′ if for each p ∈ S there is an injective function fp : µ(p) → µ′(p) so
that for each u ∈ µ(p), we have u  fp(u). The result is a wqo by Higman’s lemma
[57] and the fact that wqos are stable under Cartesian products. The ordering is also
compatible with the transitions by the monotonicity requirement on labelings. The
following theorem follows using standard results on well-structured transition systems
[1, 41].
Theorem 2. The coverability problem for U-labeled Petri nets is decidable and EXPSPACE-
hard for decidable provenance domains U .
The coverability problem for labeled Petri nets need not be in EXPSPACE, even
when the operations on U are provided by an oracle. For example, nested Petri nets
[85] can encode reset nets, for which a non-primitive recursive lower bound is known
for coverability [110].
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2.4.2 From Message Passing Programs to Labeled Petri Nets
Let P = (Prin, C, {Gp}p∈Prin) be a message passing program and U = (U,, ψ) a
provenance domain. We now give a labeled Petri net semantics to the program.
Define the labeled Petri net N(P,U) = 〈S, T, (I,O),Λ〉 as follows. There is a place
for each program location, for each local variable and message value, and each channel
and message value: S = V F ∪ (XF×M) ∪ (C×M).
In the definition of labels, we use variable prov(p) for the token (which is a prove-
nance) in place p ∈ S that is used for firing. The set T is the smallest set that satisfies
the following conditions.
1. For each e ≡ v y:=⊗(x),p−−−−−−→v′ in EF, and for each m,m′∈M, there is a transition t
with I(t)=Jv, (x,m), (y,m′)K and O(t)=Jv′, (x,m), (y,⊗m)K. Also, Λ(t, (x,m)) =
prov(x,m), Λ(t, (y,⊗m))=ψ(p,⊗)(prov(x,m)), and Λ(t, v′)=ε.
2. For each e ≡ v assume(x=m),p−−−−−−−−−→v′ in EF, there is a transition t with I(t)=Jv, (x,m)K
and O(t)=Jv′, (x,m)K. Also, Λ(t, v′) = ε, and Λ(t, (x,m)) = prov(x,m).
3. For each e ≡ v ch!x,p−−−−→v′ in EF, and for each m∈M, there is a transition t with
I(t)=Jv,(x,m)K,O(t)=Jv′,(x,m),(ch,m)K. Also, Λ(t, v′)=ε, Λ(t, (x,m))=prov(x,m),
and Λ(t, (ch,m))=ψ(p, !)(prov(x,m)).
4. For each e ≡ v ch?x,p−−−−→v′ inEF, for eachm,m′∈M, there is a transition twith I(t) =
Jv, (x,m), (ch,m′)K and O(t) = Jv′, (x,m′)K. Also, Λ(t, v′) = ε and Λ(t, (x,m′)) =
ψ(p, ?)(prov(ch,m′)).
To relate P with its Petri nets semantics N(P,U), we define a bijection ι between
configurations and labeled markings: ι(`, c, pi) = µ iff all of the three conditions hold:
(1) µ(v) = JεK iff there is p ∈ Prin with `(p) = v; (2) for all x ∈ XF, for all m ∈ M, and
for all u ∈ U , µ(x,m) = JuK iff pi(x) = (m,u); (3) for all ch ∈ C, for all m ∈ M, and
for all u ∈ U , µ(ch,m)(u) = k iff c(ch)(m,u) = k. Define the initial labeled marking
µ0 = ι(`0, c0, pi0). The following observation follows from the definition of ι.
Lemma 1. TS(P) and TS(N(P,U)) are isomorphic.
Complexity-wise, the problem inherits the hardness of coverability in (unlabeled)
Petri nets for any non-trivial provenance domain.
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Theorem 3. Given a message passing program P and a decidable provenance domain U =
(U,, ψ), the provenance verification problem is decidable. It is EXPSPACE-hard for any
provenance domain with at least two elements.
Proof. From the construction of the labeled Petri net, Lemma 1, the provenance veri-
fication problem is reducible in polynomial time to coverability for labeled Petri nets.
Thus, by Theorem 2, provenance verification problem is decidable.
For EXPSPACE-hardness, we reduce Petri net coverability to provenance verifica-
tion. To simulate a Petri net with a message passing program, we introduce a channel
for every place and then serialize the reading of tokens. Consider N = 〈S, T, (I,O)〉.
We construct a message passing program with one principal, one message, and a chan-
nel for each place in S. The control flow graph of the only principal has a central
node from which loops simulate the Petri net transitions. At each step, the central
node picks a transition t ∈ T non-deterministically and simulates first the consump-
tion and then the production of tokens — one by one. To consume a token from place
p with I(t)(p) = 1, the principal receives a message from channel p. For the produc-
tion, it sends a message to the channel p′ with O(t)(p′) = 1. Additionally, the principal
non-deterministically checks if the current configuration of channels covers the target
marking. If so, it writes a message into a special variable x. The provenance verifi-
cation problem asks whether x ever contains a message with non-trivial provenance.
EXPSPACE-hardness follows from Theorem 1.
2.5 EXPSPACE Upper Bounds
For set and language provenance domains, we can in fact show a matching upper
bound on the complexity. It relies on a fairly general product construction and reduc-
tion to Petri nets. We say that a provenance domain U is of finite index if the equivalence
induced by  has finitely many classes. We denote this equivalence by ≡. Clearly, any
finite provenance domain (thus, the set domain) is of finite index. The language do-
main is also of finite index: take the equivalence relation induced by the Myhill-Nerode
classes of the language. The following lemma characterizes the structural properties of
provenance domains of finite index.
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Lemma 2. Consider a Petri net N = 〈S, T, (I,O),Λ〉 that is labelled by U of finite index. (1)
The equivalence classes are closed under Λ: for any tuple e1, . . . , ek of≡-equivalence classes, the
image Λ(e1, . . . , ek) is fully contained in another equivalence class e. (2) The upward-closure
of any u ∈ U is a finite union of ≡-classes.
Let N = 〈S, T, (I,O),Λ〉 be a U-labeled Petri net, and suppose U is of finite in-
dex. We now define a product construction that reduces N to an ordinary Petri net
N ′ = 〈S′, T ′, (I ′, O′)〉. Intuitively, for each place p ∈ S and each equivalence class e,
there is a place (p, e) in S′ that keeps track of all tokens in N at place p and having their
label in the equivalence class e. We define S′ = S × {[u]≡ | u ∈ U}. Each transition
in N is simulated by a family of transitions in T ′, one for each combination of equiva-
lence classes for the source tokens. More precisely, T ′ is the smallest set that contains
the following family of transitions for each t ∈ T . Let p1, . . . , pk be the places in S with
I(t)(pi) = 1. For each sequence p = 〈e1, . . . , ek〉 of k-tuples of≡-equivalence classes, we
have a transition tp ∈ T ′ such that I ′(tp)((pi, ei)) = 1 for i = 1, . . . , k and I ′(tp)(p) = 0
for all other places. Moreover, for each p ∈ S with O(t)(p) = 1 labeled with Λ, we have
thatO′(tp)((p, e)) = 1 with Λ(e1, . . . , ek) ⊆ e. Note that this inclusion is well-defined by
Lemma 2(1). This product construction reduces a labelled coverability query in N to
several unlabelled queries in N ′. What are the unlabelled queries we need? Consider
a token u in a labelled marking µ ∈ M[U ]S . We use the equivalence classes that, with
Lemma 2(2), characterize the upward closure of u. In the following proposition, we as-
sume that these classes are effectively computable. This is the case for set and language
domains.
Proposition 1. If U is of finite index, coverability for U-labeled Petri nets is reducible to cov-
erability for Petri nets.
Proposition 1 provides a 2EXPSPACE upper bound for the set and language do-
mains, which is not optimal. Consider the set domain. Each subset of principals yields
an equivalence class of provenances. Hence, there is an exponential number of classes
and the above product net is exponential. A similar problem occurs for the language
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domain if the provenance specification is given by a non-deterministic finite automa-
ton. There are regular languages where this non-deterministic representation is expo-
nentially more succinct than any deterministic one. The deterministic one, however, is
needed in the product. To derive an optimal upper bound, we give compact represen-
tations of these exponentially many classes.
Theorem 4. Provenance verification problem is in EXPSPACE for set and language domains.
Proof. To establish membership in EXPSPACE, we implement the above reduction from
labeled to unlabeled coverability in a compact way, so that the size of the resulting Petri
net is polynomial in the size of the input. The challenge is to avoid the multiplication
between places and equivalence classes, which may be exponential. Instead, we first
encode the classes into polynomially many additional places, and maintain the rela-
tionship between a place and a class in the marking of the new net. Second, we only
keep the provenance information for tokens in the goal marking, and omit the prove-
nance of the remaining tokens.
Let E be the set of equivalence classes of a provenance domain of finite index. Let
κ = dlog |E|e. The symbolic representation of E uses 2κ places. Let the places be
b0, d0, . . . , bκ−1, dκ−1. We maintain the invariant that in any reachable marking, exactly
one of bi, di contains a single token, for i = 0, . . . , (κ − 1). Intuitively, a token in bi
specifies the bit i is one, and a token in di specifies the bit i is zero. Using constructions
on (1-safe) Petri nets, one can “copy” a bitvector, remove all tokens from a bitvector, or
update a bitvector to a value.
For example, to empty out a bitvector, we introduce κ+ 1 places p0, . . . , pκ, with an
initial token in p0. Each pi, i ∈ {0, . . . , κ − 1}, has two transitions: they take a token
from pi and from bi (resp. di), and put a token in pi+1. When pκ is marked, all the bits
have been cleared. Similarly, to copy the configuration from places b0, d0, . . . , bκ−1, dκ−1
to empty places b′0, d′0, . . . , b′κ−1, d′κ−1, we use the following gadget. We add additional
κ + 1 places p0, . . . , pκ, with an initial token on p0. For each pi, i ∈ {0, . . . , κ − 1} there
are two transitions: one takes a token from pi and one token from bi and puts a token
in pi+1, one in bi, and one in b′i; the other takes a token from pi and one from di and
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puts a token in pi+1, one in di, and one in d′i. When the place pκ is marked, the bits in
b0, d0, . . . , bκ−1, dκ−1 have been copied to b′0, d′0, . . . , b′κ−1, d′κ−1.
Now, in the translation of the Petri net, instead of a place (x,m, e) for each variable
x, message m, and equivalence class e ∈ E, we keep 2κ places for each place (x,m),
encoding the equivalence class e for x and m. If all 2κ places for (x,m) are empty in
a marking, it implies that the current content of x is not m; otherwise, the provenance
equivalence class e ∈ E of (x,m) is encoded by the 2κ bits. The transitions of the net
are updated with the gadgets to copy the provenance bitvectors in case of assignments.
Moreover, for each channel ch , we maintain the provenance information of one
message, and drop the provenance of every other message in the channel. That is, each
channel ch is modeled using places (ch,m) for each m ∈ M, and in addition, 2κ·|M|
places that encode the provenance equivalence class of one message for each value in
M stored in the channel. Intuitively, tokens in (ch,m) denote messages with value m
in the channel ch whose provenance has been “forgotten” and tokens in the bitvectors
encode one message (per message type) in the channel whose provenance is encoded
using 2κ places. We use non-determinism to guess which messages contribute to the
message with provenance in the target. When a message is sent to a channel, we non-
deterministically decide to keep its provenance (thus using the bitvectors, moving any
tokens already there) or to drop its provenance.
Similarly, when we receive from a channel, we non-deterministically decide to ei-
ther read from the “special” places for the encoding of an equivalence class, or from
the “normal” place.
Now, for the set domain, we use 2|Prin| places to encode sets of principals. For the
language domain, where the specification is given by a non-deterministic automaton
with states Q, we use 2|Q| places to encode the subsets of states. The encoding allows
us to perform the subset construction on the fly. Each action of the program requires
at most a polynomial number of additional places to encode the gadgets. Thus, we
get a Petri net that is polynomial in the size of the message passing program and the
specification. Thus, using Theorem 1, we get the EXPSPACE upper bound.
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2.6 Implementation and Experiments
We have implemented PROVKEEPER, a verifer for the provenance verification prob-
lem for language provenance domains. PROVKEEPER takes as input a message passing
program encoded in an extended Promela syntax in which channels are marked asyn-
chronous and have the semantics described in Section 2.3. It reduces the provenance
verification problem to Petri net coverability using the algorithm from Section 2.4. We
first used state-of-the-art tools for Petri net coverability [44, 93]. Unfortunately, the
times taken to verify the provenance properties were high. This is because Petri net
coverability tools are optimized for nets with many places that can be unbounded and
for high concurrency. Instead, message passing programs only have few places that
are unbounded (the channels). Our second observation is that message passing pro-
grams have a lot of scope for partial-order reduction, by allowing a process to continue
executing until it hits a blocking receive action. To take advantage of these features,
we implemented PROVKEEPER that combines expand-enlarge-check (EEC) [47] with
partial order reduction [51].
2.6.1 Expand-Enlarge-Check and Partial Order Reduction
The EEC procedure [47] performs counter abstraction over a Petri net. We observe that
only the places representing shared channels can have more than one token in our Petri
nets. Instead of counting the exact number of messages in a channel, we fix a parameter
k ≥ 0 and count precisely up to k. If at any point, the number of messages in a channel
exceeds k, we replace the number by∞. Once the count goes to∞, we do not decrease
the count even when messages are removed from the channel. For example, if k = 0,
the abstraction of a channel distinguishes two cases: either the channel has no messages
or it has an arbitrary number of messages.
The abstraction is sound, in that if a marking is coverable in the original net, it is
also covered in the abstraction. However, the abstraction can add spurious counterex-
amples, in that a marking can be considered coverable in the abstraction, even though it
is not coverable in the original net. By concretely simulating a specific counterexample
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path, we can decide if the counterexample is genuine or spurious. In case the coun-
terexample is spurious, we increase the parameter k and continue. This abstraction-
refinement process is guaranteed to terminate, by either finding a genuine path that
covers a given marking, or by proving that the target marking is not coverable for some
parameter k in the abstraction [47]. We have found that k = 1 is usually sufficient to
soundly abstract the state space and to prove a provenance property; this is consistent
with other uses of counter abstractions in verification [64, 101].
Additionally, we note that once the parameter k is fixed, the state space of the sys-
tem is finite, since each channel can have at most k + 2 messages ({0, . . . , k} ∪ {∞}).
Thus, for each k, we can perform reachability analysis using a finite-state reachability
engine. The implementation of PROVKEEPER uses the Spin model checker [59] to per-
form reachability analysis in every iteration where k is fixed. In Spin models, for each
channel, each message type, and each state of the provenance automaton, we have a
variable that takes k + 2 values, implementing the k-abstraction.
Additionally, message passing programs have the potential for partial order reduc-
tion. For example, each process in the program can be executed until it reaches a block-
ing receive action, and the local actions of different processes commute. Since Spin
already implements partial order reduction, we get the benefits of partial order reduc-
tion for free.
2.6.2 Case Studies: Message Passing Benchmarks
We first describe our evaluation on a set of three message passing systems (see Ta-
ble 2.1). The example MyHealth Portal is described in [8]. We checked if the provenance
of a variable is always in the regular language Patient (Secretary + ε) Nurse Doctor+ +
ε. The bug tracking system [63] manages software bug reports. It has five princi-
pals and eight types of messages (bug report, closed, fix-again, fix, must-fix, more-
information, pending, and verified). The provenance specification, given as an au-
tomaton with nine states, encodes the flow of events leading from a bug report to a
bug fix. We found that the original system violated the specification because a mes-
sage was sent to an incorrect channel. After fixing the bug, we were able to prove the
property for the new system. The Service Incident Exchange Standard (SIS) specifies a
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Example Principals Messages Channels Automaton
Health Care 4 4 5 6
Bug Tracking 5 8 5 9
SIS 16 9 18 2
TABLE 2.1: Message passing benchmarks. “Principals” is the number
of principals, “Messages” the possible values of messages, “Channels”
is the number of shared channels, and “Automaton” is the number of
states in the provenance automaton.
system to share service incident data and facilitate resolutions. The standard envisages
interactions between service requesters and providers. We took the system model from
[23], which consists of 16 principals, 18 channels, and 9 message types. The property
to check is once a service request is terminated, it is never reopened.
Results Table 2.2 lists the analysis results. All experiments were performed on a 2 core
Intel Xeon X5650 CPU machine with 64GB memory and 64bit Linux (Debian/Lenny).
We compare state-of-the-art Petri net coverability tools (Mist2 [44] and Petruchio [93])
with PROVKEEPER. We run Petruchio and three different options of Mist2 and report
the best times. A timeout indicates that all the tools timed out. The “Markings” row
indicates the number of coverability checks required to prove correctness. The time
denotes the sum of the times for all the coverability checks to finish, where for each
check, we take the best time by any tool.
For PROVKEEPER, we report the parameter k for which either a genuine counterex-
ample was found, or the system was proved correct. We compare the results with and
without partial order reduction. For each run, we give three numbers: the number of
states and transitions explored by our checker and the time taken. There is a significant
reduction when partial order reduction is turned on. Moreover, PROVKEEPER is orders
of magnitude faster than the Petri net coverability tools.
2.6.3 Private Mode and Firefox Extensions
We performed a larger case study on provenance in browser extensions. Modern
browsers provide a “private mode” that deletes cookies, forms, and browsing history
at the end of each browsing session. Browsers also provide an extension mechanism,
through which third-party developers can add functionality to browsers. Extensions
Chapter 2. PROVKEEPER: A Provenance Verifier for Message Passing Programs 29
PN tools Health Care Bug Tracking (1) Bug Tracking (2) SIS
Markings 12 1 40 127
Time 125.6s 2308.940s timeout 1152.07s
PROVKEEPER Health Care Bug Tracking (1) Bug Tracking (2) SIS
k 0 1 0 1
States (No POR) 6351 39 4905516 3738754
States (POR) 2490 39 995468 893786
Trans (No POR) 23357 39 24850365 17274836
Trans (POR) 4249 39 1707682 1736062
Time (No POR) 0.04s 0.01s 38.6s 58.7s
Time (POR) 0.01s 0.01s 3.37s 6.10s
TABLE 2.2: Results of the message passing benchmarks. Bug Tracking
(1) is the buggy version.
can communicate between their front- and back-ends by asynchronous messages pass-
ing, and between each other via temporary files. Moreover, Firefox lets extension devel-
opers manage SQLite databases in user machines by invoking a service called mozIS-
torageService. It provides a set of asynchronous APIs for extensions to communicate
with databases through SQL queries. If extension developers do not properly handle
the private mode, user data may be stored in the database while the user is browsing
in private mode.
It is expected that browser extensions should respect the private mode. Unfortu-
nately, browsers do not restrict an extension’s capability in private mode, and it is the
responsibility of developers not to record user data in private mode. In the second set
of case studies, we check if extension developers for Firefox obey the privacy concerns
when the user is browsing in private mode.
Our goal is to check if extensions using mozIStorageService can store user data while
in private mode. We formulate the problem of tracking information flow in private
mode as a provenance verification problem. Consider a set of browser extensions
cooperating with each other, and a principal Db modelling a database. For each ex-
tension A, we introduce two principals NormA and PrivA that represent two instances
of A running in the normal and in the private mode, respectively. For each exten-
sion A that saves data to the database, there are two channels chDb, ch′Db for NormA
and PrivA to interact with Db. Moreover, for each pair of extensions (A,B) where A
sends data to B, for instance, by writing and reading files, there are four combinations:
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(NormA,NormB), (PrivA,NormB), (NormA,PrivB), and (PrivA,PrivB). For each case, we
introduce a channel ch to model the message flow from A to B. The property we check
is whether some PrivA directly or indirectly updates the database. Note that it is not
sufficient to ensure every write to the database is guarded by a check that the browser
is not in private mode. There can be indirect flows where data is stored in a temporary
file in private mode, or communicated to a different extension, and later stored in the
database.
We use Firefox 13.0.1 in our experiments. We selected nine popular extensions from
Firefox’s extension repository, by filtering them based on the keywords form, history,
and shopping, and then filtering based on their use of mozIStorageService. The extensions
we chose have about 50000 users on average.
The workflow of the verification is as follows. We first use JSure [38], a Javascript
parser and static analyzer, to obtain the control flow from the extension source code,
and to produce a message passing program in Promela syntax. As the access to a
database is either via calling the mozIStorageService APIs directly or via helper exten-
sions, we capture along the control flow the information about when an extension calls
these APIs to update the database, and the information about when extensions commu-
nicate with each other by writing and reading temporary files. Our front end abstracts
away complex data structures in the program. In particular, we do not track the con-
tents inserted into the database. This may lead to false positives in the analysis. We
then run PROVKEEPER to verify the message passing program.
Table 2.3 lists the results. Five out of the nine examples are found to store user
information even in private mode. All examples can be verified efficiently (in a few
milliseconds) because usually a small portion of code is related to database accesses
and extension communications, and complex data structures are abstracted out. For all
unsafe cases, we have successfully replayed executions that violate the private mode
in Firefox.
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2.7 Related Work
Provenance annotation on data has been studied extensively in the database commu-
nity [18, 33, 54], both for annotating query results and for tracking information through
workflows. Provenance information is usually tracked for a fixed database and a fixed
query in a declarative query language. Seen as a program, the query has exactly one
“execution path.” The connection between provenance tracking and dependency anal-
ysis in (sequential) programs was made in [26]. A provenance-tracking semantics for
asynchronous pi-calculus was given in [115], but the static analysis problem was not
considered. Most previous work focused on dynamic tracking and enforcement along
one execution path, and the static meet-over-all-paths solution was not considered. In
contrast, we provide algorithms to track provenances in concurrent message passing
programs, and give algorithms to check provenance queries over all execution paths of
programs. We were inspired by the algebraic framework of provenance semirings [54]
to give a similar algebraic description of provenance domains.
Our algorithm for provenance verification generalizes algorithms for explicit in-
formation flow studied in the context of sequential programs [107], e.g., through taint
analysis. Taint analysis problems [60, 84] classify methods as sources, sinks, and sanitiz-
ers, and require that any data flow from sources to sinks must go through one or more
sanitizers. In our model, this property can be formulated by requiring that the prove-
nance of every message received by a sink must conform to the regular specification
(source+ sanitizer+)∗. We are able to verify such properties for message passing pro-
grams, where the source, sanitizer, and sink can be concurrently executing processes
sharing unbounded channels, and with other intermediary processes as well. Previ-
ous work, too numerous to enumerate here, either dealt with dynamic enforcement
or provided imprecise static checks for these domains. We show precise static analysis
remains decidable!
2.8 Extensions
We have described a general algebraic model of provenance in concurrent message
passing systems and an algorithm for statically verifying provenance properties. For
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these expressive programs, only dynamic checks or imprecise static checks had been
studied so far. While the complexity may seem high, reachability analysis in message
passing programs is already EXPSPACE-complete, so provenance verification does not
incur an extra cost.
Our decidability results continue to hold under some extensions to the program-
ming model. For example, our decidability results also hold when programs can test
the provenance of a message against an upward closed set in a conditional, or in the
presence of a spawn instruction that dynamically generates a new thread of execution.
Informally, to decide provenance verification in the presence of provenance-tests, we
extend the product construction to track the membership in each upward closed set ap-
pearing syntactically in some conditional. To handle spawn, we modify the reduction
to Petri nets to keep a place for each spawned instance (that is, each tuple of control
location and valuation to local variables).
On the other hand, many other extensions are easily seen to be undecidable. For
example, if each principal executes a recursive program, or if messages come from an
unbounded domain such as the natural numbers, or if channels preserve the order of
messages, the provenance verification problem becomes undecidable by simple reduc-
tions from known undecidable problems [95].
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Name LOC Leak Usage Leak Details Time
Amazon Price
History and
More 4.1.4
8124 Yes
Provide comparative
pricing for searched
products. Inform pric-
ing drops for searched
products.
Records shopping
history while in
private mode.
57ms
Facebook Chat
History Man-
ager 1.5
2798 Yes
Help users organize
conversations by time
and names of persons.
Records the person
to whom users
talk, the conversa-
tion content, and
the time in private
mode.
60ms
FVD Speed
Dial with On-
line Sync 4.0.3
21278 Yes
Provide a dashboard
holding favorite web-
sites of users. Cross-
platform bookmark
synchronization.
Keeps counting
how often users
look at the web-
sites on heir Speed
Dial in private
mode and lists
them.
57ms
Privad 1.0 17593 Yes
Uses differential pri-
vacy to prevent ad tar-
geting.
Records user
browsing history
while in private
mode.
60ms
Shopping As-
sist 3.2.4.6
15263 Yes
Provide comparative
pricing for searched
products.
Records shopping
history while in
private mode.
57ms
Form History
Control 1.2.10.3
16560 No
Autosave text on forms,
search bar history, for
crash recovery.
63ms
History
Deleter 2.4
3027 No
Utilities to delete his-
tory automatically by
user defined rules.
90ms
Lazarus: Form
Recovery 2.3 10839 No
Autosave text on
forms, search bar
history, for crash
recovery.
64ms
Session Man-
ager 0.7.9 14010 No
Autosave sessions by
time for crash recov-
ery.
104ms
TABLE 2.3: Experimental results for Firefox extensions.

Chapter 3
KUAI: A Model Checker for
Software-defined Networks
3.1 Introduction
Software-defined networking (SDN) is a novel networking architecture in which a cen-
tralized software controller dynamically updates the packet processing policies in net-
work switches based on observing the flow of packets in the network [40, 62]. SDNs
have been used to implement sophisticated packet processing policies in networks, and
there is increasing industrial adoption [62, 91].
We consider the problem of verifying that an SDN satisfies a network-wide safety
property. Since the controller code in an SDN can dynamically change how packets
flow in the network, a bug in the controller code can lead to hard-to-analyze network
errors at run time. We describe the design of , a distributed enumerative model checker
for SDNs. The input to is a model of an SDN consisting of two parts. The first part is the
controller, written in a simplified guarded-command language similar to Murphi. The
second part is the description of a network, consisting of a fixed finite set of switches, a
fixed set of client nodes, and the topology of the network (i.e., the connections between
the ports of the clients and the switches). Given a safety property of the network,
explores the state space of the SDN to check if the property holds on all executions.
Figure 3.1 shows a simple SDN. It consists of two switches sw1 and sw2 connected
to two clients c1 and c2. Each client has a port and each switch has two ports to send
and receive packets, and the figure shows how the ports are connected to each other.
Each connection between ports represents a bi-directional communication channel that
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FIGURE 3.1: SSH Example
1 def pktIn(pkt)
2 (sw,pt) = pkt.loc
3 if pkt.prot = SSH:
4 drop(pkt)
5 else:
6 dest = 2 if pt = 1 else 1
7 fwd(pkt, [|dest|], sw)
8 rule r1 = (5,{prot=SSH},[||])
9 rule r2 = (1,{port=1},[|2|])
10 rule r3 = (1,{port=2},[|1|])
11 message cm1 = add(r1)
12 message cm2 = add(r2)
13 message cm3 = add(r3)
14 for sw in [sw1, sw2]:
15 send_message(cm1, sw)
16 send_message(cm2, sw)
17 send_message(cm3, sw)
LISTING 3.1: Controller for SSH
may reorder packets. Moreover, the switches are connected to a controller through
dedicated links. Packets are routed in the network using flow tables in switches. A
flow table is a collection of prioritized forwarding rules. A rule consists of a priority, a
pattern on packet headers, and a list of ports. A switch processes an incoming packet
based on its flow table. It looks at the highest priority rule whose pattern matches
the packet and forwards the packet to the list of ports specified in the rule, and drops
the packet if the list of ports in the rule is empty. In case no rule matches a packet,
the switch forwards the packet to the controller using a request queue and waits for a
reply from the controller on a forward queue. The controller replies with a list of ports
to which the packet should be forwarded, and optionally sends control messages to the
control queue of one or more switches to update their flow tables. A control message
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can add or delete a rule in a switch.
By specifying the rules to be added or deleted, a controller can dynamically control
the behaviors of all switches in an SDN network. For example, suppose we want to
implement the policy that all SSH packets are dropped. The controller can update
the switches with a rule that states that no SSH packets are forwarded, and another
that states all non-SSH packets are forwarded. List 3.1 shows a possible controller that
implements this policy. Essentially, the controller drops SSH packets, and adds three
rules on the switches: r1 to drop SSH packets, r2 to forward packets from port 1 to port
2, and r3 to forward packets from port 2 to port 1. Since dropping SSH packets (rule r1)
has higher priority, it will match SSH packets, and rules r2 and r3 will only match (and
forward) non-SSH packets. The controller has a subtle bug. It turns out that a switch
can implement rules in arbitrary order. Thus, the switches may end up adding rules r2
and r3 before adding r1, thus violating the policy. Our model checker KUAI confirms
the bug A possible fix in this case is to implement a barrier after line 15, to ensure that
rule r1 is added before the other rules. Our model checker confirms the policy holds in
the fixed version.
The verification of SDNs is challenging due to several reasons. First, even when
the topology is fixed with a finite set of clients and switches, the state space is still
unbounded, as clients may generate unboundedly many packets and these packets
could be simultaneously progressing through the network. For example, client c1 may
send a packet to sw1 at any point, and an unbounded number of packets can be in the
network before sw1 processes them. Similarly, there may be an unbounded number
of control messages (i.e., messages sent from the controller to a switch) between the
controller and the switches. While there may be a physical limit on the number of
packets and control messages imposed by packet buffers in the switches, the sizes of
these buffers can be large (of the order of megabytes) and precise modeling of buffers
will blow up the state space.
Second, the packets may be processed in arbitrary interleaved orders, and the pro-
cessing of one packet may influence the processing of subsequent ones because the
controller may update flow tables based on the first packet. Similarly, control messages
between the controller and the switches may be processed in arbitrary order and this
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may lead to potential bugs, including the bug pointed to above.
KUAI handles these challenges in the following way. First, instead of modeling
unbounded multisets for packet queues, we implement a counter abstraction where we
track, for each possible packet, whether zero or arbitrarily many instances of the packet
are waiting in a multiset. This abstraction enables us to apply finite-state model check-
ing approaches.
Second, we implement a set of partial-order reduction techniques that are specific to
the SDN domain. For example, we note that while in principle a switch only processes
one packet at a time, we do not lose behaviors by processing all packets at the packet
queue of a switch atomically. Similarly, using the semantics of the barrier message [91],
we show that a switch can atomically execute all control messages up to the last barrier
in its control queue. Specifically, this optimization enables the model checker to bound
the size of control queues. Additionally, we show that whenever there is a packet in a
client’s packet queue, the client can receive and process it immediately, so that sends
from switches can be atomically processed with receives at clients. Finally, we show
that we can eagerly serve requests to the controller, that is, we do not lose behaviors if
we restrict the controller’s request queue to size one and service these requests as soon
as they appear.
We empirically demonstrate that our set of partial order reduction techniques sig-
nificantly reduces the state spaces of SDN benchmarks, often by many orders of mag-
nitude. For the simple SSH example, the number of explored states is approximately 2
million without partial order reductions, but only 13 with reductions!
To handle large state spaces, our model checker KUAI distributes the model check-
ing over a number of nodes in a cluster, using the PReach distributed model checker
[10] (based on Murphi [37]) as its back end. The large-scale distribution enables KUAI
to model check large state spaces quickly.
3.2 Software-defined Networks
Preliminaries. A multiset m over a set Σ is a function Σ → N with finite support (i.e.,
m(σ) 6= 0 for finitely many σ ∈ Σ). By M[Σ] we denote the set of all multisets over
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Σ. We shall write m = Jσ21, σ3K for the multiset m ∈ M[{σ1,σ2,σ3}] with m(σ1) =
2,m(σ2) = 0, and m(σ3) = 1. We write ∅ for an empty multiset, mapping each σ ∈ Σ to
0. We write {} for an empty set. Two multisets are ordered by m1 ≤ m2 if for all σ ∈ Σ,
we have m1(σ) ≤ m2(σ). Let m1 ⊕m2 (resp. m1 	m2) be the multiset that maps every
element σ ∈ Σ to m1(σ) +m2(σ) (resp. max{0,m1(σ)−m2(σ)}).
Given a set of states, a (guarded) action α is a pair (g, c) where g is a guard that
evaluates the states to a boolean and c is a command. A action α is enabled in a state
s if the guard of α evaluates s to true. If α is enabled in s, the command of α can
execute and lead to a new state s′, denoted by s α−→ s′. We write α(s) = s′ if s α−→ s′.
A transition system TS is a tuple (S,A,→, s0,AP , L) where S is a set of states, A is a
set of actions, →⊆ S × A × S is a transition relation, s0 ∈ S is the initial state, AP is
a set of atomic propositions, and L : S → 2AP is a labeling function. We write→∗ for
the reflexive transitive closure of→. A state s′ is reachable from s if s →∗ s′. We write
s →+ s′ if there is a state t such that s → t →∗ s′. For a state s, let A(s) be the set
of actions enabled in s; we assume A(s) 6= ∅ for each s ∈ S. The trace of an infinite
execution ρ = s α1−→ s1 α2−→ . . . is defined as trace(ρ) = L(s)L(s1) . . .. The trace of a
finite execution ρ = s α1−→ s1 α2−→ . . . αn−−→ sn is defined as trace(ρ) = L(s)L(s1) . . . L(sn).
An execution is initial if it starts in s0. Let Traces(TS ) be the set of traces of initial
executions in TS . We define invariants and invariant satisfaction in the usual way.
Syntax of Software-defined Networks We model an SDN as a network consisting of
nodes, connections, and a controller program. Nodes come from a finite set Clients of
clients and a (disjoint) finite set Switches of switches. Each node n has a finite set of ports
Port(n) ⊆ N which are connected to ports of other nodes. A location (n, pt) is a pair of
a node and a port pt ∈ Port(n). Let Loc be the set of locations. A connection is a pair
of locations. A network is well-formed if there is a bijective function λ : Loc → Loc,
called the topology function, such that {((n, pt), λ(n, pt)) | (n, pt) ∈ Loc} is the set of
connections and no two clients are connected directly.
We model a packet pkt in the network as a tuple (a1, . . . , ak, loc), where (a1, . . . , ak) ∈
{0, 1}k models an abstraction of the packet data and loc ∈ Loc indicates the location of
pkt . Let Packet be the set of all packets.
Each switch contains a set of rules that determine how packets are forwarded. A
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rule is a tuple (priority , pattern, ports), where priority ∈ N determines the priority of
the rule, pattern is a proposition over Packet , and ports is a multiset of ports. We
write Rule to denote the set of all rules. Intuitively, a packet matches a rule if it satis-
fies pattern . A switch forwards a packet along ports for the highest priority rule that
matches.
Rules are added or deleted on a switch by the controller through a set of control
messages CM = {add(r), del(r) | r ∈ Rule}. Additionally, the controller uses a barrier
message b to synchronize.
type client {
Port : set of nat
pq : multiset of packets
}
rule "send(c, pkt)"
true ==> send(c, pkt)
end
rule "recv(c,pkt,pkts)"
exist(pkt:c.pq, true) ==> recv(c,pkt,pkts)
end
LISTING 3.2: Client
A client c ∈ Clients is modeled as in List 3.2. It consists of a finite set Port of
ports and a packet queue pq ∈ M[Packet ] containing a multiset of packets which have
arrived at the client. We use (guarded) actions to model behaviors of clients. An action
is written as “rule name guard =⇒ command end.” Predicate exist(i : X,ϕ) asserts
that there is an element i in the set (or multiset) X such that the predicate ϕ holds.
Additionally, if exist(i : X,ϕ) holds, then the variable i is bound to an element of X
that satisfies ϕ and can be used later in the command part. In each step, a client c can
(1) send a non-deterministically chosen packet pkt along some ports (rule send), or (2)
receive a packet pkt from its packet queue and (optionally) send a multiset of packets
pkts on some ports (rule recv).
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type switch {
Port : set of nat
ft : set of rules
pq : multiset of packets
cq : list of barriers and
multisets of control messages
fq : set of forward messages
wait : boolean
}
rule "match(sw,pkt,r)"
!sw.wait & noBarrier(sw) &
exist(pkt:sw.pq,
exist(r:sw.ft, bestmatch(sw,r,pkt))) ==>
match(sw,pkt,r)
end
rule "nomatch(sw,pkt)"
!sw.wait & noBarrier(sw) & !RqFull(controller) &
exist(pkt:sw.pq,
!exist(r:sw.ft,bestmatch(sw,r,pkt))) ==>
nomatch(sw,pkt)
end
rule "add(sw,r)"
!sw.wait & noBarrier(sw) &
exist(add(r):sw.cq[0],true) ==>
add(sw,r)
end
rule "delete(sw,r)"
!sw.wait & noBarrier(sw) &
exist(del(r):sw.cq[0],true) ==>
delete(sw,r)
end
rule "fwd(sw,pkt,pts)"
sw.wait & noBarrier(sw) &
exist((pkt,pts):fq, true) ==>
fwd(sw,pkt,pts)
end
rule "barrier(sw)"
!noBarrier(sw) ==>
barrier(sw)
end
LISTING 3.3: Switch
A switch sw is modeled as in List 3.3. It consists of a set of ports, a flow table ft ⊆
Rule , a packet queue pq containing packets arriving from neighboring nodes, a control
queue cq containing control messages or barriers from the controller, a forward queue fq
consisting of at most one pair (pkt , ports) through which the controller tells the switch
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to forward packet pkt along the ports ports , and a boolean variable wait . Predicate
noBarrier(sw) asserts sw .cq does not contain a barrier. Predicate bestmatch(sw , r, pkt)
asserts that r is the highest priority rule whose pattern matches the packet pkt in switch
sw’s flow table.
Intuitively, a switch has a normal mode and a waiting mode determined by the wait
variable. When the switch is in the normal mode, as long as there is no barrier in its
control queue, it can either attempt to forward a packet from its packet queue based
on its flow table, or update its flow table according to a control message in its control
queue. When the switch cannot find a matching rule in its flow table for a packet, it can
initiate a request to the controller, change to the waiting mode, and wait for a forward
message from the controller telling it how to forward the packet. Once it receives a
forward message (pkt , pts) and there is no barrier in the control queue, it forwards the
pending packet pkt to the ports in pts , and changes back to the normal mode. If the
control queue contains one or more barriers, the switch dequeues all control messages
up to the first barrier from its control queue and updates its flow table.
type controller {
CS : set of control states
cs0 : CS cs : CS
rq : set of packets κ : N+
pktIn : function
}
rule "ctrl(pkt,cs)"
exist(pkt:controller.rq, true) ==>
ctrl(pkt,controller.cs)
end
LISTING 3.4: Controller
A controller controller is modeled as in List 3.4. It is a tuple (CS , cs0, cs, rq, κ, pktIn)
where CS is a finite set of control states, cs0 ∈ CS is the initial control state, cs is the
current control state, rq is a finite request queue of size κ ≥ 1 consisting of packets for-
warded to the controller from switches, and pktIn is a function that takes a packet
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pkt and a control state cs1, and returns a tuple (η, (pkt , pts), cs2) where η is a function
from Switches to (M[CM ] ∪ {b})∗, (pkt , pts) is a forward message, and cs2 is a control
state. Intuitively, in each step, the controller removes a packet pkt from rq and exe-
cutes pktIn(pkt , controller .cs). Based on the result (η, (pkt , pts), cs ′), it sends back to
the source of the packet the forward message (pkt , pts) that specifies pkt should be for-
warded along pts , and goes to a new control state cs ′. Further, for each switch sw in
the network it appends η(sw) to sw ’s control queue.
Semantics of Software-defined Networks The semantics of an SDN is given as a tran-
sition system. LetN = (Clients,Switches, λ,Packet ,Rule, controller) be an SDN, where
each component is as defined above.
A state s of the SDN N is a quadruple (pi, δ, cs, rq), where pi is a function map-
ping each client c ∈ Clients to its packet queue pq and δ is a function mapping each
switch sw ∈ Switches to a tuple (pq , cq , fq , ft ,wait) consisting of its packet queue, con-
trol queue, forward queue, flow table, and the wait variable.
For a non-empty list l = [x1, x2, . . . , xn], define l.hd=x1, l.tl=[x2, . . . , xn], and l[i] as
the i-th element in l. Given two lists l1 and l2, let l1@l2 be the concatenation of l1 and
l2. For two non-empty lists l1 = [x1, . . . , xm] and l2 = [y1, . . . , yn] in (M[CM ] ∪ {b})∗,
define l1 + l2 be the list [x1, . . . , xm−1, xm ⊕ y1, y2, . . . , yn] if xm 6= b and y1 6= b; l1@l2
otherwise.
Given a flow table ft and a list l ∈ (M[CM ]∪ b)∗, let update(ft , l) be a procedure that
updates ft based on l as follows. It dequeues the head of l and sets l to l.tl . If the head
is a barrier b, then ignore it. If the head is a multiset m, it nondeterministically chooses
a fetching order p and based on p, removes a control message cm with m(cm) > 0 from
m. If cm is add(r), then add the rule r to ft , or if cm is del(r), then delete r from ft . It
keeps updating ft based on p until m becomes empty. It repeats the above instructions
on l until l becomes empty. Then it returns the resulting flow table ft .
For a function f : X → Y , x ∈ X , and y ∈ Y , let f [x 7→ y] denote the function that
maps x to y and all x′ 6= x to f(x′). Let f [x1 7→ y1;x2 7→ y2; . . . ;xn 7→ yn] denote the
function f [x1 7→ y1][x2 7→ y2] . . . [xn 7→ yn]. Given a subset X ′ = {x1, . . . , xn} ⊆ X , let
f [foreach xi ∈ X ′ : xi 7→ yi] be the function f [x1 7→ y1] . . . [xn 7→ yn] where 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Given a tuple t = (f1, . . . , fn), let t.fi be the field fi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. By abuse of
44 Chapter 3. KUAI: A Model Checker for Software-defined Networks
notation, we write t[fi 7→ v] to be the tuple such that t[fi 7→ v].fi = v and for any j 6= i,
t[fi 7→ v].fj = t.fj .
We define the following basic operations over δ and pi:
1. Add or delete packets in switches or in clients. Given a set X ⊆ Switches ×
PacketN, define addPkt(δ,X) = δ[ foreach (sw , pktk) ∈ X, sw 7→ δ(sw)[pq 7→
δ(sw).pq
⊕ JpktkK]]. Given a set Y ⊆ Clients × PacketN, define addPkt(pi, Y ) =
pi[ foreach (c, pktk) ∈ Y, c 7→ pi(c) ⊕ JpktkK]. We define delPkt(δ,X) and
delPkt(pi, Y ) analogously by replacing ⊕with 	 above.
2. Set the wait bit of a switch sw to true or false. Define setWait(δ, sw) = δ[sw 7→
δ(sw)[wait 7→ true]] and unsetWait(δ, sw) = δ[sw 7→ δ(sw)[wait 7→ false]].
3. Add or delete a rule r in the flow table of a switch sw. Define addRule(δ, sw, r) =
δ[cq 7→ [δ(sw).cq .hd 	 Jadd(r)K]; sw 7→ δ(sw)[ft 7→ δ(sw).ft ∪ {r}]]. De-
fine delRule(δ, sw, r) = δ[cq 7→ [δ(sw).cq .hd 	 Jdel(r)K]; sw 7→ δ(sw)[ft 7→
δ(sw).ft\{r}]].
4. Add or delete a forward message msg in a switch sw . Define
addFwdMsg(δ, sw ,msg) = δ[sw 7→ δ(sw)[fq 7→ δ(sw).fq ∪ {msg}]] and
delFwdMsg(δ, sw ,msg) = δ[sw 7→ δ(sw)[fq 7→ δ(sw).fq\{msg}]].
5. Flush and run all control messages up to the first barrier in a switch. Define
flush(δ, sw) = δ[sw 7→ δ(sw)[cq 7→ l; ft 7→ update(δ(sw).ft , [m, b])]] where l = [∅], if
δ(sw).cq = [m, b]; l = l′, if δ(sw).cq = [m, b]@l′ and l′ is not an empty list.
6. Flush and run all control messages up to the last barrier in a switch. Define
flushall(δ, sw) = δ[sw 7→ δ(sw)[cq 7→ l1; ft 7→update(δ(sw).ft , l2)]] where l1 = [∅]
and l2 = δ(sw).cq if the last element of δ(sw).cq is a barrier. Otherwise, let
δ(sw).cq = l@[m]. Then l1=[m] and l2= l.
7. Add control messages and barriers to the control queues of the switches. Given
a total function f : Switches → (M[CM ] ∪ {b})∗, define addCtrlCmd(δ, f) =
δ[ foreach sw ∈ Switches : sw 7→ δ(sw)[cq 7→ δ(sw).cq + f(sw)]].
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For a switch sw , a packet pkt , and a multiset of ports pts , let FwdToC (sw , pkt , pts)
be a set {(c, pkt ′k) | ∃pt ∈ sw .Port . pts(pt) = k ∧ λ(sw , pt) = (c, pt ′) ∧ c ∈ Clients ∧
pkt ′ = pkt [loc 7→ (c, pt ′)]} and FwdToSw(sw , pkt , pts) be a set {(sw ′, pkt ′k) | ∃pt ∈
sw .Port . pts(pt) = k ∧ λ(sw , pt) = (sw ′, pt ′) ∧ sw ′ ∈ Switches ∧ pkt ′ = pkt [loc 7→
(sw ′, pt ′)]}. Intuitively, when sw is about to forward pkt on its ports pts , these two
sets summarize how many packets should be forwarded to its connected clients and
switches.
For an SDN N , let Send = {send(c, pkt) | c ∈ Clients ∧ pkt ∈ Packet} be the set of
send actions. We define analogously the set of receive actions Recv , the set of match actions
Match , the set of no-match actions NoMatch , the set of add actions Add , the set of delete
actions Del , the set of forward actions Forward , the set of barrier actions Barrier , and the
set of control actions Ctrl .
Let pi0 = λc ∈ Clients.∅ and δ0 = λsw ∈ Switches.(∅, [∅], {}, {}, false). The semantics
of an SDN N is given by a transition system TS (N ) = (S,A,→, s0,AP , L). Here, S is
the set of states, s0 = (pi0, δ0, cs0, {}) is the initial state, and A = Send ∪Recv ∪Match ∪
NoMatch ∪ Add ∪ Del ∪ Forward ∪ Barrier ∪ Ctrl . The transition relation s α−→ s′ is
defined as follows.
1. α = send(c, pkt). (pi, δ, cs, rq) α−→ (pi, δ′, cs, rq) where δ′ = addPkt(δ, {(sw , pkt)})
and sw = pkt .loc.n.
2. α = recv(c, pkt , pkts). (pi, δ, cs, rq) α−→ (pi′, δ′, cs, rq) where pi′ =
delPkt(pi, {(c, pkt)}), δ′ = addPkt(δ,X) and X = {(sw , pkt ′k) | pkts(pkt ′) =
k ∧ pkt ′.loc.n = sw}.
3. α = match(sw , pkt , r). (pi, δ, cs, rq) α−→ (pi′, δ′, cs, rq)
where pi′ = addPkt(pi,FwdToC (sw , pkt , r.ports)) and δ′ =
addPkt(δ,FwdToSw(sw , pkt , r.ports)).
4. α = nomatch(sw , pkt). (pi, δ, cs, rq) α−→ (pi, δ′, cs, rq ′) where rq ′ = rq ∪ {pkt}, δ′′=
delPkt(δ, {(sw , pkt)}), and δ′ = setWait(δ′′, sw).
5. α = add(sw , r). (pi, δ, cs, rq) α−→ (pi, δ′, cs, rq) where δ′ = addRule(δ, sw , r).
6. α = del(sw , r). (pi, δ, cs, rq) α−→ (pi, δ′, cs, rq) where δ′ = delRule(δ, sw , r).
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7. α = fwd(sw , pkt , pts). (pi, δ, cs, rq) α−→ (pi′, δ′, cs, rq) where pi′ =
addPkt(pi,FwdToC (sw , pkt , pts)), δ1 = delFwdMsg(δ, sw , (pkt , pts)), δ2 =
addPkt(δ1,FwdToSw(sw , pkt , pts)), and δ′ = unsetWait(δ2, sw).
8. α = barrier(sw). (pi, δ, cs, rq) α−→ (pi, δ′, cs, rq) where δ′ = flush(δ, sw).
9. α = ctrl(pkt , cs). Let pktIn(pkt , cs) = (η,msg, cs ′) and sw = pkt .loc.n.
(pi, δ, cs, rq)
α−→ (pi, δ′, cs ′, rq ′) where rq ′ = rq\{pkt}, δ′′ = addFwdMsg(δ, sw ,msg),
and δ′ = addCtrlCmd(δ′′, η).
An atomic proposition p ∈ AP is an assertion over packet fields or over control states.
Define an SDN specification as a safety property φ where φ is a formula over AP
and  is the “globally” operator of linear-temporal logic. The model checking problem
for an SDN asks, given an SDN N and an SDN specification φ, if TS (N ) satisfies
φ. For example, blocking SSH packets can be specified as 
∧
pkt∈Packet(pkt .loc.n ∈
Clients ∧ pkt .src ∈ Clients ∧ pkt .loc.n 6= pkt .src ⇒ pkt .prot 6= SSH).
3.3 Optimizations
We now describe partial-order reduction and abstraction techniques that reduce the
state space. These techniques use the structure of SDNs and, as we demonstrate empir-
ically, are crucial in making the model checking scale to non-trivial examples. We state
the correctness theorems; the proofs are in Section 3.5.
Partial Order Reduction Let TS = (S,A,→, s0,AP , L) be an action-deterministic tran-
sition system, i.e., s α−→ s′ and s α−→ s′′ implies s′ = s′′. Given two actions α, β ∈ A
with α 6= β, α and β are independent if for any s ∈ S with α, β ∈ A(s), β ∈ A(α(s)),
α ∈ A(β(s))), and α(β(s)) = β(α(s)). The actions α and β are dependent if α and β are
not independent. An action α ∈ A is a stutter action if for each transition s α−→ s′ in TS ,
we have L(s) = L(s′).
For i ∈ {1, 2}, let TS i = (Si,Ai,→i, si0,AP , Li) be transition systems. Infi-
nite executions ρ1 of TS 1 and ρ2 of TS 2 are stutter-equivalent, denoted ρ1 , ρ2,
if there is an infinite sequence A0A1A2 . . . with Ai ⊆ AP , and natural numbers
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n0, n1, n2, . . . ,m0,m1,m2, . . . ≥ 1 such that
trace(ρ1) = A0 . . . A0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n0 times
A1 . . . A1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n1 times
A2 . . . A2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n2 times
. . .
trace(ρ2) = A0 . . . A0︸ ︷︷ ︸
m0 times
A1 . . . A1︸ ︷︷ ︸
m1 times
A2 . . . A2︸ ︷︷ ︸
m2 times
. . .
TS 1 and TS 2 are stutter equivalent, denoted TS 1 , TS 2 , if TS 1 E TS 2 and TS 2 E TS 1,
whereE is defined by: TS 1ETS 2 iff for all ρ1 ∈ Traces(TS 1). ∃ρ2 ∈ Traces(TS 2). ρ1 ,
ρ2.
3.3.1 Barrier Optimization
Intuitively, barrier optimization uses the observation that for any state, we can al-
ways flush out control queues of switches until there are no barriers in them. This
implies that after a control action is executed, one can immediately update flow tables
of switches whose control queue has barriers added by the controller. Hence a con-
trol action and successive barrier actions can be merged. We prove its correctness by
viewing it as an instance of partial order reduction.
For an SDN N , note that TS (N ) is not action-deterministic due to barrier actions.
With different fetching orders, barrier(sw) may lead to multiple states. Define b(s, sw)
as the number of transitions of the form s
barrier(sw)−−−−−−−→ s′. Note that a barrier action from
any s leads to at most 2|Rule| states. Hence for each transition s
barrier(sw)−−−−−−−→ si where
1 ≤ i ≤ b(s, sw), we can append the action with the index i, i.e., s barrier(sw)i−−−−−−−→ si. In the
following, we redefine the set Barrier = {barrier(sw)i | sw ∈ Switches∧1 ≤ i ≤ 2|Rule|},
and assume that TS (N ) is action-deterministic by renaming barrier actions.
A switch sw has a barrier iff there is a barrier in sw ’s control queue. A state
s has a barrier, denoted hasb(s), iff some switch sw ∈ Switches has a barrier in s.
Define the ample set for every state s in TS (N ) as follows: if s has a barrier, then
ample(s) = {barrier(sw)i | 1 ≤ i ≤ b(s, sw) ∧ sw has a barrier in s}, that is, all bar-
rier actions enabled in s. If s does not have a barrier, then ample(s) = A(s).
Given TS (N ), we now define a transition system T̂S = (Sˆ,A,⇒, s0,AP , L) where
Sˆ = S is the set of states, and the transition relation ⇒ is defined as: if s α−→ s′ and
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α ∈ ample(s), then s α=⇒ s′.
Theorem 5. Let TS (N ) be an action-deterministic transition system. TS (N ) , T̂S .
Intuitively, Theorem 5 holds because any barrier action is independent of other
actions and is a stutter action. Hence for an infinite execution s α1−→ s1 . . . αn−−→
sn
barrier(sw)−−−−−−−→ t in TS (N ) where s has a barrier and αi is not a barrier action for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n, we can permute barrier(sw) forward until s and obtain a stutter-equivalent
execution in T̂S .
Since Theorem 5 holds, we can merge a control action and successive barrier ac-
tions into a single transition s
ctrl(pkt ,cs)−−−−−−−→2 s′ where we define the new semantics
of ctrl(pkt , cs) under the transition relation →2. Formally, Let (η, (pkt , pts), cs ′) =
pktIn(pkt , cs) and sw = pkt .loc.n.
Ctrl. (pi, δ, cs, rq)
ctrl(pkt ,cs)−−−−−−−→2 (pi, δ′, cs ′, rq ′) where rq ′ = rq\{pkt}. Define δ′′ =
addFwdMsg(δ, sw , (pkt , pts)), and δ′′′= addCtrlCmd(δ′′, η). Let {sw1, . . . , swn} be
the set of all switches whose control queue has barriers in δ′′′. Let δ0 = δ′′′ and
δi = flushall(δi−1, sw i) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Define δ′ = δn.
Given T̂S = (Sˆ,A,⇒, s0,AP , L), define a transition system TS 2 = (S2,A2,→2
, s0,AP2, L2) where S2 ⊆ Sˆ is a set of states reachable by →2, A2 is A\Barrier ,
AP2 = AP , L2 = L, and→2 is defined inductively as
s0
α
=⇒ s′
s0
α−→2 s′
s0 →+2 s α=⇒ s′ ∧ α 6∈ Ctrl
s
α−→2 s′
s0 →+2 s α=⇒ t⇒∗ s′ ∧ α ∈ Ctrl ∧ ¬hasb(s′)
s
α−→2 s′
Since we only remove barrier actions which are stutter actions, we have TS 2 ,
T̂S , TS (N ). Hence we have the following theorem:
Theorem 6. Given an SDNN and a safety propertyφ, TS (N ) satisfiesφ iff TS 2 satisfies
φ.
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3.3.2 Client Optimization
Given transition system TS 2 = (S2,A2,→2, s0,AP2, L2), we further reduce the state
space by observing that any receive action of a client is a stutter action and is in-
dependent of other actions. Formally, we define ample(s) for each state s ∈ S2
as follows: if there is a client in s such that its packet queue is not empty, then
ample(s) = {recv(c, pkt , pkts) | pkt is in c.pq at s}, that is, all receive actions enabled in
s. Otherwise, ample(s) = A(s). We now define a transition system TS 3 = (S3,A3,→3
, s0,AP3, L3) where S3 = S2, A3 = A2, AP3 = AP2, L3 = L2, and where the transition
relation→3 is defined as: if s α−→2 s′ and α ∈ ample(s), then s α−→3 s′.
Theorem 7. (1) TS 2 , TS 3. (2) Given a safety property φ, TS 2 satisfies φ iff TS 3
satisfies φ.
3.3.3 (0,∞) Abstraction
The (0,∞) abstraction bounds the size of packet queues and the multiset in each control
queue. The idea is as follows. One can regard a multiset as a counter that counts the
number of elements in it exactly. Instead, (0,∞) abstraction abstracts a multiset so that
for each element e, it either does not contain e (i.e. 0) or contains unboundedly many
copies of e (i.e. ∞). Then the size of an abstracted multiset is bounded. Note that for
any state s in TS 3, any switch’s control queue contains exactly one multiset. Hence,
the abstraction bounds the length of control queues.
Let N∞ = N ∪ {∞} be the extension of the natural numbers with infinity. We nat-
urally extend the addition operation by assuming that ∞ +∞ = ∞ and ∞ + c = ∞
for all c ∈ Z. Given a multiset m ∈ M[D] for some finite set D, define an extended
multiset over(m) such that for each element d ∈ D, over(m)(d) = 0 if m(d) = 0, and
over(m)(d) = ∞ otherwise. Define M[D]∞ as the set of all extended multisets and
multisets over D. Given a control queue cq with length n, let over(cq) be such that
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, over(cq)[i] = over(cq [i]) if cq [i] 6= b; over(cq)[i] = b otherwise. For
m1,m2 ∈ M[D]∞, we write m1 ≤e m2 iff for all d ∈ D, m1(d) ≤ m2(d) or m2(d) = ∞.
Given two control queues cq , cq ′ of same length n, define cq ≤e cq ′ iff for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
(cq [i] = b↔ cq ′[i] = b) ∧ (cq [i] 6= b→ cq [i] ≤e cq ′[i]).
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Given an SDN and the transition system TS 3 = (S3,A3,→3, s0,AP3, L3), Define
a transition system TS 4 = (S4,A4,→4, s0,AP4, L4) where S4 = {over(s) | s ∈ S3},
A4 = A3, AP4 = AP3, and L4 = L3. The definition of →4 is given in detail in Sec-
tion 3.5.3. We provide the intuition of →4 here: →4 is defined so that (1) whenever a
packet pkt is added k ≥ 1 times into a packet queue pq , we set pq to over(pq ⊕ JpktkK),
and (2) whenever η(sw) is added into switch sw ’s control queue cq , we set cq to
over(cq + η(sw)). The following lemma claims that TS 4 simulates TS 3, which leads
to Theorem 8.
Lemma 3. For any infinite initial execution s0
β1−→3 s1 β2−→3 s2 . . . in TS 3, there is an infinite
initial execution t0
β1−→4 t1 β2−→4 t2 . . . in TS 4 such that for all i ≥ 0, si = (pii, δi, csi, rq i) and
ti = (pi
′
i, δ
′
i, cs
′
i, rq
′
i) satisfy the following condition: for all c ∈ Clients , pii(c) ≤e pi′i(c) and for
all sw ∈ Switches , δi(sw).pq ≤e δ′i(sw).pq , δi(sw).cq ≤e δ′i(sw).cq , δi(sw).fq = δ′i(sw).fq ,
δi(sw).ft = δ
′
i(sw).ft , and δi(sw).wait = δ
′
i(sw).wait , and csi = cs
′
i, and rq i = rq
′
i.
Theorem 8. Given a safety property φ, if TS 4 satisfies φ then TS 3 satisfies φ.
3.3.4 All Packets in One Shot Abstraction
So far, a switch processes a single packet at a time. We can further reduce the reachable
state space by forcing a switch to process all packets matched by some rule at a time.
The intermediate states produced by successive match actions in a switch are removed.
Let TS 4 = (S4,A4,→4, s0,AP4, L4). Define a transition system TS 5 = (S5,A5,→5
, s0,AP5, L5) where S5 = S4, AP5 = AP4, L5 = L4, A5 is the union of the new “multi-
ple” match actions and A4 excluding the old “single" match actions, and→5 is defined
as:
s
α−→4 s′ ∧ α is not a match action
s
α−→5 s′
and if pkt_lst = [pkt1, . . . , pktn] and r_lst = [r1, . . . , rn]
s
match(sw ,pkt1,r1)−−−−−−−−−−−→4 s1 . . . sn−1 match(sw ,pktn,rn)−−−−−−−−−−−→4 s′
s
match(sw ,pkt_lst ,r_lst)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→5 s′
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We prove TS 5 simulates TS 4. We define a relation R ⊆ S4 × S5 such that
((pi, δ, cs, rq), (pi′, δ′, cs ′, rq ′)) ∈ R iff for all pkt ∈ Packet , for all c ∈ Clients , pi(c)(pkt) =
∞→ pi′(c)(pkt) =∞ and for all sw ∈ Switches , δ(sw).pq(pkt) =∞→ δ′(sw).pq(pkt) =
∞, δ(sw).cq = δ′(sw).cq , δ(sw).fq = δ′(sw).fq , δ(sw).ft = δ′(sw).ft , and δ(sw).wait =
δ′(sw).wait , and cs = cs ′, and rq = rq ′.
Theorem 9. (1)The relation R is a simulation relation. (2)For a safety property φ, if TS 5
satisfies φ, then TS 4 satisfies φ.
3.3.5 Controller Optimization
We consider a restricted class of SDNs in which the size κ of the controller’s request
queue is one. Under this restriction, we can define a new transition system TS 6 that
is stutter equivalent to TS 5 and has fewer reachable states. The idea is to observe that
a no-match action is a stutter action and is independent of any actions before a corre-
sponding control action is executed. Formally, given TS 5 = (S5,A5,→5, s0,AP5, L5),
we define a new transition relation→6 inductively:
s0
α−→5 s′
s0
α−→6 s′
s0 →+6 s1
nomatch(sw ,pkt)−−−−−−−−−−→5 s2 ctrl(pkt ,cs)−−−−−−−→5 s′
s1
nomatch_ctrl(sw ,pkt ,cs)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→6 s′
s0 →+6 s1 α−→5 s′ ∧ α is not a no-match action
s1
α−→6 s′
where a new action nomatch_ctrl(sw , pkt , cs) merges nomatch(sw , pkt) and ctrl(pkt , cs)
actions. We define a transition system TS 6 = (S6,A6,→6, s0,AP6, L6), where S6 =
S5 is the set of states, A6 is the union of all nomatch_ctrl(sw , pkt , cs) actions and
A5\(NoMatch ∪ Ctrl), AP6 = AP5, and L6 = L5.
Theorem 10. Given an SDNN where the size of the request queue of the controller is one, and
a safety property φ. (1) TS 5 , TS 6. (2) TS 5 satisfies φ iff TS 6 satisfies φ.
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3.4 Implementation and Evaluation
KUAI1 is implemented on top of PReach [10], a distributed enumerative model checker
built on Murphi. We model switches, clients, and the controller as concurrent Murphi
processes which communicate using message passing, with the queues modeled as
multisets. We manually abstract IP packets using predicates used in the controller. We
implement (0,∞)-counter abstraction as a library on top of Murphi multisets.
KUAI takes as input topology information such as the number of switches, clients,
and their connections, (manually) abstracted packets, and the controller code written as
a Murphi process, and invariants written in Murphi syntax. We found it fairly straight-
forward to port POX [102] controllers due to the imperative features of Murphi. Mur-
phi allows arbitrary first order logic formulas as invariants and it is easy to specify
safety properties. KUAI compiles them into a single Murphi file and the model check-
ing effort is then distributed across several machines using PReach. Finally the output
of the tool is an error trace if the program invariant fails, or success otherwise.
We have evaluated KUAI on a number of real world OpenFlow benchmarks. The
experiments were performed on a cluster of 5 Dell R910 rack servers each with 4 Intel
Xeon X7550 2GHz processors, 64 x 16GB Quad Rank RDIMMs memory and 174GB
storage. Our experiments had access to a total of 150 cores and had access to 4TB of
RAM.
Table 3.1 shows a summary of experimental results and compares against model
checking without the optimizations from Section 3.3. Empty rows indicate model
checking did not terminate in 1 hour or ran out of memory. Figure 3.2 shows the scal-
ability of model checking with increasing distribution on the three largest examples.
We noticed that the performance of the distributed model checker plateaued around 70
Erlang processes on these and other large examples. Thus, times (in table 3.1) are pro-
vided for configurations that use 70 Erlang processes. As we introduced abstractions,
it is possible that we get false positives. We verified the existence of all bugs reported
by KUAI manually and there were no false positives.
Besides the table, we plot the MAC learning example in Figure 3.3, which shows
1The tool is can be downloaded at https://github.com/t-saideep/kuai
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Program Bytes/ w/o optimizations w/ optimizations
state States Time States Time
SSH 2×2 304 2,283,527 23.52s 13 6.40s
ML 3×3 320 9,109,456 89.99s 5308 6.39s
ML 6×3 748 23,926,202 604.07s
ML 9×2 1276 18,615,767 793.84s
FW(S) 1×2 332 2,110,986 26.89s 3645 5.45s
FW(M) 2×4 448 45,507 8.03s
FW(M) 3×4 560 512,439 55.06s
FW(M) 4×4 676 5,360,871 475.54s
RS 4×4 764 4998 6.60s
RS 4×5 764 590,570 82.82s
RS 4×6 764 5,112,013 327.39s
SIM 5×6 632 167 6.23s
SIM 5×8 632 167 6.34s
SIM 5×12 1108 167 6.85s
TABLE 3.1: Experimental results. Omitted entries indicate that model checking
did not terminate. The number X×Y in the Program column means that there
are X switches and Y clients in the example.
how significantly our optimization techniques reduce the state space. Though we still
suffer from the state-space explosion problem, our optimizations delay it and enable
us to verify SDNs with much larger configurations.
We now describe the benchmarks in detail.
SSH We run KUAI on the SSH controller from Listing 3.1. It finds the control mes-
sage reordering bug in 0.1 seconds. By adding a barrier after line 15, KUAI proves the
correctness in 6.4 seconds by exploring 13 states. In contrast, the unoptimized version
explores over 2 million states.
MAC Learning Controller (ML) This is based on the POX [102] implementation of
the standard ethernet discovery protocol. We checked there are no forwarding loops
(similar to [114]), i.e., a packet should not reach a switch more than once. Packets
are augmented with a bit for each switch which gets set when the switch processes
that packet. The invariant is specified using these visit-bits (called reached):  ∀sw ∈
Switches. ∀pkt ∈ sw .pq. (¬pkt .reached(sw)).
A cycle in the topology will lead to forwarding loops as the controller does not
compute the minimum spanning tree. We discover the bug in a cyclic topology of 3
switches 3 clients in 0.47 seconds. We re-ran the example on a topology containing the
minimum spanning tree of the original cyclic topology and the tool is able to prove
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FIGURE 3.2: Verification time vs processes ◦ML 9×2∆ML 6×3  FW(M) 4×4
that there were no forwarding loops in 6.39 seconds. We scale the example by adding
more switches. We notice that while the verification on topology with 9 switches and 2
clients has fewer states than the one with 6 switches and 3 clients, each state in the latter
case is bigger than the former and hence the memory and communication overheads
are higher.
Single Switch Firewall (FW(S)) This is based on an advanced GENI assignment [48] on
building an OpenFlow based firewall. The controller takes as input a simple configura-
tion file which is a list of tuples of the form (client1, port1, client2, port2). This specifies
that packets originating from client1 on port1 can be forwarded to client2 on port2. We
abbreviate the tuples as (client1: port1 → client2: port2). Any flow not explicitly al-
lowed is forbidden. The flows are uni-directional and the above flow will reject traffic
initiated by client2 on port2 towards client1 on port1. However, once client1 initiates
a flow, the firewall should allow client2 to reply back, making the flow bi-directional
until client1 closes the connection.
The naive implementation of the controller is as follows: on receiving a packet
(c1: p1 → c2: p2), check if there is a tuple matching the flow in the policy. If
it does, add rules (c1: p1 → c2: p2) and (c2: p2 → c1: p1) and forward the
packet to c2. Otherwise add a rule to drop packets of the form (c1: p1 →
c2: p2). The invariant to verify here is to ensure the policy of the firewall, i.e.,
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FIGURE 3.3: State space of MAC learning controller.
∆: optimized, ◦: unoptimized
a packet from c1: p1 should be forwarded to c2: p2 if and only if (c1: p2 →
c2: p2) exists in the firewall policy or if (c2: p2 → c1: p1) exists in the policy
and c2 has already initiated the corresponding flow. The following formula speci-
fies that allowed packets should not be dropped: ∀p ∈ Packet . on_dropped(p) ⇒
¬flows[p.src][packet.src_port][packet.dest][p.dest_port], where on_dropped(p) is set if a
packet-drop transition is fired on packet p (and reset at the beginning of every transi-
tion). flows is an auxiliary variable in the controller which keeps track of allowed flows
based on the firewall policy and initiating client.
We ran the experiment on a topology with 2 clients and a firewall. We found an
interesting bug in our implementation which is caused by not assigning proper prior-
ities to rules. For example, when (c1: p1 → c2: p2) is present in the policy but not
(c2: p2 → c1: p1), the rule to drop flows should have a lower priority than the rules
to allow flows. Otherwise, the following bug would occur. If c2 initiates the flow
(c2: p2 → c1: p1) then the controller adds a rule to drop packets matching that flow.
Later on, if c1 initiates (c1: p1 → c2: p2) and the controller adds the corresponding
rules to allow the flow on both directions, the switch now has two conflicting rules of
the same priority. One to allow and the other to drop (c2: p2 → c1: p1). The switch
may non-deterministically choose to drop the packet. Once we fixed the bug, the tool
could prove the invariant in 5.45 seconds.
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Multiple Switch Firewalls (FW(M)) We extend the above example to include multiple
replicated firewalls for load balancing. We now allow the clients to send packets to all
of these firewalls. We augment the implementation of the single switch controller to
add the same rules on all firewalls. However, this implementation no longer ensures
the invariant in the multi-switch setting.
Consider the case with two firewalls, f1 and f2. The tool reports the following bug:
c1 initiates (c1: p1 → c2: p2) on firewall f1. The controller adds the corresponding
rules to allow flows in both directions to f1 and f2 but only sends a barrier to f1. Now
f2 delays the installation of (c2: p2 → c1: p1) and c2 replies back to c1 through f2
which forwards the packet to the controller. The controller then drops the packet.
The fix here is to add the rules along with barriers on all switches and not just the
switch from which the packet originates. With this fix the tool is able to prove the
property in 8 seconds. In order to test the scalability, we tested the tool on increasing
number of firewalls in the topology.
Resonance (RS) Resonance [97] is a system for ensuring security in large networks
using OpenFlow switches. When a new client enters the network, it is assigned regis-
tration state and is only allowed to communicate with a web portal. The portal either
authenticates a client by sending a signal to the controller (and the controller assigns
the client an authenticated state), or sets the client to quarantined state. In the authen-
ticated state, the client is only allowed to communicate with a scanner. The scanner
ensures that the client is not infected and sends a signal to the controller and lets the
controller assign it an operational state. If an infection is detected, it is assigned a quar-
antined state. The clients in operational state are periodically scanned and moved to the
quarantined state if they are infected. Quarantined clients cannot communicate with
other clients.
In our model, the web portal non-deterministically chooses to authenticate or quar-
antine a client and the scanner non-deterministically marks a client operational or quar-
antined. We check the invariant that packets from quarantined clients should not be
forwarded: ∀p ∈ Packet . on_forward(p) ⇒ (state(p.src) 6= Quarantined). Similar to
on_drop, on_forward is set when packet-forward transition is fired and reset before the
beginning of every transition. The controller follows the Resonance algorithm [97].
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We ran the experiment on a topology of two clients, one portal, one scanner and
four switches. The topology is the same as in Figure 2 of [97] without DHCP and
DNS clients. KUAI proves the invariant in 6.6 seconds. We scale up the example by
increasing the number of clients.
Simple (SIM) Simple [105] is a policy enforcement layer built on top of OpenFlow to
ensure efficient middlebox traffic steering. In many network settings, traffic is routed
through several middleboxes, such as firewalls, loggers, proxies, etc., before reaching
the final destination. Simple takes a middlebox policy as input and translates this to
forwarding rules to ensure the policy holds. The invariant ensures that all source pack-
ets to a client will be received and forwarded by the middleboxes specified in a given
policy before the packet reaches its destination.
We ran the experiment on a topology of two clients, two firewalls, one IDS, one
proxy and five switches (see Figure 1 of [105]). KUAI can prove the invariant in 6.48
seconds.
We scale up the example by fixing the destination client and increasing the number
of source clients that can send packets to it. Because of our “all packets in one shot”
optimization (section 3.3.4), no matter how many packets get queued initially, they
are all forwarded in lock-step as the controller forwarding rule applies to all incoming
packets.
3.5 Proof Details
3.5.1 Proofs for Barrier Optimization
To ease the proof of Theorem 5, we first provide several lemmas. Lemmas 4 and 5
provide two properties of a barrier action.
Lemma 4. Let TS (N ) = (S,A,→, s0,AP , L) be an action-deterministic transition system.
For each 1 ≤ i ≤ 2|Rule|, for all sw ∈ Switches , barrier(sw)i is independent of A\Barrier .
Proof. It is straightforward to check the correctness of this lemma by using the defini-
tion of independence between actions.
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Lemma 5. Let TS (N ) = (S,A,→, s0,AP , L) be an action-deterministic transition system
and an SDN specification φ. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ 2|Rule| and sw ∈ Switches , barrier(sw)i is a
stutter action w.r.t. φ.
Proof. φ is a proposition over packets that have been forwarded by some switch at
least once, or over control states. Since barrier(sw)i does not change packets or control
states, barrier(sw)i is a stutter action.
Lemma 6 shows the definition of ample set in TS (N ) satisfies three conditions.
Lemma 6. ample(s) satisfies the following conditions.
1. ∅ 6= ample(s) ⊆ A(s).
2. Let s β1−→ s1 β2−→ . . . βn−→ sn α−→ t be a finite execution in TS (N ). If α ∈ A\ample(s)
depends on ample(s), βi ∈ ample(s) for some 0 < i ≤ n.
3. If ample(s) 6= A(s) then any α ∈ ample(s) is a stutter action.
Proof. Conditions (1) and (3) are straightforward to verify.
Let us prove condition (2) by contradiction. Suppose (2) does not hold. Then there
is a finite execution ρ = s
β1−→ s1 β2−→ . . . βn−→ sn α−→ t in TS (N ) such that for any
1 ≤ i ≤ n, βi 6∈ ample(s) and α depends on ample(s).
If ample(s) = A(s), then β1 ∈ ample(s), which leads to a contradiction. Otherwise
ample(s) = {barrier(sw)i | 1 ≤ i ≤ b(s, sw) ∧ sw has a barrier in s}. Since α depends
on ample(s), by Lemma 4, α can only be a barrier action. Since for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
βi 6∈ ample(s), βi is not a barrier action. Hence α ∈ A(s). By the definition of ample(s),
α ∈ ample(s), which leads to a contradiction. Therefore condition (2) holds.
Lemma 6 implies the following three lemmas from 7 to 9.
Lemma 7. Let s be a state in TS (N ). If α ∈ ample(s), then α is independent of
A(s)\ample(s).
Proof. Suppose not. Then there is an action β ∈ A(s)\ample(s) such that α and β are
dependent. Since β ∈ A(s), then s β−→ s1 is a finite execution in TS (N ). However it
violates the condition (2) in Lemma 6.
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Lemmas 8 and 9 explain two ways to obtain a stutter equivalent execution.
Lemma 8. Let ρ be a finite execution in TS (N ) of the form s β1−→ s1 β2−→ . . . βn−→ sn α−→ t
where βi 6∈ ample(s), for 0 < i ≤ n, and α ∈ ample(s). There exists a finite execution ρ′ of
the form s α=⇒ t0 β1−→ . . . βn−1−−−→ tn−1 βn−→ t and ρ , ρ′.
Proof. We prove it by induction on i ≥ 1.
Base case (i = 1): Then ρ = s
β1−→ s1 α−→ t. Since β1 6∈ ample(s) and α ∈ ample(s)
by Lemma 7, we have β1 and α are independent. Hence we can permute them and get
ρ′ = s α−→ t1 β1−→ t. Since α ∈ ample(s), we have ρ′ = s α=⇒ t1 β1−→ t. Moreover, since α is a
barrier action and it is a stutter action, we have ρ , ρ′.
Induction step (i = n): Let ρ = s
β1−→ s1 β2−→ . . . βn−→ sn βn+1−−−→ sn+1 α−→ t. Since
βn+1 6∈ ample(s) and α ∈ ample(s), by Lemma 7, βn+1 and α are independent. Hence
we have ρˆ = s
β1−→ s1 β2−→ . . . βn−→ sn α−→ tn βn+1−−−→ t. Since α is a stutter action, ρ ,
ρˆ. Let ρˆ(n) = s
β1−→ s1 β2−→ s2 . . . βn−→ sn α−→ tn. By induction hypothesis, there is a
ρ′(n) = s α=⇒ t0 β1−→ t1 . . . βn−1−−−→ tn−1 βn−→ tn such that ρˆ(n) , ρ′(n). Then we have
ρ′ = s α=⇒ t0 β1−→ t1 . . . βn−1−−−→ tn−1 βn−→ tn βn+1−−−→ t and ρ′ , ρˆ , ρ.
Lemma 9. Let ρ = s β1−→ s1 β2−→ . . . be an infinite execution in TS (N ) where βi 6∈ ample(s),
for i > 0. There exists an execution ρ′ of the form s α=⇒ t0 β1−→ t1 β2−→ . . . where α ∈ ample(s)
and ρ , ρ′.
Proof. Since for all i > 0, βi 6∈ ample(s) and α ∈ ample(s), by Lemma 7, βi and α are
independent. Hence we have ρ′ = s α=⇒ t0 β1−→ t1 β2−→ . . . where for each i > 0, α(si) = ti.
Since α is a stutter action, for each i > 0, L(si) = L(ti) and L(s) = L(t0). Hence
ρ , ρ′.
The transition system T̂S has the following property in Lemma 10.
Lemma 10. For any infinite execution ρ in T̂S , there are infinitely many state s in ρ such that
ample(s) = A(s).
Proof. Suppose not. Without loss of generality, assume that from the k-th state sk on,
all the states after sk in ρ are such that ample(s) 6= A(s). Then we have for all i > k, the
action taken from si is a barrier action. However, sk has finitely many barriers, which
implies that ρ cannot be infinite. Contradiction.
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Finally, we prove our main theorem for the barrier optimization:
Theorem 11. Let TS (N ) be an action-deterministic transition system. TS (N ) , T̂S .
Proof. By the definition of⇒, we know that every execution in T̂S is also an execution
in TS (N ), and hence T̂S E TS (N ).
We now prove that TS (N ) E T̂S , that is, for any initial infinite execution ρ in
TS (N ), there is an initial infinite execution ρ′ in T̂S such that ρ , ρ′. The idea is the
following. Let ρ be an infinite initial execution in TS (N ) that is not in T̂S . Let l be
the minimal index in ρ such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ l, the transition si−1 µi−→ si is also a
transition si−1
µi
=⇒ si in T̂S , that is,
ρ = s0
µ1
=⇒ . . . µl=⇒ s β1−→ s1 β2−→ s2 . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
ρ0
Let ρ0 be an execution in TS (N ) which starts in state s and is induced by the action
sequence β1β2β3 . . . where β1 6∈ ample(s). The execution ρ0 is successively replaced
with stutter-equivalent executions ρm, m = 1, 2, 3, ..., by means of the transforma-
tions indicated in Lemmas 8 and 9. Each of these executions ρm starts in state s and
is based on an action sequence of the form α1 . . . αmβ1γ1γ2γ3 . . . The action sequence
α1 . . . αm contains the actions of the ample sets, which are newly inserted according
to Lemma 9, and all actions βn, which were shifted forward according to Lemma 8.
γ1γ2γ3 . . . denotes the remaining subsequence of β1, β2, β3, . . .. Thus, ρm is of the form
s
α1=⇒ t1 α2=⇒ . . . αm==⇒ tm β1−→ tm0
γ1−→ tm1
γ2−→ tm2
γ3−→ . . . where α1, . . . αm are stutter actions.
By Lemma 10, β1 ∈ ample(tm) for some m ≥ 1. Then s α1=⇒ t1 α2=⇒ . . . αm==⇒ tm β1=⇒ tm0
becomes an execution in T̂S . By repeating this reasoning to the rest of the execu-
tion tm0
γ1−→ tm1
γ2−→ tm2
γ3−→ . . ., we obtain an execution ρ′0 in T̂S (as the “limit” of
ρm, ρm+1, . . .), where the induced action sequence contains all actions that occur in ρ0
(in TS ).
Let us assume that ρ has the form s0
ξ1−→ s1 ξ2−→ . . . and let 0 = k0 < k1 < k2 < . . .
such that ξk1 , ξk2 , . . . results from ξ1, ξ2, . . . by omitting all stutter actions in ξ1, ξ2, . . ..
Then, trace(ρ) has the formA+0 A
+
1 A
+
2 . . ., whereAi is the label L(sk) of all states sk with
ki ≤ k < ki+1. Since each of the nonstutter actions ξki is eventually processed, when
generating the executions ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, . . ., for each index ki there is some finite sequence
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wi of the form A+0 A
+
1 . . . A
+
i and some index li such that the traces of the executions
ρj for all j ≥ li start with wi. In particular, wi is a proper prefix of wi+1 and wi are
prefixes of the trace associated with the limit execution ρ′. Hence, trace(ρ′) has the
form A+0 A
+
1 A
+
2 . . ., and ρ , ρ′.
Theorem 12. Given an SDNN and a safety propertyφ, TS (N ) satisfiesφ iff TS 2 satisfies
φ.
Proof. If TS (N ) does not satisfy φ, then there is an execution s0 α1−→ . . . αn−−→ sn in
TS (N ) such that L(sn) does not satisfy φ. Since TS (N ) E TS 2, there is an execution
s0
β1−→2 . . . βm−−→2 tm in TS 2 such that L(tm) = L(sn). Hence L(tm) does not satisfy φ
either. Hence TS 2 does not satisfy φ.
We can prove the other direction analogously.
3.5.2 Proofs for Client Optimization
The proofs for client optimization mimic the ones in the barrier optimization above.
We first show that a receive action is independent of any other actions in Lemma 11
and is a stutter action in Lemma 12.
Lemma 11. Let TS 2 = (S2,A2,→2, s0,AP2, L2) be an action-deterministic transition sys-
tem. Any receive action recv(c, pkt , pkts) is independent of A2\{recv(c, pkt , pkts)}.
Proof. It is straightforward to check the correctness of this lemma by using the defini-
tion of independence between actions.
Lemma 12. Let TS 2 = (S2,A2,→2, s0,AP2, L2) be an action-deterministic transition sys-
tem and an SDN specificationφ. Any receive action recv(c, pkt , pkts) is a stutter action w.r.t.
φ.
Proof. φ is a proposition over packets that have been forwarded by some switch at least
once or over control states. Since any packet sent to the network by a receive action
has not been forwarded yet, and a receive action does not change control states, any
receive action is a stutter action.
Lemma 13 shows the definition of ample set in TS 2 satisfies three conditions.
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Lemma 13. ample(s) satisfies the following conditions.
1. ∅ 6= ample(s) ⊆ A(s).
2. Let s β1−→2 s1 β2−→2 . . . βn−→2 sn α−→2 t be a finite execution in TS 2. If α ∈ A\ample(s)
depends on ample(s), βi ∈ ample(s) for some 0 < i ≤ n.
3. If ample(s) 6= A(s) then any α ∈ ample(s) is a stutter action.
Proof. Conditions (1) and (3) are straightforward to verify.
Let us prove condition (2) by contradiction. Suppose (2) does not hold. Then there
is a finite execution ρ = s
β1−→2 s1 β2−→2 . . . βn−→2 sn α−→2 t in TS 2 such that for any
1 ≤ i ≤ n, βi 6∈ ample(s) and α depends on ample(s).
If ample(s) = A(s), then β1 ∈ ample(s), which leads to a contradiction. Otherwise
ample(s) contains only receive actions. By Lemma 11, α is a receive action. Since for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n, βi is not a receive action, α ∈ A(s). Hence α ∈ ample(s), which leads to a
contradiction. Therefore condition (2) holds.
The transition system TS 3 has the following property in Lemma 14.
Lemma 14. For any infinite execution ρ in TS 3, there are infinitely many state s in ρ such
that ample(s) = A(s).
Proof. Suppose not. Without loss of generality, assume that from the k-th state sk on,
all the states after sk in ρ are such that ample(s) 6= A(s). Then we have for all i > k,
the action taken from si is a receive action. However, there are finitely many packets in
packet queues of clients in sk, which implies that ρ cannot be infinite. Contradiction.
Finally, we prove our main theorem for the client optimization:
Theorem 13. (1) TS 2 , TS 3. (2) Given a safety property φ, TS 2 satisfies φ iff TS 3
satisfies φ.
Proof. Since Lemmas 13 and 14 hold, we can mimic the proof for Theorem 11 and prove
claim (1). By claim (1), claim (2) holds immediately.
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3.5.3 Proofs for (0,∞) Abstraction
Semantics
Given a flow table ft and a list l in (M[CM ]∞ ∪ b)∗, let updatee(ft , l) be a procedure that
updates ft based on l as follows. It dequeues the head of l and sets l to l.tl . If the head is
a barrier, then ignore it. If it is an extended multiset m, it nondeterministically chooses
a fetching order p and based on p, removes a control message cm with m(cm) = ∞
from m and set m(cm) = 0. If cm is add(r), then add the rule r to ft , or if cm is del(r),
then delete r from ft . It keeps updating ft based on p until m becomes empty. It repeats
the above instructions on l until l becomes empty. Then it returns the resulting flow
table ft .
We define the following operations for over-approximation:
1. Add packets in switches or clients. Given a set X ⊆ Switches × PacketN,
define addPkte(δ,X) = δ[ foreach (sw , pktk) ∈ X, sw 7→ δ(sw)[pq 7→
over(δ(sw).pq ⊕ JpktkK)]]. Given a set Y ⊆ Clients × PacketN, define
addPkte(pi, Y ) = pi[ foreach (c, pktk) ∈ Y, c 7→ over(pi(c)⊕ JpktkK)].
2. Flush and run all control messages up to the last barrier in a switch. Define
flushalle(δ, sw) = δ[sw 7→ δ(sw)[cq 7→ l1; ft 7→ updatee(δ(sw).ft , l2)]] where l1 = [∅]
and l2 = δ(sw).cq if the last element in δ(sw).cq is a barrier. Otherwise, let
δ(sw).cq = l@[m]. Then l1 = [m] and l2 = l.
3. Add control messages and barriers to the control queues of the switches. Given
a total function f : Switches → RE , define addCtrlCmde(δ, f) = δ[ foreach sw ∈
Switches : sw 7→ δ(sw)[cq 7→ over(δ(sw).cq + f(sw))]].
For an SDN and the transition system TS 3 = (S3,A3,→3, s0,AP3, L3), define a
transition system TS 4 = (S4,A4,→4, s0,AP4, L4) where S4 = {over(s) | s ∈ S3}, A4 =
A3, AP4 = AP3, L4 = L3, and for t, t′ ∈ S4, t α−→4 t′ is defined as
1. α = send(c, pkt). (pi, δ, cs, rq) α−→4 (pi, δ′, cs, rq) where δ′ = addPkte(δ, {sw , pkt})
and sw = pkt .loc.n.
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2. α = recv(c, pkt , pkts). (pi, δ, cs, rq) α−→4 (pi′, δ′, cs, rq) where pi′ =
delPkt(pi, {c, pkt}), δ′ = addPkte(δ,X) and X = {(sw , pkt ′k) | pkts(pkt ′) =
k ∧ pkt ′.loc.n = sw}.
3. α = match(sw , pkt , r). (pi, δ, cs, rq) α−→4 (pi′, δ′, cs, rq)
where pi′ = addPkte(pi,FwdToC (sw , pkt , r.ports)) and δ′ =
addPkte(δ,FwdToSw(sw , pkt , r.ports)).
4. α = nomatch(sw , pkt). (pi, δ, cs, rq) α−→4 (pi, δ′, cs, rq ′) where δ′′ =
delPkt(δ, {sw , pkt}), δ′ = setWait(δ′′, sw), and rq ′ = rq ∪ {pkt}.
5. α = add(sw , r). (pi, δ, cs, rq) α−→4 (pi, δ′, cs, rq) where δ′ = addRule(δ, sw , r).
6. α = del(sw , r). (pi, δ, cs, rq) α−→4 (pi, δ′, cs, rq) where δ′ = delRule(δ, sw , r).
7. α = fwd(sw , pkt , pts). (pi, δ, cs, rq) α−→4 (pi′, δ′, cs, rq) where pi′ =
addPkte(pi,FwdToC (sw , pkt , pts)), δ1 = delFwdMsg(δ, sw , (pkt , pts)), δ2 =
addPkte(δ1,FwdToSw(sw , pkt , pts)), and δ′ = unsetWait(δ2, sw).
8. α = ctrl(pkt , cs). (pi, δ, cs, rq) α−→4 (pi, δ′, cs ′, rq ′) where rq ′ = rq\{pkt}.
Let pktIn(pkt , cs) = (η,msg, cs ′) and sw = pkt .loc.n. Define δ′′ =
addFwdMsg(δ, sw ,msg), and δ′′′= addCtrlCmde(δ′′, η). Let {sw1, . . . , swn} be the
set of all switches whose control queue has barriers in δ′′′. Let δ0 = δ′′′ and
δi = flushall
e(δi−1, sw i) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Define δ′ = δn.
Proofs
Lemma 15. Given a flow table ft and a multiset m of control messages. For any fetch-
ing order p chosen by update(ft , [m]) to process m, there is a fetching order p′ chosen by
updatee(ft , [over(m)]) to process over(m) such that update(ft , [m]) = updatee(ft , [over(m)]).
Proof. Let R = {r | m(add(r)) > 0 ∨m(del(r)) > 0} be the set of rules that are manipu-
lated bym. Fix a fetching order p for update . We construct a fetching order p′ for updatee
such that for each r ∈ R, if p adds r to ft , then p′ also adds r to ft ; and if p deletes r from
ft , then p′ deletes r from ft too. As a result, update(ft , [m]) = updatee(ft , [over(m)]).
Fix a rule r ∈ R. If p adds r to ft , then there are two cases to consider.
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1. m(add(r)) > 0 and m(del(r)) = 0. Then we have over(m)(add(r)) = ∞ and
over(m)(del(r)) = 0. Then any fetching order of updatee(ft , [over(m)]) including
p′ adds r to ft .
2. m[add(r)] > 0 and m[del(r)] > 0. Then we have over(m)(add(r)) = ∞ and
over(m)(del(r)) = ∞. We require that p′ fetch del(r) first and then add(r). Hence
p′ adds r to ft as well.
If p deletes r from ft , then there are two cases to consider.
1. m(add(r)) = 0 and m(del(r)) > 0. Then we have over(m)(add(r)) = 0 and
over(m)(del(r)) = ∞. Then any fetching order of updatee(ft , [over(m)]) includ-
ing p′ deletes r from ft .
2. m(add(r)) > 0 and m(del(r)) > 0. Then we have over(m)(add(r)) = ∞ and
over(m)(del(r)) = ∞. We require that p′ fetch add(r) first and then del(r). Hence
p′ deletes r from ft as well.
Consequently, if update(ft , [m]) chooses p, then let updatee(ft , [over(m)]) choose p′, and
we have update(ft , [m]) = updatee(ft , [over(m)]).
We can naturally extend the notion of fetching order from a single multiset to a
list l in (M[CM ] ∪ b)∗. Given l, let l′ be the list of multisets [m1, . . . ,mn] obtained by
removing all barriers from l. Let pi be a fetching order formi, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Define a
fetching order of update(ft , l) to be p1, p2, . . . , pn, that is, the composition of individual
fetching orders one by one. Given a list l in (M[CM ]∞ ∪ b)∗, we define a fetching order
of updatee(ft , l) analogously. We now can extend Lemma 15 to a list l in (M[CM ] ∪ b)∗
as a corollary.
Corollary 1. Given a flow table ft and a list l in (M[CM ] ∪ b)∗. for any fetching order p
of update(ft , l), there is a fetching order p′ of updatee(ft , over(l)) such that update(ft , l) =
updatee(ft , over(l)).
The following lemma claims two properties between finite initial executions in TS 3
and TS 4.
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Lemma 16. Let s0
α1−→3 s1 α2−→3 s2 . . . αn−−→3 sn be an initial execution in TS 3 and t0 α1−→4
t1
α2−→4 t2 . . . αn−−→4 tn be an initial execution in TS 4 for some n ≥ 0. For all 0 ≤ i ≤ n, let
si = (pii, δi, csi, rq i) and ti = (pi′i, δ
′
i, cs
′
i, rq
′
i). The following two properties hold:
1. For all 0 ≤ i ≤ n, sw ∈ Switches , and rule r ∈ Rule , if δi(sw).cq = [mi] ∧
mi(add(r)) = 0∧mi(del(r)) = 0∧δ′i(sw).cq = [m′i]∧m′i(add(r)) =∞∧m′i(del(r)) =
0, then r ∈ δi(sw).ft and r ∈ δ′i(sw).ft .
2. For all 0 ≤ i ≤ n, sw ∈ Switches , and rule r ∈ Rule , if δi(sw).cq = [mi] ∧
mi(add(r)) = 0∧m(del(r)) = 0∧δ′i(sw).cq = [m′i]∧m′i(del(r)) =∞∧m′i(add(r)) =
0, then r 6∈ δi(sw).ft and r 6∈ δ′i(sw).ft .
Proof. We now prove property 1 by induction on n.
Base case (n = 0): the property 1 holds trivially.
Induction step: suppose for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n, property 1 holds. We now prove that
property 1 also holds for two executions of length n + 1. Suppose we have two initial
executions s0
α1−→3 s1 α2−→2 s2 . . . αn−−→3 sn αn+1−−−→3 sn+1 and t0 α1−→4 t1 α2−→4 t2 . . . αn−−→4
tn
αn+1−−−→4 tn+1. Without loss of generality, fix a switch sw and a rule r. Assume that
δn+1(sw).cq = [mn+1]∧mn+1(add(r)) = 0∧mn+1(del(r)) = 0∧ δ′n+1(sw).cq = [m′n+1]∧
m′n+1(add(r)) = ∞∧m′n+1(del(r)) = 0 holds. Our goal is to prove r ∈ δn+1(sw).ft and
r ∈ δ′n+1(sw).ft . We prove it by case analysis on the action αn+1.
1. αn+1 is in Send ∪Recv ∪Match∪NoMatch∪Forward , or is of the form add(sw ′, r′)
or del(sw ′, r′) where sw ′ ∈ Switches and r′ 6= r. Then we have δn(sw).cq =
[mn] ∧ mn(add(r)) = 0 ∧ mn(del(r)) = 0 ∧ δ′n(sw).cq = [m′n] ∧ m′n(add(r)) =
∞ ∧ m′n(del(r)) = 0. By induction hypothesis, r ∈ δn(sw).ft and r ∈ δ′n(sw).ft .
Since αn+1 does not add or delete r, we have r ∈ δn+1(sw).ft and r ∈ δ′n+1(sw).ft .
2. αn+1 is the action add(sw , r). Then r ∈ δn+1(sw).ft and r ∈ δ′n+1(sw).ft trivially
hold because r is added by αn+1.
3. αn+1 is the action del(sw , r). This case is impossible because this implies that
δ′n+1(sw).cq = [m′n+1] and m′n+1(del(r)) =∞.
4. αn+1 is a control action ctrl(pkt , cs). There are three cases that αn+1 may modify
the control queue cq of the switch sw .
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(1) αn+1 appends nothing to cq . Then by the same argument in (1), we have
r ∈ δn+1(sw).ft and r ∈ δ′n+1(sw).ft .
(2) αn+1 appends a multiset m′′ to cq . Since mn+1(add(r)) = mn+1(del(r)) =
0 at sn+1, we have m′′(add(r)) = m′′(del(r)) = 0, and δn(sw).cq =
[mn] ∧ mn(add(r)) = 0 ∧ mn(del(r)) = 0. Since m′n+1(add(r)) = ∞ and
m′n+1(del(r)) = 0 at tn+1 and m′′(add(r)) = 0, we have δ′n(sw).cq = [m′n] ∧
m′n(add(r)) = ∞ ∧ m′n(del(r)) = 0. By induction hypothesis, r ∈ δn(sw).ft
and r ∈ δ′n(sw).ft . Since αn+1 does not change any flow table, we have
r ∈ δn+1(sw).ft and r ∈ δ′n+1(sw).ft .
(3) αn+1 appends more than one multiset to cq . This case is impossible because
a barrier must be appended in cq . Then m′n+1(add(r)) = ∞ at tn+1 implies
that mn+1(add(r)) 6= 0 at sn+1, which is a contradiction.
Since the proof of property 2 is analogous to the proof of property 1 above, we skip
it now.
We now prove TS 4 simulates TS 3 in the following lemma.
Lemma 17. For any infinite initial execution s0
β1−→3 s1 β2−→3 s2 . . . in TS 3, there is an infinite
initial execution t0
β1−→4 t1 β2−→4 t2 . . . in TS 4 such that for all i ≥ 0, si = (pii, δi, csi, rq i) and
ti = (pi
′
i, δ
′
i, cs
′
i, rq
′
i) satisfy the following condition: for all c ∈ Clients , pii(c) ≤e pi′i(c) and for
all sw ∈ Switches , δi(sw).pq ≤e δ′i(sw).pq , δi(sw).cq ≤e δ′i(sw).cq , δi(sw).fq = δ′i(sw).fq ,
δi(sw).ft = δ
′
i(sw).ft , and δi(sw).wait = δ
′
i(sw).wait , and csi = cs
′
i, and rq i = rq
′
i.
Proof. Induction on the length k of an initial execution in TS 3.
Base case (k = 0): it holds because s0 = t0.
Induction step: Suppose the theorem holds for k = n. Consider an initial execution
s0
β1−→3 s1 β2−→3 s2 . . . βn−→3 sn βn+1−−−→3 sn+1 in TS 3. By induction hypothesis, there is an
initial execution t0
β1−→4 t1 β2−→4 t2 . . . βn−→4 tn in TS 4 such that if for 0 ≤ i ≤ n, si and
ti satisfy the condition. Hence βn+1 is enabled at tn. Suppose βn+1(tn) = tn+1. Our
goal is to prove sn+1 and tn+1 also satisfy the condition. We prove it by case analysis
on βn+1. It is easy to check if all actions except control actions are taken from sn and
get sn+1, the same action can also taken from tn and get tn+1, and sn+1 and tn+1 satisfy
the condition.
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Let us consider the case where a control action βn+1 is taken from sn to sn+1. By
induction hypothesis, rq ′n = rqn and cs′n = csn. Hence rq ′n+1 = rqn+1 and cs′n+1 =
csn+1. Without loss of generality, it is sufficient to analyze one switch sw and show
δn+1(sw).cq ≤e δ′n+1(sw).cq and δn+1(sw).ft = δ′n+1(sw).ft .
Denote l be the list in (M[CM ]∪ b)∗ that is added to the switch sw by the controller.
If l is empty, then cq and ft do not change after βn+1 is taken, that is, δn+1(sw).cq =
δn(sw).cq ≤e δ′n(sw).cq = δ′n+1(sw).cq , and δn+1(sw).ft = δn(sw).ft = δ′n(sw).ft =
δ′n+1(sw).ft . If l is not empty, we consider three cases:
1. l = [m]. Since l has no barriers, δ′n+1(sw).ft = δ′n(sw).ft = δn(sw).ft = δn+1(sw).ft .
In addition, δn+1(sw).cq = [δn(sw).cq .hd ⊕ m] ≤e [δ′n(sw).cq .hd ⊕ over(m)] =
δ′n+1(sw).cq
2. l = [m]@l2@[b, mˆ] or [m]@l2@[b]. Then δn+1(sw).cq ≤e δ′n+1(sw).cq . Suppose
δn(sw).cq = [m0] and δ′n(sw).cq = [m′0]. we show that for any fetching order
p of update(δn(sw).ft ,m0 ⊕ m) that leads to fˆt , there is a fetching order p′ of
updatee(δ′n(sw).ft ,m′0 ⊕ over(m)) that leads to fˆt
′
such that fˆt = fˆt
′
. Fix a fetching
order p. We construct p′ based on each rule r ∈ Rule .
(a) r is added to δn(sw).ft by p. There are two possibilities.
i. m0 ⊕ m(add(r)) > 0 and m0 ⊕ m(del(r)) = 0. Then we have m′0 ⊕
over(m)(add(r)) = ∞. If m′0 ⊕ over(m)(del(r)) = 0, then we do not
restrict p′ because r must be added. If m′0 ⊕ over(m)(del(r)) = ∞, then
we require p′ fetch del(r) first and then add(r).
ii. m0 ⊕ m(add(r)) > 0 and m0 ⊕ m(del(r)) > 0. Then we have m′0 ⊕
over(m)(add(r)) =∞ and m′0⊕over(m)(del(r)) =∞. We require p′ fetch
del(r) first and then add(r).
(b) r is deleted from δn(sw).ft . There are two possibilities.
i. m0 ⊕ m(add(r)) = 0 and m0 ⊕ m(del(r)) > 0. Then we have m′0 ⊕
over(m)(del(r)) = ∞. If m′0 ⊕ over(m)(add(r)) = 0, then we do not
restrict p′ because r must be deleted. If m′0 ⊕ over(m)(add(r)) =∞, then
we require p′ fetch add(r) first and then del(r).
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ii. m0 ⊕ m(add(r)) > 0 and m0 ⊕ m(del(r)) > 0. Then we have m′0 ⊕
over(m)(add(r)) =∞ and m′0⊕over(m)(del(r)) =∞. We require p′ fetch
add(r) first and then del(r).
(c) m0 ⊕m(add(r)) = 0 and m0 ⊕m(del(r)) = 0. There are three possibilities.
i. m′0 ⊕ over(m)(add(r)) = ∞ and m′0 ⊕ over(m)(del(r)) = ∞. If r ∈
δ′n(sw).ft , then we require p′ fetch del(r) first and then add(r). If r 6∈
δ′n(sw).ft , then we require p′ fetch add(r) first and then del(r).
ii. m′0 ⊕ over(m)(add(r)) = ∞ and m′0 ⊕ over(m)(del(r)) = 0. Then we
have m′0(add(r)) = ∞ and m′0(del(r)) = 0. By Lemma 16, r ∈ δ′n(sw).ft .
Hence we do not restrict p′ because r must be added to a flow table that
already contains r.
iii. m′0 ⊕ over(m)(add(r)) = 0 and m′0 ⊕ over(m)(del(r)) = ∞. Then we
have m′0(add(r)) = 0 and m′0(del(r)) = ∞. By Lemma 16, r 6∈ δ′n(sw).ft .
Hence we do not restrict p′ because r must be deleted from a flow table
that does not contain r.
Intuitively, p′ adds or deletes a rule in δ′n(sw).ft if p adds or deletes the rule in
δn(sw).ft . For those control messages of the form add(r) and del(r) that are not
in m0 ⊕m but in m′0 ⊕ over(m), either p′ adds r to δ′n(sw).ft containing r already,
or deletes r from δ′n(sw).ft not containing r, or neutralizes add(r) and del(r) to
keep r ∈ fˆt ′ iff r ∈ δ′n(sw).ft . Hence, fˆt = fˆt
′
. By Corollary 1, for any fetching
order p2 of update(fˆt , l2@[b]) that leads to δn+1(sw).ft , there is a fetching order
p′2 of update
e(fˆt
′
, over(l2@[b])) that leads to δ′n+1(sw).ft such that δn+1(sw).ft =
δ′n+1(sw).ft .
3. l = [b]@l2@[b, mˆ] or [b]@l2@[b]. The proof is analogous to the case (2) wherem = ∅.
Since we have proved all cases, the lemma holds.
Since TS 4 simulates TS 3 by Lemma 17, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 14. For an SDN property φ, if TS 4 satisfies φ, TS 3 satisfies φ.
70 Chapter 3. KUAI: A Model Checker for Software-defined Networks
3.5.4 Proofs for All Packets In One Shot
We prove that TS 5 simulates TS 4. We define a relation R ⊆ S4 × S5 such that
((pi, δ, cs, rq), (pi′, δ′, cs ′, rq ′)) ∈ R iff for all pkt ∈ Packet , for all c ∈ Clients , pi(c)(pkt) =
∞→ pi′(c)(pkt) =∞ and for all sw ∈ Switches , δ(sw).pq(pkt) =∞→ δ′(sw).pq(pkt) =
∞, δ(sw).cq = δ′(sw).cq , δ(sw).fq = δ′(sw).fq , δ(sw).ft = δ′(sw).ft , and δ(sw).wait =
δ′(sw).wait , and cs = cs ′, and rq = rq ′.
Theorem 15. (1) The relation R is a simulation relation. (2) For a safety property φ, if TS 5
satisfies φ, TS 4 satisfies φ.
Proof. Proof of claim (1):
It is straightforward to verify that for all (s, t) ∈ R, if s α−→4 s′, then there are t′ and α′
such that t α
′−→5 t′ and (s′, t′) ∈ R. In particular, α = α′ if α is not a match action. If α is a
match action match(sw , pkt , r) in A4, then α′ is a match action match(sw , pkt_lst , r_lst)
in A5 such that pkt is in pkt_lst and r is in r_lst .
By claim (1), TS 5 simulates TS 4 and hence claim (2) holds accordingly.
3.5.5 Proofs for Controller Optimization
Theorem 16. Given an SDNN where the size of the request queue of the controller is one, and
a safety property φ. (1) TS 5 , TS 6. (2) TS 5 satisfies φ iff TS 6 satisfies φ.
Proof. Proof of claim (1):
We first prove TS 6 E TS 5, i.e., for each initial infinite execution ρ = t0 α1−→6
t1
α2−→6 . . . in TS 6, there is an initial infinite execution ρ′ = s0 β1−→5 s1 β2−→5 . . .
such that ρ , ρ′. We construct ρ′ by scanning ρ from the beginning. For all i ≥ 0,
if ti
nomatch_ctrl(sw ,pkt ,cs)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→6 ti+1 in ρ, then we split nomatch_ctrl(sw , pkt , cs) into two
actions nomatch(sw , pkt) and ctrl(pkt , cs) and introduce a new intermediate state ui
such that si
nomatch(sw ,pkt)−−−−−−−−−−→5 ui ctrl(pkt ,cs)−−−−−−−→5 si+1 in ρ′. If ti α−→6 ti+1 and α is not
nomatch_ctrl(sw , pkt , cs), then define si
α−→5 si+1. The construction of ρ′ ensures that
for all i ≥ 0, si = ti. Moreover, if ui is the successor of si then L5(si) = L5(ui) because
nomatch(sw , pkt) is a stutter action. Therefore, ρ′ , ρ.
We then prove TS 5 E TS 6. Let ρ = s0
β1−→5 s1 β2−→5 . . . be an initial infinite execution
in TS 5. The construction of ρ′ is the following. We walk through ρ until we find a
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nomatch(sw , pkt) action. If we cannot find it, then ρ is in TS 6 by definition. Otherwise,
ρ is of the form ρ = s0
β1−→5 s1 β2−→5 . . . βi−1−−−→5 si−1 nomatch(sw ,pkt)−−−−−−−−−−→5 si βi+1−−−→5 si+1 . . .
where for all 1 ≤ j ≤ i− 1, βj is not a no-match action. By definition of→6, we have an
execution ρˆ = s0
β1−→6 s1 β2−→6 . . . βi−1−−−→6 si−1 nomatch(sw ,pkt)−−−−−−−−−−→5 si βi+1−−−→5 si+1 . . .. We now
consider two cases.
(1) Control action ctrl(pkt , cs) does not appear in βj for all j > i. Since we as-
sume that the size of the request queue of the controller is 1, we know that for all
j > i, nomatch(sw , pkt) is independent of βj . We can keep permuting nomatch(sw , pkt)
backward with βi+1, βi+2, . . . and at the limit, we get an execution ρ′′ in which
nomatch(sw , pkt) is never executed.
ρ′′ = s0
β1−→6 s1 β2−→6 . . . βi−1−−−→6 si−1 βi+1−−−→5 ui βi+2−−−→5 ui+1 . . .
Since the size of the request queue of the controller is one, for all j > i, βj is not a
no-match action and by the definition of→6, we have
ρ′ = s0
β1−→6 s1 β2−→6 . . . βi−1−−−→6 si−1 βi+1−−−→6 ui βi+2−−−→6 ui+1 . . .
Moreover, since nomatch(sw , pkt) is a stutter action, we have ρ′ , ρ.
(2) Control action ctrl(pkt , cs) appears and the first one is βk for some k > i. Hence
ρˆ has the form: ρˆ = s0
β1−→6 . . . βi−1−−−→6 si−1 nomatch(sw ,pkt)−−−−−−−−−−→5 si βi+1−−−→5 si+1 . . . sk−1 βk−→5
sk . . ..
Since the size of request queue is one, then nomatch(sw , pkt) is independent of any
actions βj where i < j < k. We then permute nomatch(sw , pkt) with βj successively
and end up with an execution as follows: s0
β1−→6 . . . βi−1−−−→6 si−1 βi+1−−−→5 ui βi+2−−−→5
. . . uk−2
nomatch(sw ,pkt)−−−−−−−−−−→5 sk−1 βk−→5 sk . . ..
Since for all i < j < k, βj is not a no-match action, by definition of →6, we have
ρ1 = s0
β1−→6 . . . βi−1−−−→6 si−1 βi+1−−−→6 ui βi+2−−−→6 . . . uk−2 nomatch_ctrl(sw ,pkt ,cs)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→6 sk . . ..
The execution s0 →∗5 sk of ρ and the execution s0 →∗6 sk of ρ1 are stutter equivalent
because nomatch(sw , pkt) is a stutter action.
Now the next task to make the rest execution of ρ1 from sk and the rest execution of
ρ from sk stutter equivalent. By repeating the reasoning in cases (1) and (2) from sk on
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in ρ1, at the limit, we end up with an execution ρ′ in TS 6 such that ρ′ , ρ.
Since claim (1) holds, claim (2) holds immediately.
3.6 Related Work
There is a lot of systems and networking interest in SDNs [40, 62] and standards such as
Openflow [91]. From the formal methods perspective, research has focused on verified
programming language frameworks for writing SDN controllers [43, 55]. Here, veri-
fication refers to correct compilation from Frenetic to executable code, or to checking
composability of programs, not the correctness of invariants.
Previous model checking attempts for SDNs mostly focused either on proving a
static snapshot of the network [69] or on model checking or symbolic simulation tech-
niques for a fixed number of packets [22, 98]. Recent work extended to controller up-
dates and arbitrary number of packets [114], but used a manual process to add non-
interference lemmas. In contrast, our technique automatically deals with unboundedly
many packets and, thanks to the partial-order techniques, scales to much larger con-
figurations than reported in [114]. Program verification for SDN controllers using loop
invariants and SMT solving has been proposed recently [6]. While the invariants can
quantify over the network (and therefore not limited to finite topologies), the model
of the network ignores asynchronous interleavings of packet and control message pro-
cessing that we handle here.
Our work builds on top of distributed enumerative model checking and the PReach
tool [10]. Our contribution is identifying domain specific state space reduction heuris-
tics that enable us to explore large configurations.
Chapter 4
Expand, Enlarge, and Check for
Branching Vector Addition Systems
4.1 Introduction
Branching vector addition systems (BVAS) are an expressive model that generalize vec-
tor addition systems (VAS, or Petri nets) with branching structures. Intuitively, one can
consider a VAS as producing a linear sequence of vectors using unary rewrite rules,
where a rewrite rule takes a vector v and adds a constant δ to it, as long as the sum
v + δ remains non-negative on all co-ordinates. A branching VAS adds a second, bi-
nary rewrite rule that takes two vectors v1 and v2 and rewrites them to v1 + v2 + δ
for a constant δ, again provided the sum is non-negative on all co-ordinates. Thus,
a BVAS generates a derivation tree of vectors, starting with a multiset of initial vec-
tors, or axioms, at the leaves and generating a vector at the root of a derivation, where
each internal node in the tree applies a unary or a binary rewrite rule. The reachabil-
ity problem for BVAS is to check if a given vector can be derived, and the coverability
problem asks, given a vector v, if a vector v′ ≥ v can be derived. These generalize the
corresponding problems for VAS. Several verification problems, such as the analysis
of recursively parallel programs [12] and the analysis of some cryptographic protocols
[120], have been shown to reduce to the coverability problem for BVAS.
Coverability for BVAS is known to be decidable, both through a generalized Karp-
Miller construction [119] as well as through a bounding argument [35]. Further,
the bounding argument characterizes the complexity of the problem: coverability is
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2EXPTIME-complete [35] (contrast with the EXPSPACE-completeness for VAS [106]).
The Karp-Miller construction is non-primitive recursive, since BVAS subsume VAS [68].
Despite potential applications, the study of BVAS has so far remained in the do-
main of theoretical results, and to the best of our knowledge, there have not been any
attempts to build analysis tools for coverability. In contrast, tools for VAS coverability
have made steady progress and can now handle quite large benchmarks derived from
the analysis of multi-threaded programs [65, 70]. In our view, one reason is that a direct
implementation of the algorithms from [35, 119] are unlikely to perform well: Karp-
Miller trees for VAS do not perform well in practice, and Demri et al.’s complexity-
theoretically optimal algorithm performs a non-deterministic guess and enumeration
by an alternating Turing machine.
In this dissertation, we apply the expand, enlarge, and check paradigm (EEC) [47] to
the analysis of BVAS. EEC is a successful heuristic for checking coverability of well-
structured transition systems such as Petri nets. It constructs a sequence of under-
and over-approximations of the state space of a system such that, for a target state t,
(1) if t is coverable, then a witness is found by an under-approximation, (2) if t is not
coverable, then a witness for un-coverability is found by an over-approximation, and
(3) eventually, one of the two outcomes occur and the algorithm terminates.
EEC offers several nice features for implementation. First, each approximation it
considers is finite-state, thus opening the possibility of applying model checkers for
finite-state systems. Second, EEC is goal-directed: it computes abstractions that are
precise enough to prove or disprove coverability of a target, unlike a Karp-Miller pro-
cedure that computes the exact coverability set independent of the target. Third, it
allows a forward abstract exploration of the state space, which is often more effective
in practice.
Our first contribution is to port the EEC paradigm to the coverability analysis of
BVAS. We show how to construct a sequence of under- and over-approximations of
derivations such that if a target is coverable, an under-approximation derives a wit-
ness for coverability, and if a target is not coverable, an over-approximation derives
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a witness for un-coverability. We generalize the proof of correctness of EEC for well-
structured systems. Since there is no BVAS analogue of a backward-reachability algo-
rithm for VAS, our proofs instead use induction on derivations and the Karp-Miller
construction of [119].
A natural question is how well EEC performs in the worst case compared to asymp-
totically optimal algorithms. For example, even for VAS, it is unknown if the EEC algo-
rithm can match the known EXPSPACE upper bound for coverability, or if it matches
the non-primitive recursive lower bound for Karp-Miller trees. Our second contribu-
tion is to bound the number of iterations of the EEC algorithm in the worst case. We
show that we can compute a constant c of size doubly exponential in the size of the
BVAS and the target vector such that the EEC algorithm is guaranteed to terminate
in c iterations. In each iteration, the algorithm explores approximate state spaces of
derivations, that correspond to exploring AND-OR trees of size doubly exponential in
the input. In other words, if each exploration is performed optimally, we get an op-
timal asymptotic upper bound for EEC. Specifically, for VAS, we get an EXPSPACE
upper bound, since there are doubly exponential iterations and each iteration checks
two reachability problems over doubly-exponential state spaces. (In practice though,
model checkers do not implement space-optimal reachability procedures.) While our
proof uses Rackoff-style bounds [35, 106], our implementation does not require any
knowledge of these bounds. A similar argument was used in [15] to show a doubly
exponential bound on the backward reachability algorithm for VAS.
We have implemented the EEC-based procedure for BVAS coverability. Our moti-
vation for analyzing BVAS came from the analysis of recursively parallel programs [12,
45]. It is known that the analysis of asynchronous programs, a co-operatively sched-
uled concurrency model, can be reduced to coverability of VAS [45], and there have
been EEC-based tools for these programs [64]. However, some asynchronous programs
use features such as posting a set of tasks in a handler and waiting on the first task to
return, that are not reducible to asynchronous programs. Bouajjani and Emmi [12] de-
fine a class of recursively parallel programs that can express such constructs, and show
that the safety verification problem for this class is equivalent to coverability of BVAS.
We applied this reduction in our implementation, and used our tool to model check
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safety properties of recursively parallel programs. We coded the control flow of tasks
in a simple web server [34] and showed that our tool can successfully check for safety
properties and find bugs. On our examples, the EEC algorithm terminates in one iter-
ation, that is, with a {0, 1,∞} abstraction. While our evaluations are preliminary, we
believe there is a potential for model checking tools for complex concurrent programs
based on BVAS coverability.
4.2 Preliminaries
Well quasi ordering. A quasi ordering (X,) is a reflexive and transitive binary relation
on X . A quasi ordering (X,) is a well quasi ordering iff for every infinite sequence
x0, x1, . . . of elements from X , there exists i < j with xi  xj . A subset X ′ of X is
upward closed if for each x ∈ X , if there is an x′ ∈ X ′ with x′  x then x ∈ X ′. A subset
X ′ of X is downward closed if for each x ∈ X , if there is an x′ ∈ X ′ with x  x′ then
x ∈ X ′. Given x ∈ X , we write x ↓ and x ↑ for the downward closure {x′ ∈ X | x′  x}
and upward closure {x′ ∈ X | x  x′} of x respectively. Downward and upward closures
are naturally extended to sets, i.e., X ↓= ⋃x∈X x↓ and X ↑= ⋃x∈X x↑. A subset S ⊆ X
is minimal iff for every two elements x, x′ ∈ S, we have x 6 x′.
Numbers and vectors. We write N, N+ and Z for the set of non-negative, positive
and arbitrary integers, respectively. Given two integers a and b, we write [a, b] for
{n ∈ Z | a ≤ n ≤ b}.
For a vector v ∈ Zk and i ∈ [1, k], we write v[i] for the ith component of v. Given
two vectors v, v′ ∈ Zk, v ≤ v′ iff for all i ∈ [1, k], v[i] ≤ v′[i]. Moreover, v < v′ iff v ≤ v′
and v′ 6≤ v. It is well-known that (Nk,≤) is a well quasi ordering. We write 0 for the
zero vector.
Given a finite set S ⊆ Z of integers, we write max(S) for the greatest integer in the
set. We define max(∅) = 0. Given a vector v ∈ Zk, let max(v) = max({v[1], . . . , v[k]}).
When k = 0, we have max(()) = 0. We define min(S) analogously. We write min(0, v)
for the vector (min({0, v[1]}), . . . ,min({0, v[k]})). The vector max(0, v) is defined anal-
ogously. For simplicity, we write v− for the vector −min(0, v) and v+ for the vector
max(0, v). Given a finite set of vectors R ⊆ Zk, let R−/+ be the set {v−/+ | v ∈ R}
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respectively. We define max(R) = max({max(v+) | v ∈ R}). The size of a vector is the
number of bits required to encode it, all numbers being encoded in binary.
Trees. A finite binary tree T , which may contain nodes with one child, is a non-empty
finite subset of {1, 2}∗ such that, for all n ∈ {1, 2}∗ and i ∈ {1, 2}, n · 2 ∈ T implies
n · 1 ∈ T , and n · i ∈ T implies n ∈ T . The nodes of T are its elements. The root of
T is ε, the empty word. All notions such as parent, child, subtree and leaf, have their
standard meanings. The height of T is the number of nodes in the longest path from
the root to a leaf.
BVAS, derivations, and coverability. A branching vector addition system (BVAS) [35,
119] is a tuple B = (k,A,R1, R2), where k ∈ N is the dimension, A ⊆ Nk is a non-empty
finite set of axioms, andR1, R2 ⊆ Zk are finite sets of unary and binary rules, respectively.
The size of a BVAS, size(B) is the number of bits required to encode a BVAS, where
numbers are encoded in binary.
The semantics of a BVAS B is captured using derivations. Intuitively, a derivation
starts with a number of axioms from A, proceeds by applying rules from R1 ∪ R2,
and ends with a single vector. Applying a unary rule means adding it to a derived
vector, and applying a binary rule means adding it to the sum of two derived vectors.
While applying rules, all derived vectors are required to be non-negative. Formally, a
derivation D of B is defined inductively as follows.
(D1) If v ∈ A, then v is a derivation.
(D2) If D1 is a derivation with a derived vector v1 ∈ Nk, then for each unary rule
δ1 ∈ R1 with 0 ≤ v1 + δ1,
... D1
v1D : δ1v
is a derivation, where v = v1 + δ1.
(D3) If D1 and D2 are derivations with derived vectors v1, v2 ∈ Nk respectively, then
for each binary rule δ2 ∈ R2 with 0 ≤ v1 + v2 + δ2,
... D1
v1
... D2
v2D : δ2v
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is a derivation, where v = v1 + v2 + δ2.
A derivation D can be represented as a finite binary tree whose nodes are labelled
by non-negative vectors. Therefore, all notions of trees can be naturally applied to
derivations. For a derivation D and its node n, we write D(n) for the non-negative
vector labelled at n. We say D derives a vector v iff D(ε) = v.
A derivation D is compact iff for each node n and for each its ancestor n′, we have
D(n) 6= D(n′). Given a derivation D with a node n and an ancestor n′ of n with D(n) =
D(n′), a contraction D[n′ ← n] over D is obtained by replacing the subtree rooted at
n′ with the subtree rooted at n in D. We write compact(D) for the compact derivation
computed by a finite sequence of contractions over D.
Given a BVAS B = (k,A,R1, R2), we say a vector v is reachable in B iff there is a
derivation D with D(ε) = v. We write Reach(B) = {v | ∃D. D(ε) = v} for the set
of reachable vectors in B. We say a vector v is coverable in B iff there is a derivation
D with v ≤ D(ε). We call a derivation D a covering witness of v iff v ≤ D(ε). The
coverability problem asks, given a BVAS B and a vector t ∈ Nk, whether t is coverable in
B. Equivalently, t is coverable iff t ∈ Reach(B)↓.
4.3 Under- and Over-approximation
We give two approximate analyses for BVAS: an under-approximation that fixes a fi-
nite set of vectors and only considers those vectors in that finite set, and an over-
approximation that introduces limit elements. The under-approximation can show that
a vector is coverable and the over-approximation can prove that a vector is not cover-
able.
4.3.1 Underapproximation
Truncated Derivations Given a BVAS B = (k,A,R1, R2) and an i ∈ N, define Ci ⊆ Nk
asA∪{0, . . . , i}k. Given a vector v ∈ Nk and an i ∈ N, We write under(v, i) for a truncated
vector such that for all j ∈ [1, k], under(v, i)[j] = v[j] if v[j] ≤ i, under(v, i)[j] = i
otherwise. For all vector v ∈ Nk and for all i ∈ N, under(v, i) ≤ v. A truncated derivation
F w.r.t. i is defined inductively as follows.
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(T1) If v ∈ A, then v is a truncated derivation.
(T2) If F1 is a truncated derivation with a derived truncated vector v1 ∈ Nk, then for
each unary rule δ1 ∈ R1 with 0 ≤ v1 + δ1,
... F1
v1F : δ1v
is a truncated derivation, where v = under(v1 + δ1, i).
(T3) If F1 and F2 are truncated derivations with derived truncated vectors v1, v2 ∈ Nk
respectively, then for each binary rule δ2 ∈ R2 with 0 ≤ v1 + v2 + δ2,
... F1
v1
... F2
v2F : δ2v
is a truncated derivation, where v = under(v1 + v2 + δ2, i).
Analogously to derivations, a truncated derivationF is a finite binary tree whose nodes
are labelled by truncated vectors. We say F derives a truncated vector v iff F(ε) = v. We
naturally extend the notions of compactness, covering witness, and coverability to trun-
cated derivations w.r.t. ≤.
Lemma 18. Let B = (k,A,R1, R2) be a BVAS and i ∈ N. For any h ∈ N+, there are finitely
many truncated derivations of a BVAS of height h.
Given a BVAS B, we define a total orderingv on truncated derivations according to
their heights as follows. Since for each h ∈ N+ there are only finitely many, say kh, trun-
cated derivations of height h, we can enumerate them without repetition, arbitrarily as
Fh1, . . . ,Fhkh . We define Fmi v Fnj iff m < n, or m = n and i ≤ j.
The Forest Under(B, Ci) Given a BVAS B = (k,A,R1, R2) and i ∈ N, we construct
a forest Under(B, Ci) whose nodes are compact truncated derivations by the following
rules:
(U1) For each axiom v ∈ A, the truncated derivation v is a root.
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(U2) Let F1 be a compact truncated derivation in the forest. Let F be a truncated
derivation obtained by applying a unary rule δ1 ∈ R1 to F1 (as in rule T2). If
compact(F) has not been added to the forest then add compact(F) as a child of
F1 in the forest.
(U3) Suppose compact truncated derivations F1,F2 are in the forest. Let F be a trun-
cated derivation obtained by applying a binary rule δ2 ∈ R2 to F1 and F2 (as in
rule T3). If compact(F) has not been added to the forest then we add compact(F)
to the forest as a child of F ′ where F ′ is the greater one between F1 and F2 w.r.t.
the total order v.
The following lemma shows that the construction of Under(B, Ci) eventually termi-
nates, and that it can be used to prove coverability.
Theorem 17 (Underapproximation). Let B be a BVAS.
1. For any i ∈ N, the forest Under(B, Ci) is finite.
2. Given an i ∈ N, for any truncated derivation F , there is a derivation D in B such that
F(ε) ≤ D(ε).
3. For any vector v ∈ Nk, we have v ∈ Reach(B)↓ iff there exists i ∈ N such that there is a
truncated derivation F in Under(B, Ci) with v ≤ F(ε).
Proof. Part (1). Fix i. It is easy to see that there are finitely many trees in the forest
and each tree is finitely branching, since there are at most finitely many trees of a given
height. If the forest is not finite, then by König’s lemma, there is an infinite simple path
of compact truncated derivations F1,F2, . . . in the forest such that for every i ≥ 1, Fi is
a sub-compact truncated derivation of Fi+1. This induces an infinite sequence of trun-
cated vectors F1(ε),F2(ε) . . . such that for every i 6= j, Fi(ε) 6= Fj(ε). However, since
for all F in the forest, F(ε) ∈ Ci and Ci is finite, such infinite sequence of truncated
vectors does not exist.
Part (2). By induction on the height of F .
Part (3). ⇒: SinceReach(B)∩v↑6= ∅, there is a derivationD in B such that v ≤ D(ε).
Let S be the union of the set of axioms A and the set of all vectors in compact(D).
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Because both sets are finite, let i be max(S). Then compact(D) is in Under(B, Ci) and
v ≤ D(ε) = compact(D)(ε).
⇐: By Part (2), there is a derivation D in B such that F(ε) ≤ D(ε). Since D(ε) ∈
Reach(B) and v ≤ F(ε), v ∈ Reach(B)↓.
4.3.2 Overapproximation
To define over-approximation of derivations, we introduce extended derivations which
consider vectors over N∪ {∞}. We then present an algorithm that builds a forest over-
approximating the downward closure of reachable vectors of a given BVAS and prove
termination and correctness.
LetN∞ = N∪{∞} be the extension of the natural numbers with infinity. An extended
vector is an element of Nk∞. For extended vectors u, u′ ∈ Nk∞, we write u ≤∞ u′ iff for
all i ∈ [1, k], we have u[i] ≤ u′[i] or u′[i] = ∞. We write u <∞ u′ iff u ≤∞ u′ and
u′ 6≤∞ u. We always use words starting with the letter u to denote an extended vector
(e.g. u, u′, u1 etc.) and words starting with the letter v to denote a vector in Zk (e.g.
v, v′, v1 etc.). Extended vectors describe sets of vectors: we define γ : Nk∞ → 2N
k
as
γ(u) = {v ∈ Nk | v ≤∞ u}, and naturally extend γ to sets of extended vectors.
Proposition 2. [47] (1) Given an extended vector u ∈ Nk∞ and a finite set of extended vectors
S ⊆ Nk∞, γ(u) ⊆ γ(S) iff there is u′ ∈ S such that u ≤∞ u′. (2) Given two finite and minimal
sets S1, S2 ⊆ Nk∞, S1 = S2 if and only if γ(S1) = γ(S2).
Given a BVAS B = (k,A,R1, R2), there exists a finite and minimal subset CS(B) ⊆
Nk∞ such that γ(CS(B)) = Reach(B) ↓. We shall call CS(B) the finite representation of
Reach(B)↓.
Extended Derivations Given a BVAS B = (k,A,R1, R2) and an i ∈ N, let Ci =
{0, . . . , i}k ∪ A and Li = {0, . . . , i,∞}k \ {0, . . . , i}k. Given two sets S1 ⊆ Nk and
S2 ⊆ Nk∞, we say that S2 is an overapproximation of S1 iff S1 ⊆ γ(S2). Moreover, we
say that S2 is the most precise overapproximation of S1 in Li ∪ Ci iff there is no finite and
minimal subset S ⊆ Li ∪ Ci such that S1 ⊆ γ(S) ⊂ γ(S2). In the following, in case S2
is a singleton set {u}, we write that u is (the most precise) overapproximation of S1 for
simplicity.
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Given an extended vector u ∈ Nk∞ and an i ∈ N, We write over(u, i) for the extended
vector such that for all j ∈ [1, k], over(u, i)[j] = u[j] if u[j] ≤ i, over(u, i)[j] = ∞ other-
wise. Note that over(u, i) is an overapproximation of γ(u), and interestingly, is the most
precise overapproximation of γ(u) in Li ∪ Ci [47].
We can naturally extend the addition of vectors to the addition of extended vectors
by assuming that∞+∞ =∞ and∞+ c =∞ for all c ∈ Z.
Given a BVAS B = (k,A,R1, R2) and i ∈ N, an extended derivation E is defined
inductively as follows.
(E1) If v ∈ A, then v is an extended derivation.
(E2) If E1 is an extended derivation with a derived extended vector u1 ∈ Nk∞, then for
each unary rule δ1 ∈ R1 with 0 ≤∞ u1 + δ1,
... E1
u1E : δ1u
is an extended derivation, where u = over(u1 + δ1, i).
(E3) If E1 and E2 are extended derivations with derived extended vectors u1, u2 ∈ Nk∞
respectively, then for each binary rule δ2 ∈ R2 with 0 ≤∞ u1 + u2 + δ2,
... E1
u1
... E2
u2E : δ2u
is an extended derivation, where u = over(u1 + u2 + δ2, i).
Analogously to derivations, an extended derivation E is a finite binary tree whose
nodes are labelled by extended vectors. For an extended derivation E and its node
n, we write E(n) for the extended vector labelled at n. We say E derives an extended
vector u iff E(ε) = u. We naturally extend the notions of compactness, covering witness,
and coverability to extended derivations w.r.t. ≤∞. Similar to derivations, the following
lemma shows that there are finitely many extended derivations of a given height.
Lemma 19. Given a BVAS B = (k,A,R1, R2) and i ∈ N, for each h ∈ N+, there are finitely
many extended derivations of height h.
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Given a BVAS B, we define a total ordering ve on extended derivations accord-
ing to their heights. Since for each h ∈ N+ there are only finitely many, say kh, ex-
tended derivations of height h, we can enumerate them without repetition, arbitrarily
as Eh1, . . . , Ehkh . We define Emi ve Enj iff m < n, or m = n and i ≤ j.
The Forest Over(B, Li, Ci) Given a BVAS B = (k,A,R1, R2) and an i ∈ N, we con-
struct a forest Over(B, Li, Ci) whose nodes are compact extended derivations by fol-
lowing the rules below.
(O1) For each axiom v ∈ A, the extended derivation v is a root.
(O2) If a compact extended derivation E1 is already in the forest and compact(E) has
not been added in the forest where E is computed by applying a unary rule to E1
as in Rule E2, then add compact(E) as a child of E1 in the forest.
(O3) If compact extended derivations E1, E2 are already in the forest and compact(E)
has not been added in the forest where E is computed by applying a binary rule
to E1 and E2 as in Rule E3, then we add compact(E) to the forest as a child of E ′
where E ′ is the greater one between E1 and E2 w.r.t. the total order ve.
Theorem 18 (Overapproximation). Let B be a BVAS.
1. For each i ∈ N, the forest Over(B, Li, Ci) is finite.
2. Given i ∈ N, for any derivation D, there is a compact extended derivation E in
Over(B, Li, Ci) with D(ε) ≤∞ E(ε).
3. For v ∈ Nk, Reach(B) ∩ v ↑= ∅ iff there exists an i ∈ N such that for any compact
extended derivation E in Over(B, Li, Ci), we have γ(E(ε)) ∩ v↑= ∅.
Proof. The proof of Part (1) is similar to the proof of Theorem 17(1), because Li ∪ Ci is
finite.
The proof of Part (2) is by induction on the height of D.
Part (3). ⇐: Suppose Reach(B)∩ v↑6= ∅. Then there is a derivation D in B such that
D(ε) ∈ v ↑. Using Part (2), we can find E in Over(B, Li, Ci) such that D(ε) ≤∞ E(ε). For
E , we have D(ε) ∈ γ(E(ε)) and thus γ(E(ε)) ∩ v↑6= ∅.
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Algorithm 1: EEC Algorithm to decide the coverability problem of BVAS.
Input: A BVAS B = (k,A,R1, R2) and a vector t ∈ Nk.
Output: “Cover” if t is coverable in B, “Uncover” otherwise.
begin
i←− 0
while true do
Compute Under(B, Ci) // Expand
Compute Over(B, Li, Ci) // Enlarge
// Check
if ∃F ∈ Under(B, Ci). t ≤ F(ε) then
return “Cover”
else if ∀E ∈ Over(B, Li, Ci). t 6≤∞ E(ε) then
return “Uncover”
i←− i+ 1
⇒: Since Reach(B) ∩ v ↑= ∅ iff Reach(B) ↓ ∩v ↑= ∅, γ(CS(B)) ∩ v ↑= ∅. Take
i ∈ N such that CS(B) ⊆ Li ∪ Ci. For every extended derivation E in B, we have
γ(E(ε)) ⊆ γ(CS(B)). This can be proved by induction on the height of E .
For every compact extended derivation E in Over(B, Li, Ci), we therefore have that
γ(E(ε)) ⊆ γ(CS(B)). Hence γ(E(ε)) ∩ v↑= ∅.
4.3.3 EEC Algorithm
Algorithm 1 shows the schematic of the EEC algorithm. It takes as input a BVAS B and
a target vector t. It uses an abstraction parameter i, initially 0, and defines the fam-
ily of abstractions Ci and Li. It iteratively computes the under-approximation Under
and over-approximation Over w.r.t. i. If the under-approximation covers t, it returns
“Cover”; if the over-approximation shows t cannot be covered, it returns “Uncover.”
Otherwise, it increments i and loops again. From Theorems 17 and 18, we conclude
that this algorithm eventually terminates with the correct result.
We briefly remark on two optimizations. First, instead of explicitly keeping forests
of derivations in Over and Under, we can only maintain the vectors that label the roots
of the derivations. The structure of the forest was required to prove termination in
[119], but can be reconstructed using only the vectors and the timestamps at which the
vectors were added. Second, in Under (resp. Over), we can only keep maximal vectors
(resp. extended vectors): if two vectors v1 ≤ v2 (resp. extended vectors u1 ≤∞ u2), we
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can omit v1 (resp. u1) and only keep v2 (resp. u2). Indeed, if t ≤ v1 in Under, we also
have t ≤ v2, and so the cover check succeeds in the EEC algorithm. Further, if t 6≤∞ u2
in Over, we have t 6≤∞ u1, and so the uncover check succeeds as well. We thank Sylvain
Schmitz for these observations.
4.4 Complexity Analysis
We now give an upper bound on the number of iterations of the EEC algorithm. Given
a BVAS B = (k,A,R1, R2) and a derivationD, for each internal node n, we write δ(n) ∈
Zk for the rule δ ∈ R1 ∪ R2 that is applied to derive D(n). We extend this notation to
truncated and extended derivations as well. Given a derivation D and an i ∈ Nk, we
define a truncated derivation under(D, i) inductively as follows:
1. If n is a leaf, then under(D, i)(n) = D(n).
2. If n has a child n′ and D(n) = D(n′) + δ(n), then under(D, i)(n) =
under(under(D, i)(n′) + δ(n), i).
3. If n has two children n′, n′′ andD(n) = D(n′)+D(n′′)+δ(n), then under(D, i)(n) =
under(under(D, i)(n′) + under(D, i)(n′′) + δ(n), i).
We can also define an extended derivation over(D, i) inductively by following the above
rules except that we replace all under(, i) by over(, i).
We start with some intuition in the special case of vector addition systems. A vector
addition system (VAS) V is a BVAS (k, {a}, R, ∅). For simplicity, we write a VAS as just
(k, a,R). Note that a derivation D of a VAS V is degenerated to a sequence of non-
negative vectors. In the following, we say the length of D instead of the height of D
for convenience in the VAS context. For VAS, Rackoff [106] proved the coverability
problem is EXPSPACE-complete by showing that if a covering witness (derivation)
exists, then there must exist one whose length h is at most doubly exponential in the
size of the VAS V and the target vector t. Further, there is a derivation of length at most
h in which the maximum constant is bounded by i := h · size(V) + max(t). This is
because in h steps, a vector can decrease at most h · size(V), so if any co-ordinate goes
over i, it remains higher than max(t) after executing the path. By the same argument,
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if there is an extended derivation of length at most h and constant i covering t, then we
can find a derivation for t.
If t is coverable, using the above argument and Theorem 17, we see that
Under(V, Ci) will contain a covering witness of t. If t is not coverable, then the above
argument shows that all extended derivations of Over(V, Li, Ci) of length at most h
will not cover t. However, there may be longer extended derivations in Over(V, Li, Ci).
For these, we can show that Over(V, Li, Ci) also contains a contraction of that extended
derivation of length at most h. In both cases, EEC terminates in i iterations, which is
doubly exponential in the size of the input.
We now show the bound for BVAS. The following lemma is the key observation in
the optimal algorithm of [35].
Lemma 20. [35] Given a BVAS B = (k,A,R1, R2) and a vector t ∈ Nk, if t is coverable in B,
then there is a covering witness (derivation) D whose height is at most (max((R1 ∪ R2)−) +
max(t) + 2)(3k)!.
Moreover, the following lemma shows that the maximum constant appearing in a
height-bounded derivation can remain polynomial in the height.
Lemma 21. Given a BVAS B = (k,A,R1, R2), a vector t ∈ Nk and a derivation D whose
height is at most h, for any bound i ≥ h ·max((R1 ∪R2)−) + max(t), D is a covering witness
of t iff under(D, i) is a covering witness of t.
Proof. Fix an i such that i ≥ h ·max((R1 ∪R2)−) + max(t).
⇐: It holds by Theorem 17.
⇒: Given a derivationD, we say that an index j is marked iff during the construction
of under(D, i), there is a vector v, which is computed after applying a rule and before
comparing to i, such that v[j] > i.
Given a derivation D, during the construction of under(D, i), for each index j ∈
[1, k], we check the following: If j is marked, then there is a node n such that
under(D, i)(n)[j] = i. Since height(under(D, i)) = height(D) ≤ h, we know that
the length of the path from n to the root ε is at most h. Hence under(D, i)(ε)[j] ≥
under(D, i)(n)[j]−h ·max((R1∪R2)−) = i−h ·max((R1∪R2)−) ≥ max(t) ≥ t[j]. On the
other hand, if j is not marked, we have that for all node n, under(D, i)(n)[j] = D(n)[j].
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Hence under(D, i)(ε)[j] = D(ε)[j] ≥ t[j]. Hence under(D, i) is a covering witness of
t.
We now prove the case where the target vector t is coverable. We show that
Under(B, Ci) contains a truncated derivation covering t, where i is bounded by a dou-
bly exponential function of the input.
Lemma 22. Given a BVAS B = (k,A,R1, R2) and a vector t ∈ Nk, if t is coverable in
B, then there exists F ∈ Under(B, Ci) such that t ≤ F(ε) for some i = 22O(n logn) , where
n = size(B) + size(t).
Proof. Let h be the bound from Lemma 20. Clearly, h = 22O(nlogn) . Pick i = h2. By
Lemma 20, there is a derivation D that covers t and whose height is at most h. Since
i = h2 ≥ h ·max((R1 ∪ R2)−) + max(t), by Lemma 21, there is a truncated derivation
under(D, i) that covers t. Moreover, compact(under(D, i)) is in Under(B, Ci).
Assume now that the target vector t ∈ Nk is not coverable. Lemma 23, from [35],
connects derivations of “small” height to extended derivations for high enough con-
stants. Lemma 24 shows that extended derivations of “large” height can be contracted.
The proof of this lemma mimicks the proof for (ordinary) derivations.
Lemma 23. [35] Given a BVAS (k,A,R1, R2), a vector t ∈ Nk, and a derivation D whose
height is at most h, for any bound i ≥ h ·max((R1 ∪R2)−) + max(t), D is a covering witness
of t iff over(D, i) is a covering witness of t.
Lemma 24. Let B = (k,A,R1, R2) be a BVAS and i ∈ N. If there is an extended derivation E
that covers t ∈ Nk, then there is a contraction of E whose height is at most (max((R1∪R2)−)+
max(t) + 2)(3k)!.
Finally, we prove that if t is not coverable, then Over(B, Li, Ci) does not find an
extended derivation covering t, for i as above.
Lemma 25. Given a BVAS B = (k,A,R1, R2) and t ∈ Nk, there is an i = 22O(n logn) , where
n = size(B) + size(t), such that if t is not coverable in B, then for all extended derivations
E ∈ Over(B, Li, Ci), we have E does not cover t.
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Proof. Suppose not. Then there is an E ∈ Over(B, Li, Ci) so that E covers t. Let h be the
bound from Lemma 24, and let i = h2. We consider two cases: (1) The height of E is at
most h. Then since i = h2 ≥ h ·max((R1 ∪R2)−) + max(t), by Lemma 23, t is coverable
in B. Contradiction. (2) The height of E is greater than h. By Lemma 24, there is a
contraction of E that covers t and whose height is at most h. Following the arguments
in case (1), we again get a contradiction.
Our main theorem follows from Lemmas 22 and 25.
Theorem 19. Given a BVAS B = (k,A,R1, R2) and a vector t ∈ Nk, the EEC algorithm
terminates in 22O(n logn) iterations, where n = size(B) + size(t).
The bound on the number of iterations also provides a bound on the overall asymp-
totic complexity of the algorithm. For BVAS, each iteration of the EEC algorithm per-
forms two instances of AND-OR reachability to perform the cover and the uncover
checks. Moreover, the size of the graph is at most doubly exponential in the size of the
BVAS, since the finite component of each vector is bounded by a doubly exponential
function of the input. Since AND-OR reachability can be performed in time linear in
the size of the graph, this gives a 2EXPTIME algorithm. For VAS, each iteration of the
EEC algorithm performs two instances of reachability to perform the checks. Thus,
if reachability is implemented in a space optimal (NLOGSPACE) way, we get an EX-
PSPACE upper bound. (In practice, reachability is implemented using a linear time
algorithm, which leads to a 2EXPTIME upper bound.)
Chapter 5
BBS: A Phase-Bounded Model
Checker for Asynchronous Programs
5.1 Introduction
In many asynchronous applications, a single-threaded worker process interacts with a
task queue. In each scheduling step of these programs, the worker takes a task from
the queue and executes its code atomically to completion. Executing a task can call
“normal” functions as well as post additional asynchronous tasks to the queue. Addi-
tionally, tasks can be posted to the queue by the environment. This basic concurrency
model has been used in many different settings: in low-level server and networking
code, in embedded code and sensor networks [46], in smartphone programming en-
vironments such as Android or iOS, and in Javascript. While the concurrency model
enables the development of responsive applications, interactions between tasks and
the environment can give rise to subtle bugs.
Bouajjani and Emmi introduced phase-bounding [13]: a bounded systematic search
for asynchronous programs that explores all program behaviors up to a certain phase
of asynchronous tasks. Intuitively, the phase of a task is defined as its depth in the task
tree: the main task has phase 1, and each task posted asynchronously by a task at phase
i has phase i + 1. Their main result is a sequentialization procedure for asynchronous
programs for a given fixed bound L on the task phase.
Though phase-bounding was well understood in theory, as far as we are aware, there
were no tools that evaluated the practical value of phase-bounding by showing that
many bugs in realistic applications can be effectively found within small phase bounds.
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We describe our tool BBS1 that implements phase-bounding to analyze C programs
generated from TinyOS applications, which are widely used in wireless sensor net-
works. Our empirical results indicate that a variety of subtle memory-violation bugs
are manifested within a small phase bound (3 in most of the cases). From our eval-
uation, we conclude that phase-bounding is an effective approach in bug finding for
asynchronous programs.
While our evaluation focuses on TinyOS, our tool is generic, and can be ported to
other platforms that employ a similar programming model. We leave certain exten-
sions, such as handling multiple worker threads, and the experimental evaluation of
this technique to other domains, such as smartphone applications or Javascript pro-
grams, for future work.
5.2 Sequentialization Overview
We now give an informal overview of Bouajjani and Emmi’s sequentialization proce-
dure. Given an asynchronous program, we first perform the following simple trans-
formation to reduce assertion checking to checking if a global bit is set: (1) we add a
global Boolean variable gError whose initial value is false ; (2) we replace each asser-
tion assert(e) by gError = !e; if(gError) return;; and (3) we add if(gError) return;
at the beginning of each task’s body and after each procedure call. The translation
ensures that an assertion fails iff gError is true at the end of main.
Intuitively, the sequentialization replaces asynchronous posts with “normal” func-
tion calls. These function calls carry an additional parameter that specifies the phase
of the call: the phase of a call corresponding to an asynchronous post is one more than
the phase of the caller. The sequentialization maintains several versions of the global
state, one for each phase, and calls the task on the copy of the global state at its phase.
The task can immediately execute on that global state, without messing up the global
state at the posting task’s phase. Since tasks are executed in FIFO order, notice that
when two tasks t1 and t2 are posted sequentially (at phase i, say), the global state after
running t1 is exactly the global state at which t2 starts executing. Thus, the copy of the
1BBS stands for Buffer phase-Bounded Sequentializer and can be downloaded at https://github.com/
zilongwang/bbs.
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global state at phase i correctly threads the global state for all tasks executing at phase
i.
The remaining complication is connecting the various copies of the global state. For
example, the global state when phase i starts is the same as the global state at the end of
executing phase i− 1, but we do not know what that state is (without executing phase
i − 1 first). Here, we use non-determinism. We guess the initial values of the global
state for each phase at the beginning of the execution. At the end of the execution, we
check that our guess was correct, using the then available values of the global states at
each phase. If the guess was correct, we check if some copy of gError is set to true: this
would imply a semantically consistent run that had an assertion failure.
We now make the translation a bit more precise. Given a phase bound L ∈ N, i.e.,
the maximal number of phases to explore, the sequentialization consists of four steps:
1. Track the phase of tasks at which they run in an execution. Intuitively, the phase
of main, the initial task, is 1, and if a task at phase i executes post p(e), then
the new task p is at phase i + 1. As an example, consider an error trace in Fig-
ure 5.1, task t0 is at phase 1, and tasks t1, t2 are at phase 2. This tracking can
be done by augmenting each procedure’s parameter list with an integer k that
tracks the phase of the procedure. Consequently, we also replace each normal
synchronous procedure call p(e) by p(e, k), and each asynchronous call post p(e)
by post p(e, k + 1).
2. Replace each post p(e, k + 1) by if(k < L) p(e, k + 1);, meaning that if some task
at phase k posts the task p and k+ 1 does not exceed the phase bound L, the task
p is immediately called and runs at phase k + 1 instead of putting it into the task
queue.
3. For each global variable g, create L copies of it, denoted by g[1], . . . , g[L]. Set the
initial value of the first copy g[1] to the initial value of g, and nondeterministically
guess the initial values of the other copies. For each statement of a program, if
g appears, then replace it by g[k]. Intuitively, the i-th copy of global variables is
used to record the evolution of global valuations along an execution at phase i.
92 Chapter 5. BBS: A Phase-Bounded Model Checker for Asynchronous Programs
FIGURE 5.1: An error trace before sequentialization. Circles denote the
starting or ending points of tasks. Solid lines denote the execution of
tasks. Triangles with dashed arrows indicate a post statement that posts
a task to the queue; triangles without dashed arrows are statements right
after post statements. The cross represents where the assertion fails. This
error trace is read as follows: task t0 runs, posts tasks t1 and t2 to the
task queue, and completes. Then t1 and t2 runs one after another. We
divided the error trace into execution segments (1)–(5), ordered by their
execution order. Values of the global state x at each segment are shown.
E.g., when segment (1) starts and ends, x = v0 and x = v1, respectively.
When segment (4) starts and ends, x = v4 and x = v5, respectively. Note
that due to the FIFO order, v3 = v4.
4. Run the initial task t0 at phase 1. When t0 returns, for each phase i ∈ [2, L], enforce
that the guessed initial values of the i-th copy are indeed equal to the final values
of the (i− 1)-th copy. Finally, a bug is found if some copy of gError equals true .
Step 4 is better explained through an example. We present how a sequentialized
execution in Figure 5.2 is related to an error trace of Figure 5.1. Suppose that the phase
bound L = 2 and the above first three steps have been done correctly.
FIGURE 5.2: The sequentialized error trace after sequentialization. Val-
ues of each copy of the global state x at each segment are shown. E.g.,
when segment (a) starts and ends, the first copy x[1] = v0 and x[1] = v1,
respectively. When segment (b) starts, the second copy x[2] is guessed to
v4. When segment (b) ends, x[2] = v5.
Consider segment (a) in Figure 5.2 and segment (1) in Figure 5.1. When task t0
starts, notice that the global state x in segment (1) and its first copy x[1] in segment
(a) are always the same because both are initialized to v0, and in each step of their
executions, the way that segment (1) modifies x is the same as the way that segment
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(a) modifies x[1]. In this case, we say that segment (a) uses the first copy of the global
state to “mimic” the evolution of the global state in segment (1).
Since the last statement of segment (a) is if(k < L) p(e, k+1); and the current phase
k = 1, segment (b) starts. Notice that segment (b) runs at phase 2 and only modifies the
second copy of the global state x[2]. Additionally, if we assume that the initial value of
x[2] are guessed correctly, i.e., v4, shown in Figure 5.2, then segment (b) uses the second
copy of the global state to “mimic” the evolution of the global state in segment (4).
After segment (b) completes, the control goes back to phase 1 and segment (c) starts.
Note that segment (b) does not modify the first copy x[1], and hence when segment (c)
starts, the value of x[1] is still v1. As a result, segment (c) uses the first copy of the global
state to “mimic” the evolution of the global state in segment (2).
After segment (c) completes, segment (d) starts. Note that since segment (c) does
not modify the second copy x[2], the value of x[2] is still v5 at the beginning of segment
(d), which is the same as the value of x at the beginning of segment (5). Hence segment
(d) uses x[2] to mimic x in segment (5). When segment (d) completes, segment (e) starts
to use the first copy x[1] to mimic segment (3).
Finally, When segment (e) completes, by using assume statements, we enforce that
the initial value for the second copy x[2] is indeed guessed to v4 in order to satisfy the
FIFO order imposed by the task queue. After the enforcement, the sequential execution
in Figure 5.2 and the error trace in Figure 5.1 reach exactly the same set of global states.
Hence we conclude that a bug is found.
5.3 Experimental Evaluation
We first provide a brief introduction to TinyOS applications. We then present the design
of BBS and elaborate on our experimental results.
5.3.1 TinyOS Execution Model
TinyOS [58] is a popular operating system designed for wireless sensor networks. It
uses nesC [46] as the programming language and provides a toolchain that translates
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nesC programs into embedded C code and then compiles the C code into executables
which are deployed on sensor motes to perform operations such as data collection.
TinyOS provides a programming language (nesC) and an execution model tailored
towards asynchronous programming. A nesC program consists of tasks and interrupt
handlers. When the program runs, TinyOS associates a scheduler, a stack, and a task
queue with it, and starts to run the “main” task on the stack. Tasks run to completion
and can post additional tasks into the task queue. When a task completes, the scheduler
dequeues the first task from the task queue, and runs it on the stack.
Hardware interrupts may arrive at any time (when the corresponding interrupt is
enabled). For instance, a timer interrupt may occur periodically so that sensors can
read meters, or a receive interrupt may occur to notice sensors that packets arrived
from outside. When an (enabled) interrupt occurs, TinyOS pre-empts the running task
and executes the corresponding interrupt handler defined in the nesC program. An
interrupt handler can also post tasks to the task queue, which is used as a mechanism
to achieve deferred computation and hide the latency of time-consuming operations
such as I/O. Once the interrupt handler completes, the interrupted task resumes.
5.3.2 BBS Overview
We implemented BBS to perform phase-bounded analysis for TinyOS applications. BBS
checks user-defined assertions as well as two common memory violations in C pro-
grams: out-of-bound array accesses (OOB) and null-pointer dereference.
The workflow of BBS is shown in Figure 5.3. First, given a TinyOS application con-
sisting of nesC files, the nesC compiler nescc combines them together and generates a
self-contained embedded C file. nescc supports many mote platforms and generates
different embedded C code based on platforms. In our work, we let nescc generate
embedded C code for MSP430 platforms.
BBS takes as inputs the MSP430 embedded C file containing assertions and a phase
bound, and executes three modules.
The first module performs preprocessing and static analysis on the C program to
instrument interrupts and assertions. Interrupt handlers are obtained from nescc-
generated attributes in the code. A naive way to instrument interrupts is to insert
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FIGURE 5.3: The workflow of BBS
them before each statement of the C program. However, if a statement does not have
potentially raced variables2, we do not need to instrument interrupts before it, because
the execution of such statements commutes with the interrupt handler: either order of
execution leads to the same final state. Thus BBS performs static analysis to compute
potentially raced variables and instruments interrupts accordingly.
The second module implements the sequentialization algorithm. The resulting se-
quential C program is fed into the bounded model checker CBMC [28, 73], which out-
puts either an error trace or “program safe” up to the phase bound and the bound
imposed by CBMC.
5.3.3 Experimental Experience with BBS
We used BBS to analyze eight TinyOS applications in the apps directory from TinyOS’s
source tree. These benchmarks cover most of the basic functionalities provided by a
sensor mote such as timers, radio communication, and serial transmission.
In Table 5.1, we summarize the size and complexity of these benchmarks in terms
of (1) lines of code in the cleanly reformatted ANSI C program after the preprocessing
stage, (2) the number of types of tasks that can be posted, (3) the number of types of
hardware interrupts that are expected, (4) the number of global variables as well as the
number of potentially raced variables (found by the static analysis).
In each of the first three benchmarks, we manually injected a realistic memory vi-
olation bug that programmers often make. The rest five benchmarks were previously
known to be buggy [17, 30, 80, 108]. The TestSerial benchmark contains two bugs and
2A potentially raced variable is accessed by both tasks and interrupt handlers, and at least one access
from both is a write.
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Benchmark LOC Tasks Interrupt Global Potentially raced
Types variables global variables
TestAdc 6738 9 2 100 19
TestEui 7467 13 3 138 17
TestAM 11259 13 5 154 27
BlinkFail 3153 3 1 64 5
TestSerial 6590 10 3 127 17
TestPrintf 6882 13 3 136 18
TestDissemination 13004 17 5 166 37
TestDip 17091 25 7 243 49
TABLE 5.1: TinyOS benchmarks
Benchmark Bug type Min phase Time Error Trace
Seq. (s) CBMC (s) (in steps)
TestAdc NullPtr 2 3.92 15.92 2014
TestEui OOB 2 3.97 12.78 9425
TestAM NullPtr 3 5.88 342.99 12925
BlinkFail OOB 3 2.55 2.69 3773
TestSerial OOB 4 3.75 23.92 13531
User-defined 4 39.01 14161
TestPrintf OOB 3 3.78 30.32 14154
TestDissemination NullPtr 3 5.95 843.68 17307
TestDip NullPtr 3 7.69 681.81 20274
TABLE 5.2: Experimental results
each of the rest has one bug. We ran BBS on these benchmarks to see whether it could
find these bugs efficiently within small phase bounds.
Experimental results All experiments were performed on a 2 core Intel Xeon X5650
CPU machine with 64GB memory and 64bit Linux (Debian/Lenny). Table 5.2 lists the
analysis results, showing that BBS successfully uncovered all bugs that are injected in
the first three benchmarks, as well as all previously known bugs in the rest five bench-
marks. We report the type of bugs, the minimal phases that are required to uncover
the bugs, the time used in both sequentialization and CBMC, and the lengths of error
traces. Notice that all bugs were found within small phase bounds, that is, at most
4 phases. This result indicates that the phase-bounded approach effectively uncovers
interesting bugs within small phase bounds for realistic C programs.
Chapter 6
LLSPLAT: A Concolic Testing Tool
with Bounded Model Checking
6.1 Introduction
With the increasing power of computers and advances in constraint solving technolo-
gies, an automated dynamic testing technique called concolic testing [52, 111] has re-
ceived much attention due to its low false positives and high code coverage [21, 25].
Concolic testing runs a program under test with a random input vector. It then gen-
erates additional input vectors by analyzing previous execution paths. Specifically,
concolic testing selects one of the branches in a previous execution path and gener-
ates a new input vector to steer the next execution toward the opposite branch of the
selected branch. By carefully selecting branches for the new inputs, concolic testing
avoids generating redundant input vectors that execute the same program path, and
thus enumerates all non-redundant program paths. In practice, concolic testing suffers
from path explosion: it has to enumerate a huge number of non-redundant execution
paths [3, 21, 25, 50].
On the other hand, bounded model checking (BMC) [29, 31, 73, 92] is a fully sym-
bolic testing technique. Given a program under test and a bound k, BMC unrolls loops
and inlines function calls k times to construct an acyclic program which is an under-
approximation of the original program. It then performs verification condition (VC) gen-
eration over the acyclic program to obtain a formula which encodes the acyclic program
and a property to check. The formula is then fed into a SAT solver. If the formula is
proved to be valid by the solver, the property holds. Otherwise, the solver provides a
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model from which we can extract an execution of the program that violates the prop-
erty. BMC provides a way to encode and reason about multiple execution paths using
a single formula, but its scalability is often limited by deterministic dependencies be-
tween program paths and data values.
A natural question is whether there is a way to combine concolic testing with BMC to
boost the exploration among the huge number of program paths? In this dissertation, we
provide a positive answer and propose a concolic+BMC algorithm. Intuitively, given
a program under test, the algorithm starts with the per-path search mode in concolic
testing while referring to the control flow graph (CFG) of the program to identify easy-
to-analyze portions of code that do not contain loops, recursive function calls, or other
instructions that are difficult to generate formulas using BMC. Whenever a concolic
execution encounters such a portion, the algorithm switches to the BMC mode and
generates a BMC formula for the portion, and identifies a frontier of hard-to-analyze in-
structions. The BMC formula summarizes the effects of all execution paths through the
easy-to-analyze portion up to the hard frontier. When the concolic execution reaches
the frontier, the algorithm switches back to the per-path search mode to handle the
cases that are difficult to summarize by BMC.
We have developed LLSPLAT, a tool that implements the concolic+BMC algorithm
for C programs. We evaluate LLSPLAT with two state-of-the-art concolic testing tools
CREST [19] and KLEE [20], using 36 programs from SVCOMP15 [117]. The evaluation
shows that (1) for the same time budget (an hour per program), LLSPLAT provides on
average 31%, 19%, 20%, 21% higher branch coverage than CREST’s four search strate-
gies, and on average 21% higher branch coverage than KLEE, and (2) LLSPLAT achieves
higher branch coverage quickly: in our experiments, it starts to outperform CREST and
KLEE after at most 3 minutes. In addition, we also evaluate LLSPLAT with the state-
of-the-art bounded model checker CBMC [73] using 13 sequentialized SystemC bench-
marks. The experiments show that LLSPLAT finds bugs more quickly than CBMC.
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6.2 A Motivating Example
We illustrate the inadequacy of concolic testing and BMC acting alone, and the benefits
of their combination, using the function foo below. The function runs in an infinite
loop, and receives two inputs in each iteration. One input c is a character and the other
input s is a character array. The function foo hits an error if the variable state is
9 and the input array s holds the string “reset”. Similar functions like foo are often
generated by lexers.
1 void foo() {
2 char c, s[6];
3 int state = 0;
4
5 while(1) {
6 c = input(); s = input();
7
8 if (c == ’[’ && state == 0) state = 1;
9 if (c == ’(’ && state == 1) state = 2;
10 if (c == ’{’ && state == 2) state = 3;
11 if (c == ’~’ && state == 3) state = 4;
12 if (c == ’a’ && state == 4) state = 5;
13 if (c == ’x’ && state == 5) state = 6;
14 if (c == ’}’ && state == 6) state = 7;
15 if (c == ’)’ && state == 7) state = 8;
16 if (c == ’]’ && state == 8) state = 9;
17 if (s[0] == ’r’ && s[1] == ’e’ && s[2] == ’s’ &&
18 s[3] == ’e’ && s[4] == ’t’ && s[5] == 0 && state == 9)
19 goto ERROR;
20 }
21 ERROR: assert(0);
22 }
LISTING 6.1: A motivating example
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To reveal the error in the function foo, concolic testing systematically explores all
execution paths of the function. Since the function foo runs in an infinite loop, the
number of distinct feasible executions is infinite. To perform concolic testing we need
to bound the number of iterations of the loop if we perform a depth-first search of the
execution paths. There are 17 possible choices of values of c and s that concolic testing
would consider, and at least 9 iterations are required to hit the error. Hence, concolic
testing will explore about 179 ≈ 1011 execution paths. It is unlikely that concolic test-
ing can hit the error in a reasonable time budget. We confirm this fact by testing the
function foo using CREST [19] and KLEE [20]. Both tools could not hit the error in an
hour. It is worth mentioning that, if there were code consisting of many conditionals
after the ERROR label instead of the assertion, things would get even worse because
concolic testing cannot reach them, which is a primary reason for poor branch cover-
age.
On the other hand, BMC by itself does not reveal the error in foo either. BMC
relies on the user to figure out an appropriate unrolling bound k to reach a deep error.
To prevent inadequate unrolling bound which leads to unsoundness, BMC adds an
unrolling assertion assert(¬cond) as the last statement of the k-th unrolling, where cond
is the looping condition of the unrolled loop. Thus, no matter what unrolling bound
k is set for the infinite loop in foo, an unrolling assertion assert(0) is always added,
which prevents BMC from hitting the actual error. We validated this fact by running
the example with CBMC [73].
In our concolic+BMC approach, whenever a concolic execution encounters a con-
ditional, it has a choice either to save a predicate representing that a particular branch
is taken along the execution as concolic testing does, or to save a BMC formula, for ex-
ample, that encodes the entire conditional. Which choice is taken depends on whether
the conditional is “simple” enough to generate a BMC formula easily. For example, a
conditional is simple if there are no loops and recursive function calls1 inside it.
1The program size after function inlining can be exponentially larger than the size of the original pro-
gram.
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Program P ::= (var g)∗ · Fn+
Functions Fn ::= f((var p)∗) · (var l)∗ ·BB+
Basic blocks BB ::= Inst∗ · TermInst
Instructions Inst ::= x←− e | f(e∗) | x←− input()
Basic block terminators TermInst ::= ret | br e BB1 BB2 | br BB | ERROR
Variables x ::= g | p | l
FIGURE 6.1: Program Model
Since all conditionals are simple in function foo, the concolic+BMC approach can
easily hit the error. We validated this fact by using LLSPLAT to test function foo. LL-
SPLAT found the bug in 3s.
6.3 Concolic Testing
LLSPLAT implements the concolic testing algorithm used in DART/CUTE [52, 111]. We
first review the algorithm, and then describe how LLSPLAT modifies it.
6.3.1 Program Model
We describe how concolic testing works on a simple language shown in Figure 6.1. A
program consists of a set of global variables and a set of functions. Each function consists
of a name, a sequence of formal parameters, a set of local variables, and a set of basic
blocks representing the control flow graph (CFG) of the function. Each basic block consists
of a list of instructions followed by a terminating instruction. There are three types of
instructions: x ←− e is an assignment, f(e∗) is a function call, and x ←− input()
indicates that the variable x is a program input. There are four types of terminating
instructions: ret is a return instruction, br e BB1 BB2 is a conditional branch, br BB is
an unconditional branch, andERROR indicates program abortion. We omit an explicit
syntax of expressions. We assume there is an entry function main that is not called
anywhere. We assume each function has an entry basic block, and every basic block of
the function is reachable from it.
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6.3.2 The Concolic Testing Algorithm
To test a program P , concolic testing tries to explore all execution paths of P . It first
instruments the program P by Algo 2, and outputs an instrumented program P ′. Ig-
nore the red-highlighted lines in the algorithms for now because they are used in the
concolic+BMC approach we describe later. Algo 3 repeatedly runs the instrumented
program P ′. Due to limited space, we omit the instrumentation for function calls, and
the code that bounds the search depth in the search strategy — these are identical to
previous work [52, 111].
Algo 2 first makes a copy P ′ of the program P , and inserts various global variables
and function calls which are used for the symbolic execution. It then returns the instru-
mented program P ′. Algo 4 presents the definitions of the instrumented functions. The
expressions enclosed in double quotes (“e”) represent syntactic objects. We denote &x
to be the address of a variable x.
The function initInput(“x”) initializes the input variable x using the input map I
in all runs except the first. The variable x is assigned randomly in the first run. The
function also saves a fresh symbolic variable for x in the symbolic store.
The function updateSymStore(“x”, “e”) updates x’s symbolic expression in the
symbolic store symStore based on the expression e. We write symexpr(“e”) to rep-
resent the symbolic expression by substituting each variable v in “e” with its symbolic
expression symStore[&v]. For example, if “e” = “a + b”, symStore[&a] = ea, and
symStore[&b] = eb, then symexpr(“e”) = ea + eb.
The function addPathConstraint(“e”, e) updates the path constraint pathC and the
coverage history branch_hist. Symbolic predicate expressions from the branching points
are collected in the list pathC. At the end of the execution, pathC contains all predicates
whose conjunction holds for the execution path. To explore paths of the program under
test, each run (except the first) is executed based on the coverage history computed
in the previous run. The coverage history is a list of BranchNodes. A BranchNode
has two boolean fields: isCovered records which branch is taken, and done records
whether both branches have executed in prior runs (with the same history up to this
branch node).
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Algorithm 2: Instrumentation
Program instrument(P):
P ′ ←− P
Add to P ′ global vars i←− 0, inputNo←− 0, symStore←− [], pathC ←− []
Govs←− {BB | BB is a governor in P}
Add to P ′ global vars bmcNo←− 0, currGov ←− None, init←− None
foreach BB ∈ P ′ do
if BB ∈ GR(gov) for some gov ∈ Govs then continue
foreach Inst ∈ BB do
switch Inst do
case x←− input()
Replace Inst by InitInput(“x”)
case x←− e
Add updateSymStore(“x”, “e”) before Inst
case br e BB1 BB2
if BB ∈ Govs then
Add startBMC(BB) before Inst
foreach d ∈ Dests(BB) do
Add endBMC(BB, d) as the 1st instruction of d
else
Add addPathConstraint(“e”, e) before Inst
case Return
if Inst is in the main function then
Add SolveConstraint() before Inst
case ERROR
Add print(“ERROR found”) before Inst
return P ′
The function solveConstraint() determines new inputs that forces the next run to
execute the last unexplored branch of the j-th conditional in branch_hist.
6.4 Combining Concolic Testing with BMC
We now present the concolic+BMC algorithm. The key observation is that given a
program P under test, the instrumented program for P can additionally refer to the
(static) CFG of P and perform static analysis at run time. Section 6.4.1 describes how
to identify program portions for BMC formula generation. Section 6.4.2 describes the
BMC formula generation algorithm. Section 6.4.3 integrates this with concolic testing.
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Algorithm 3: run_llsplat
void run_llsplat(P):
I ←− []; branch_hist←− []; completed←− false
CFGP ←− CFGofProgram(P )
while ¬completed do execute instrument(P )
6.4.1 Identifying Program Portions for BMC
Preliminaries Given a CFG, a basic block m dominates a basic block n if every path
from the entry basic block of the CFG to n goes through m. We denote Dom(m) to be
the set of basic blocks which m dominates. A depth-first search of the CFG forms a
depth-first spanning tree (DFST). There are edges in CFG that go from a basic block m to
an ancestor of n in DFST (possibly to m itself). We call these edges back edges, and recall
the following result [32].
Lemma 26. A directed graph is acyclic iff a depth-first search yields no back edge.
Governors, Governed Regions, and Destinations Given a basic block m, a basic
block n ∈ Dom(m) is polluted in Dom(m) in the following four cases: (1) n contains
function call instructions, (2) n has no successors, (3) n is the source or the target of a
back edge, or (4) n is reachable from a polluted basic block k ∈ Dom(m). A basic block
m effectively dominates a basic block n if n ∈ Dom(m) and n is not polluted in Dom(m).
We denote Edom(m) to be the set of basic blocks that m effectively dominates.
A basic block m is called a governor candidate if (1) the terminating instruction of
m is of the form br e BB1 BB2, (2) m dominates both BB1 and BB2, and (3)
Edom(BB1) and Edom(BB2) are not empty. Given a governor candidate m with
its two successors BB1 and BB2, the governed region of m, denoted by GR(m), is
Edom(BB1) ∪ Edom(BB2). A basic block n is a destination of GR(m) if n 6∈ GR(m)
and n is a successor of some basic block k ∈ GR(m). Let the set Dests(m) be all des-
tinations of GR(m). A basic block gov is a governor if gov is a governor candidate, and
there is no governor candidate m with gov ∈ GR(m). We prove the following lemma
about governors. The proof is in Section 6.7.
Lemma 27. For any governor gov, (1) GR(gov) is acyclic and does not have function calls,
(2) gov dominates every basic block BB ∈ GR(gov).
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Algorithm 4: Concolic Testing
void InitInput(“x”):
inputNo←− inputNo+ 1
j ←− inputNo
if I[j] is undefined then
x←− random()
I[j]←− x
else
x←− I[j]
// symj is a fresh variable for x
symStore[&x]←− symj
void updateSymStore(“x”, “e”):
symStore[&x]←− symexpr(“e”)
struct BranchNode:
isCovered : bool
done : bool
void addPathConstraint(“e”, b):
if b then
pathC[i]←− symexpr(“e”)
else
pathC[i]←− ¬symexpr(“e”)
if i < |branch_hist| then
if i = |branch_hist| − 1 then
branch_hist[i].done←− true
else
branch_hist[i]←−
BranchNode(isCovered : b, done :
false)
i←− i+ 1
void SolveConstraint():
j = i - 1
while j ≥ 0 do
if ¬branch_hist[j].done then
if branch_hist[j] is BmcNode then
foreach d such that ¬branch_hist[j].isCovered[d] do
if
∧
0≤k≤j−1 pathC[k] ∧ rmLastDest(path_c[j]) ∧
∨
c∈Edges_d[d] c has a
solution I ′ then
branch_hist←− branch_hist[0..j]
I ←− I ′
return
j ←− j − 1
else
branch_hist[j].isCovered←− ¬branch_hist[j].isCovered
pathC[j]←− ¬pathC[j]
if pathC[0..j] has a solution I ′ then
branch_hist←− branch_hist[0..j]
I ←− I ′
return
j ←− j − 1
else
j = j − 1
if j < 0 then completed←− true
Example Consider the program in Fig 6.2a. BB0 is a governor. Its governed region
GR(BB0) includes BB1, BB2, BB4, BB5, and BB6, which are inside the red dash
circle. BB3 and BB7 are the destinations in Dests(BB0). Though BB2 is a governor
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candidate, it is not a governor because it is in GR(BB0).
(A) A program under test (B) Variable renaming
FIGURE 6.2: An Example
6.4.2 Translating Governed Regions to BMC Formulas
A governed region is ideal for generating a BMC formula because it is acyclic, does not
have function calls, and is “sufficiently” large in the sense that it includes as many (un-
polluted) basic blocks as its governor governs. We present our algorithm that translates
a governed region to a BMC formula, and provide an example.
The BMC Formula Generation Algorithm
Given a governor gov, we construct a BMC formula φ for GR(gov) in five steps:
1. Renaming variables inGR(gov) into an SSA-form. LetAccV ars be the set of vari-
ables accessed by the instructions in GR(gov). Let a version map V be a map from
each variable x ∈ AccV ars to a variable xα with a version α ∈ N. We naturally
extend the notation V to expressions: we denote V(e) to be an expression that
replaces each variable x in e by V(x). SinceGR(gov) is acyclic, there exists a topo-
logical ordering over the basic blocks in GR(gov). Without loss of generality, let
BB1, BB2, . . . , BBn be the list of all basic blocks in GR(gov) after a topological
sort, where n is the number of basic blocks in GR(gov). For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n and
Chapter 6. LLSPLAT: A Concolic Testing Tool with Bounded Model Checking 107
each instruction I in BBi, we rename each variable in I according to the version
map V , and update the version map V . Initially, for each x ∈ AccV ars, V(x) = x0.
If I is an assignment x ←− e and V(x) = xα, then we rewrite I to xα+1 ←− V(e)
and set V(x) = xα+1. If I is a conditional branch br e BB1 BB2, then we rewrite
I to br V(e) BB1 BB2.
2. Create a boolean variable gBB for each basic block BB ∈ GR(gov).
3. Compute an edge map Edges that maps each basic block BB ∈ GR(gov) ∪
Dests(gov) to a list of edge formulas as follows. For each BB ∈ GR(gov), if its
terminating instruction is br e BB1 BB2, then we add gBB ∧ e to Edges[BB1],
and add gBB∧¬e toEdges[BB2]; if it is br BB1, then we add gBB toEdges[BB1].
Let the governor’s terminating instruction be br e BB1 BB2. Let e0 be an expres-
sion obtained by replacing each variable x in e with x0. We set Edges[BB1] = e0
and Edges[BB2] = ¬e0.
4. Compute a block map Blks that maps each basic block BB ∈ GR(gov) to a block
formula. For each BB ∈ GR(gov), let I1, I2, . . . , Ik be the non-terminating instruc-
tions in BB. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ k, if Ii is xα ←− e, we define an instruction formula
ci to be xα = ite(gBB, e, xα−1). We set Blks[BB] =
∧
1≤i≤k ci.
5. Create the final BMC formula φ, defined as follows:
φ :
∧
BB∈GR(gov)
gBB = ∨
c∈Edges[BB]
c
 ∧Blks[BB]

Intuitively, φ claims that for each basic block BB ∈ GR(gov), (1) BB is taken (i.e.,
gBB is true) if one of its predecessor is taken, and (2) the block formula of BB
must hold.
Our BMC formula generation algorithm has the following important property. The
proof is in Section 6.7.
Theorem 20. Let gov be a governor and T be an arbitrary topological ordering over GR(gov).
After the BMC algorithm is done w.r.t. T , for any destination d ∈ Dests(gov), (1) the formula
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BB Edges[BB] Blks[BB]
BB1 {x0 > y0} x3 = ite(gBB1, x2− y0, x2)
BB2 {¬(x0 > y0)} x1 = ite(gBB2, y0− x0, x0)
BB3 {gBB1, gBB6 ∧ y1 6= 9}
BB4 {gBB2 ∧ x1 > y0} x4 = ite(gBB4, y0− x3, x3)
BB5 {gBB2 ∧ ¬(x1 > y0)} x2 = ite(gBB5, y0− x1, x1)
BB6 {gBB4, gBB5 ∧ x2 6= 0} y1 = ite(gBB6, x4, y0)
BB7 {gBB5 ∧ ¬(x2 6= 0), gBB6 ∧ ¬(y1 6= 9)}
TABLE 6.1: Edge formulas and block formulas
φ ∧∨c∈Edges[d] c encodes all executions from gov to d, and (2) for every execution ρ from gov
to d, the final version of each variable x in φ represents the value of x when ρ enters d.
Example We illustrate our BMC algorithm by reusing the example in Fig 6.2a. The
topological order we use for the variable renaming is BB2, BB5, BB1, BB4, BB6. Af-
ter variable renaming, the resulting program is in Fig 6.2b. After Step 4 of the algo-
rithm, the edge map Edges and the block map Blks are shown in Table 6.1.
To give a flavor of the correctness of Theorem 20(2), we examine an execution ρ :
BB0, BB1, BB3 as an example. When ρ enters the destinationBB3, the largest version
of x and y along ρ is x3 and y0, but their final versions in φ are x4 and y1. However,
since BB2, BB4, BB5 and BB6 are not taken along ρ, we have x4 = x3, x2 = x1 = x0,
and y1 = y0. Since BB1 is taken, we have x3 = x2 − y0. Thus x4 = x0 − y0 and
y1 = y0. We conclude that x4 and y1 represent the values of x and y when ρ enters the
destination BB3.
6.4.3 Integrating BMC Formulas with Concolic Testing
To integrate BMC with concolic testing, we add the red lines in Algo 2, 3, and 4. Dur-
ing the instrumentation in Algo 2, we first compute a set Govs of all governors of the
program P . Since basic blocks in governed regions are used to generate BMC formu-
las, we skip instrumenting them. When a basic block BB has two successors, if BB
is a governor, we instrument a function call startBMC(BB) before BB’s terminating
instruction, and for each destination d ∈ Dests(BB), we instrument a function call
endBMC(BB, d) as the first instruction of d. If BB is not a governor, we perform the
old instrumentation in concolic testing.
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In Algo 3, we read the CFG of the uninstrumented program P because it is used to
generate BMC formulas along concolic executions.
Algorithm 5: startBMC and endBMC
void startBMC(gov):
currGov ←− gov; bmcNo←− bmcNo+ 1
init←− ∧x∈AccV ars(gov) (xbmcNo0 = symStore[&x])// xbmcNo0 is a fresh variable
struct BmcNode:
isCovered : BasicBlock −→ bool
Edges_d : BasicBlock −→ formula
done : bool
void endBMC(gov, d):
if currGov 6= gov then return
(φ,Vfinal, Edges)←− doBMC(CFGP , gov)
if i <| branch_hist | then
if i =| branch_hist | −1∧∀d′ ∈ Dests(gov)\{d}. branch_hist[i].isCovered[d′]
then branch_hist[i].done←− true
else
branch_hist[i]←− BmcNode(isCovered : λdest ∈ Dests(gov). false,
Edges_d : λdest ∈ Dests(gov). addSup(Edges[dest], bmcNo), done : false)
branch_hist[i].isCovered[d]←− true
pathC[i]←− init ∧ addSup(φ ∧∨c∈Edges[d] c, bmcNo)
i←− i+ 1
foreach x ∈ AccV ars(gov) do SymStore[&x]←− addSup(Vfinal(x), bmcNo)
The definition of startBMC(gov) is given in Algo 5. It saves the governor gov
that will be used to generate a BMC formula using currGov. Then it increments
bmcNo, which records the number of BMC formulas that have been generated so far
along the concolic execution. It then uses init to “glue” the execution before enter-
ing GR(gov) with the BMC formula for GR(gov). More concretely, for each variable
x ∈ AccV ars(gov), an equation xBmcNo0 = symStore[&x] is created, and init is the
conjunction of all such equations. Intuitively, the initial version xBmcNo0 represents the
value of x when the concolic execution enters GR(gov), which is also represented by
symStore[&x].
The definition of endBMC(gov, d) is given in Algo 5. If the passed-in governor gov
is the one saved in currGov, it performs the BMC generation algorithm described in
Section 6.4.2 to obtain a BMC formula φ for the governed regionGR(gov), the final ver-
sion map Vfinal, and the edge map Edges. Moreover, the coverage history branch_hist
is updated. We extend branch_hist to be a list ofBranchNode∪BmcNode. ABmcNode
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has three fields: isCovered records which destinations have been covered in prior runs,
Edges_d maps each destination to its edge formulas, and done records whether all
destinations have been covered in prior runs. Given a formula ψ and a number j,
we denote addSup(ψ, j) to be the formula obtained by replacing each variable x in ψ
with a new variable xj . We first create a formula φ ∧∨c∈Edges[d] c which represents all
executions from the governor gov to the destination d by Theorem 20. Since the gov-
erned region may be reached multiple times along an execution, we compute a formula
ψ ≡ addSup(φ ∧∨c∈Edges[d] c, bmcNo) which specifies that ψ is the bmcNo-th BMC for-
mula along the execution. We then add init∧ψ to the path constraint. Finally, to let the
concolic execution proceed, for each variable x ∈ AccV ars(gov), we update the sym-
bolic store so that symStore[&x] represents the value of x when the execution enters
the destination d. By Theorem 20, no matter which execution from gov to d is taken, the
final version Vfinal(x) always represents the value of x at that moment. Thus, we set
symStore[&x] accordingly.
The function SolveConstraint is extended as shown in Algo 4. If the node
branch_hist[j] is a BmcNode, we find an uncovered destination d, and asks if there is
an execution that goes to d. The formula rmLastDest(pathC[j]) is defined by removing
the disjunction of edge formulas of d′ from pathC[j] where d′ is the destination covered
by the just terminating execution. If there are new inputs I ′ for such an execution to d,
a new run is started with inputs I ′.
Example
We again reuse the example in Fig 6.2a. Suppose LLSPLAT randomly generates x = 10
and y = 5 in the first run. When the run terminates, the path constraint is of size 1, and
pathC[0] = init∧φ∧ψd, defined as follows. Note that the superscript 1 of the variables
in pathC[0] represents that it is the first BMC formula generated along the run. The
symbolic variables sym1 and sym2 are created for x and y when InitInput(“x”) and
InitInput(“y”) are called.
Chapter 6. LLSPLAT: A Concolic Testing Tool with Bounded Model Checking 111
The coverage history branch_hist is of size one. branch_hist[0] is a BmcNode de-
fined below:
Now LLSPLAT searches for new inputs for the next run. Since BB7 is the only
uncovered destination based on branch_hist[0].isCovered, LLSPLAT solves the formula
init∧φ∧∨c∈branch_hist[0].Edges_d[BB7] c, that is, LLSPLAT tries to find a feasible execution
path that leads to BB7 containing ERROR. Note that there are three execution paths
to BB7, and the formula encodes all. LLSPLAT has a choice to produce inputs that
follow any of them to BB7. Suppose that LLSPLAT generates a model m in which
m(sym1) = 0 and m(sym2) = 0. LLSPLAT starts the second run by setting x = 0 and
y = 0. The run follows the path BB0, BB2, BB5, BB7, and terminates. Since there is
no uncovered destination, LLSPLAT terminates after the second run.
6.5 Experiments and Evaluation
We have developed a tool LLSPLAT2 that implements the concolic+BMC algorithm.
The evaluation of LLSPLAT is divided into two parts. In the first part, we compare
LLSPLAT with two publicly available concolic testing tools, CREST [19] and KLEE [20].
CREST provides four search strategies: (1) an incremental depth-first search(IDFS), (2)
a control-flow-guided search(CFG), (3) a uniform random search(UR), and (4) a random
search selecting unexplored branches randomly(RB). Thus we need to compare against
2LLSPLAT can be downloaded at https://github.com/zilongwang/llsplat.
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four versions of CREST. In the second part, we compare LLSPLAT with the state-of-the-
art bounded model checker CBMC [73]. All experiments were performed on a 2 core
Intel Xeon E5-2667 v2 CPU machine with 256GB memory and 64bit Linux.
6.5.1 Comparing LLSPLAT with CREST and KLEE
The goal of the experiments is to answer the following two research questions:
(Q1) Given an adequate time budget, which tool has higher branch coverage?
(Q2) Given a limited time budget, which tool has higher branch coverage?
Note that the fact that a tool A outperforms a tool B under an adequate time budget
does not imply that A also outperforms B under a limited time budget. For example, it
may happen thatA starts outperformingB after a day of testing, but the testing budget
is restricted to 10 minutes for each program under test. In this case, B is preferred to A.
We used the ntdriver-simplified and ssh-simplified benchmarks (36 pro-
grams in total) in SVCOMP15 [117] as the evaluation subjects. The benchmark sizes
range over 218–2948 lines of code: 3 of the benchmarks have 200–700 lines, 29 of them
have 701–2000 lines, and 4 of them have 2001–3000 lines. Since the coverage depends
on the initial random input vector, we conducted the experiments 10 times and calcu-
lated the average coverage.
To answer the first question, we assume that one hour is an adequate time budget,
and ran LLSPLAT, KLEE, and CREST with its four search strategies. Fig 6.4 presents
the branch coverage results for each benchmark. We observe that LLSPLAT achieves
the highest branch coverage for all benchmarks: it is on average 31%, 19%, 20%, 21%
higher than IDFS, CFG, UR, and RB, respectively, and is on average 21% higher than
KLEE. We also provide a histogram in Fig 6.3 which clusters benchmarks according to
their branch coverage improvement. We observe LLSPLAT achieves 15%–35% higher
branch coverage for most of the benchmarks than KLEE and CREST, which is close to
the average improvement.
To answer the second question, we compute the crossing time from which on LL-
SPLAT always outperforms CREST and KLEE on the benchmarks. More concretely, for
each benchmark, we analyzed a graph that described how branch coverage evolved
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FIGURE 6.3: A histogram for branch coverage improvement of LLSPLAT.
X-axis shows three ranges of branch coverage improvement. Each range
has five bars, from left to right, corresponding to KLEE, CREST with four
strategies IDFS, CFG, UR, and RB, respectively. Y-axis is the number of
benchmarks.
in an hour using LLSPLAT, CREST, and KLEE, and recorded the time from which on
the branch coverage reported by LLSPLAT is always higher than the one reported by
CREST and KLEE. Fig 6.5 shows the results. The crossing time of 34 benchmarks is
below 50s. The 23th benchmark is the worst (172s). Thus we conclude that when the
testing time budget is limited, if it is not too limited (i.e., below 172s), LLSPLAT is still
preferable.
6.5.2 Comparing LLSPLAT with CBMC
The goal of the experiments is to see if LLSPLAT can find bugs more quickly than
CBMC. To achieve the goal, We used 13 sequentialized SystemC benchmarks [27]. They
are known to be buggy, and we test them with LLSPLAT and CBMC to record the time
to find the bugs. Table 6.2 shows the results. We observe that LLSPLAT finds bugs more
quickly than CBMC in 11 benchmarks (except kundu1 and transmitter1), which indi-
cates that our concolic+BMC approach is better than pure bounded model checking.
6.6 Related Work
Concolic Testing Several approaches analyze states (i.e., path constraint and symbolic
store) maintained by concolic testing so as to explore the search space efficiently. Gode-
froid [50] introduced compositional concolic testing. The work was later expended to
do compositional concolic testing on demand [2]. The main idea is to generate function
summaries for an analyzed function based on the path constraint, and to reuse them if
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FIGURE 6.4: Branch coverage. X-axis denotes the benchmarks sorted by
alphabetical order over their names. Y-axis is branch coverage. Each
benchmark has six bars representing different tools. Bars from left to
right correspond to LLSPLAT, KLEE, and CREST with four strategies
IDFS, CFG, UR, and RB, respectively.
the function is called again with similar arguments. Instead of computing dynamic un-
derapproximations of summaries, we compute exact summaries of governed regions
using the static representation of the CFG. Kuznetsov et al. [74] introduced the dynamic
state-merging (DSM) technique. DSM maintains a history queue of states. Two states
may merge (depending on a separate and independent heuristic for SMT query diffi-
culty) if they coincide in the history queue. Our concolic+BMC approach is different
because we do not analyze the states to merge execution paths.
Moreover, several approaches combine other testing techniques with concolic test-
ing together. Majumdar and Sen introduced hybrid concolic testing [87] that combines
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FIGURE 6.5: The crossing time from which on LLSPLAT outperforms
KLEE and CREST. X-axis denotes the benchmarks sorted by alphabet-
ical order over their names. Y-axis is the cross time. Each benchmark
has five bars, from left to right, corresponding to KLEE and CREST with
four strategies IDFS, CFG, UR, and RB, respectively.
random testing and concolic testing. Boonstoppel et al. proposed RWSet [11], a path
pruning technique identifying redundant execution paths based on similarity of their
live variables. Jaffar et al. [61] used interpolation to subsume execution paths that are
guaranteed not to hit a buggy location. Avgerino et al. [5] combined static data-flow
program analysis techniques with concolic testing. Santelices et al. [109] introduced
a technique that merges multiple execution paths based on the control dependency
graph of a program. To our best knowledge, we are the first who propose to combine
bounded model checking techniques with concolic testing to alleviate path explosion.
A lot of work has focused on search heuristics to quickly guide execution to a
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Benchmark CBMC (s) LLSPLAT (s)
kundu1 85 timeout
kundu2 419 0.013
pc_sfifo1 38 0.112
pc_sfifo2 27 0.420
pipeline timeout 0.111
token_ring1 56 2
token_ring2 141 12
token_ring3 269 105
toy1 158 0.024
toy2 151 0.031
transmitter1 16 22
transmitter2 75 21
transmitter3 159 52
TABLE 6.2: Testing time for sequentialized SystemC benchmarks.
Timeout is set to 30min.
specific branch [19, 20, 53, 81, 113, 121]. Search heuristics are orthogonal to our ap-
proach. Although we have implemented concolic+BMC with a naive bounded depth-
first search, the algorithm can be used with other search strategies as well.
Bounded Model Checking VC generation approaches in modern BMC tools can be
classified into two categories. The first one is based on weakest preconditions [36] by
performing a demand-driven backward analysis from the points of interest [7, 24, 42,
77]. The other one encodes a program in a forward manner, such as CBMC [73], ES-
BMC [31], and LLBMC [92]. We are inspired by the VC generation algorithm of CBMC,
and thus conceptually it is the closest work to our BMC algorithm. The VC generation
of CBMC differs from ours in four ways. First, though CBMC also does variable renam-
ing, it does it using a fixed order of basic blocks. We relax this requirement and prove
that any topological order works for variable renaming. This is important to us, be-
cause we do not have to follow the fixed order CBMC uses. In fact, we use the reverse
post order of a governed region as our topological order for variable renaming because
it has been computed during the construction of depth first spanning tree which iden-
tifies back edges. We save the computation time in this way. Secondly, though the
VC generation of CBMC also computes edge formulas for each basic block in a given
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acyclic program, all predecessors of the basic block contribute to deriving edge formu-
las. However, this is not the case in ours. For example, suppose that gov is governor,
d is a destination of GR(gov), and there is a predecessor BB 6∈ GR(gov) of d. This
case may happen because BB is polluted. Then our BMC algorithm does not derive
an edge formula from BB for d. Thirdly, CBMC does not have the notion of destina-
tions. Since a governed region may have multiple destinations, it is not clear that no
matter which destination is chosen, whether the final version of variables in the for-
mula φ that encodes the governed region always represents the value of the variables
when the destination is reached. We prove this fact. Lastly, since CBMC encodes the
entire program, it does not identify acyclic portions of a program using the notions such
as governors. It also does function inlining and loop unrolling, which we do not.
ESBMC follows the VC generation algorithm of CBMC. It extends BMC to check
concurrent programs. LLBMC explicitly models the memory as a variable representing
an array of bytes, which requires LLBMC to distinguish if a little-endian or big-endian
architecture is analyzed. They are orthogonal to LLSPLAT.
Software Model Checking Large-block encoding [9] is widely used in software
model checkers. It encodes control flow edges into one formula, for computing the ab-
stract successor during predicate abstraction. Selective enumeration using SAT solvers
[56] and symbolic encodings for program regions, e.g., to summarize loops [72], have
been successfully exploited in software model checking.
6.7 Proof Details
6.7.1 Preliminaries
Given a control flow graph (CFG) of a function, BB0, BB1, . . . , BBn is a path of CFG
if for each 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, (BBi, BBi+1) is an edge of CFG. Given an edge (a, b) of the
CFG, we call a the source of the edge and b the target of the edge. A state s of a program
is a function that maps each variable x in the program to a value in the domain of x.
Given two states s and s′, we denote s BB−−→ s′ to be an execution such that by executing
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the instructions of BB with the initial state s, the execution ends up with the state s′.
Occasionally, if we are not interested in s or s′, we omit them and write BB−−→ s′ or s BB−−→.
Given a formula ψ, an assignment m of ψ is a function that maps each variable x in
ψ to a value in the domain of x. An assignment m is a model of ψ, denoted by m |= ψ, if
ψ evaluates to true by m.
Given a set S of variables, a version map V is a renaming function that maps each
variable x ∈ S to a variable xα for some α ∈ N. We write V(S) to be the set of variables
{y | ∃x ∈ S. y = V(x)}. Given a version map V and an assignment m to the variables
in V(S), we denote m|V to be an assignment to the variables in S such that for each
variable x ∈ S, m|V(x) = m(V(x)).
We first prove properties of effective dominance sets and governors. We then prove
properties of our BMC algorithm.
6.7.2 Properties of Effective Dominance Sets and Governors
Lemma 28. Given two basic blocks m and n, if n ∈ Edom(m), then for each path from m to
n, any basic block k along the path is not polluted.
Proof. Suppose not. Then there is a path from m to n along which there is some k that
is polluted. We consider two cases. Case 1: m = n. Then k must be n. Thus n is
polluted and is not in Edom(m). Contradiction. Case 2: m 6= n. Then p : m →∗ k →+
n. Since k is polluted and n is reachable by k, n is polluted and is not in Edom(m).
Contradiction.
Lemma 29. For any basic block m, Edom(m) is acyclic.
Proof. Suppose not. Then by Lemma 26, there is a basic block n ∈ Edom(m) such that n
is the source of a back edge. Hence n is polluted and is not inEdom(m). Contradiction.
Lemma 30. Let m be a governor. The governed region GR(m) is acyclic.
Proof. Let BB1 and BB2 be the successors of m. By Lemma 29, Edom(BB1) and
Edom(BB2) are acyclic. Moreover, there is not any edge a→ b where a ∈ Edom(BB1)
and b ∈ Edom(BB2). Otherwise, we can construct a path m → BB1 →∗ a → b which
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bypasses BB2, which indicates that BB2 does not dominate b. Similarly, we can prove
that there is not any edge a → b where a ∈ Edom(BB2) and b ∈ Edom(BB1). Thus,
GR(m) is acyclic.
Lemma 31. Let m be a governor. The governed region GR(m) does not have any function
calls.
Proof. Let BB1 and BB2 be the successors of m. By Lemma 28, Edom(BB1) and
Edom(BB2) do not have function calls. Since GR(m) = Edom(BB1) ∪ Edom(BB2),
so does GR(m).
Lemma 32. A governor m dominates every basic block n in its governed region GR(m).
Proof. By definition of GR(m), we know that n is either dominated by BB1 or BB2
where BB1 and BB2 are the successors of m. Without loss of generality, let us assume
that BB1 dominates n. Since m is a governor, m dominates BB1. Since dominance
relation is transitive, m dominates n.
6.7.3 Properties of the BMC Generation Algorithm
Given a governor gov and a basic blockBB ∈ GR(gov), note that if gBB is true, then the
block formula Blks[BB] encodes the program logic of BB in SSA form, which leads to
Lemma 33.
Lemma 33. Given a program P and a governor gov, let V,V ′ be the version map before and
after the SSA variable renaming for BB. The following two statements hold: (1) If an assign-
ment m with m(gBB) = true is a model of Blks[BB], then m|V
BB−−→ m|V ′ is an execution
of P . (2) If s BB−−→ s′ is an execution of P , then there is a model m of Blks[BB] such that
m(gBB) = true , m|V = s, and m|V ′ = s′.
Proof. Proof by induction on the number of instructions in BB.
Given a governor gov, we prove that, for any destination d ∈ Dests(gov), (1) the
formula φ ∧ gd where gd =
∨
e∈Edges[d] e represents all executions from gov to d, and (2)
the final version of each variable x ∈ AccV ars(gov) in φ always represents the value of
x when an execution from gov to d reaches d.
120 Chapter 6. LLSPLAT: A Concolic Testing Tool with Bounded Model Checking
Lemma 34. Given a governor gov, for any topological ordering T over GR(gov) and any
destination d ∈ Dests(gov), if m is a model of φ ∧ gd, then (1) we can construct an execution
ρ from the governor gov to the destination d, and (2) for each variable x ∈ AccV ars(gov), if
xα is the final version of x in φ, then m(xα) is the value of x when the execution ρ enters the
destination d.
Proof. Since m is a model of φ ∧ gd, let the set Taken be {BB | m(gBB) = true}, i.e., the
set of all basic blocks whose guard gBB is set to true by m. Since gd is true , we know
that the guard of a predecessor of d holds, the guard of a predecessor of the predecessor
of d holds, and so on. This indicates that there is a path from gov to d along which the
guards gBB of all basic blocks BB ∈ GR(gov) are set to true by m. Moreover, the
guards gBB of all basic blocks BB ∈ GR(gov) that are not shown along the path are set
to false by m since the guards of two successors cannot hold at the same time. Hence
we know that the set Taken are the intermediate basic blocks of the path from gov to d.
FIGURE 6.6: Topological ordering of the governed region
As shown in Fig 6.6, let BB1, . . . , BBi1 , . . . , BBi2 , . . . , BBik , . . . BBn be the se-
quence of basic blocks in GR(gov) sorted by the topological ordering T such that each
BBij ∈ Taken where 1 ≤ j ≤ k. Note that gov,BBi1 , BBi2 , . . . , BBik , d is a path. Oth-
erwise, T is not a topological ordering. We now construct an execution along this path.
For each BBi ∈ GR(gov) where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let Vi be the version map before BBi and V ′i
be the one after BBi. By Lemma 33, we know that for each 1 ≤ j ≤ k, m|Vij
BBij−−−→ m|V ′ij
is an execution. Also, since the guards gBB of all basic block BB 6∈ Taken are set to
false by the model m, we have
m|V1 = m|Vi1 , m|V ′i1 = m|Vi2 , . . . , m|V
′
ik−1
= m|Vik , m|V ′ik
= m|V ′n
Hence,
gov−−→ m|Vi1
BBi1−−−→ m|Vi2
BBi2−−−→ . . . BBik−1−−−−−→ m|Vik
BBik−−−→ m|V ′n
d−→ is an execution
of the program P . Moreover, since m|V ′n
d−→, the final version of each variable x in the
model m represents the value of x when the execution enters the destination d.
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Lemma 35. Given a governor gov, for any topological ordering T over GR(gov) and any
destination d ∈ Dests(gov), if there is an execution from gov to d, then we can construct a
model m for the formula φ ∧ gd.
Proof. Let gov−−→ s0 BBi1−−−→ s1 BBi2−−−→ s2 . . .
BBik−−−→ sk d−→ be an execution from the governor
gov to a destination d, as shown in Fig 6.7.
FIGURE 6.7: An execution from the governor gov to a destination d
Let BB1, BB2, . . . , BBn be the sequence of basic blocks in GR(gov) sorted by the
topological ordering T . Note that for 2 ≤ j ≤ k, BBij−1 must occur before BBij along
the sequence. Otherwise, T is not a topological ordering. We present this fact in Fig 6.8.
FIGURE 6.8: Topological ordering of the governed region
For each BBi ∈ GR(gov) where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let Vi be the version map before BBi
and V ′i be the one after BBi. We now construct an assignment m and prove that m is a
model of φ ∧ gd.
Let Taken be the set {BBij | 1 ≤ j ≤ k}. For each basic block BB ∈ GR(gov), if
BB ∈ Taken, then we set m(gBB) = true , m(gBB) = false otherwise. For each variable
x ∈ AccV ars(gov), we construct the assignment m in four steps:
(1) If V1(x) = xl and Vi1(x) = xh, then for each xα with l ≤ α ≤ h, m(xα) = s0(x);
(2) For each j ∈ [1, k − 1], if V ′ij (x) = xl and Vij+1(x) = xh, then for each xα with
l < α ≤ h, m(xα) = sj(x),
(3) If V ′ik(x) = xl and V ′n(x) = xh, then for each xα with l < α ≤ h, m(xα) = sk(x);
(4) For each j ∈ [1, k], by Lemma 33, we know that there is a model mj of Blks[BBij ]
such that mj(gBBij ) = true , mj |Vij = sj−1 and mj |V ′ij
= sj . If Vij (x) = xl and
V ′ij (x) = xh, then for each xα with l < α ≤ h, m(xα) = mj(x).
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Note that each variable xα is assigned exactly once in the above construction of m,
which means m does not make different values to xα. Now we show m is indeed a
model of φ ∧ gd. We consider two cases depending on whether a basic block BB ∈
GR(gov) is in the set Taken.
1. Suppose BB ∈ Taken. Then BB is BBij for some j ∈ [1, k]. First, m |=
Blks[BBij ] according to Step 4 of the above construction. Secondly, m evaluates
gBBij to true. Lastly,m evaluates
∨
c∈Edges[BBij ] c to true by proving the following
cases.
(a) BBij is the left successor of the governor gov. Let br e BBij BB2 be the
terminating instruction of gov. Since s0 |= e and m|V1 = s0, we have m |=
V1(e), and thus m |=
∨
c∈Edges[BBij ] c.
(b) BBij is the right successor of the governor gov. This case is proved similarly
as case (a).
(c) BBij is the unique successor of the basic block BBij−1 ∈ Taken. Since
m(gBBij−1 ) = true and gBBij−1 ∈ Edges[BBij ], we have that m |=∨
c∈Edges[BBij ] c.
(d) BBij is the left successor of BBij−1 ∈ Taken. Let br e BBij BB2 be the
terminating instruction of BBij−1 . Since sj−1 |= e and m|V ′ij−1 = sj−1, we
have m |= V ′ij−1(e). Moreover, since m(gBBij−1) = true , then m |= gBBij−1 ∧
V ′ij−1(e). Hence m |=
∨
c∈Edges[BBij ] c.
(e) BBij is the right successor of BBij−1 ∈ Taken. This case is proved similarly
as case (d).
2. Suppose BB 6∈ Taken. First, since m(gBB) = false , Blks[BB] are conjunc-
tions of equations of the form xα = xα−1. By Steps (1),(2), and (3), we have
m |= Blks[BB]. Secondly, we prove that m evaluates ∨c∈Edges[BB] c to false by
contradiction. Suppose there is c ∈ ∨e∈Edges[BB] e such that m |= c. We consider
the following cases depending on the form of c.
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(a) c ≡ V1(e). Then BB is the left successor of the governor gov. Let
br e BB BBi1 be the terminating instruction of gov. Since s0 |= ¬e and
m|V1 = s0, we have m |= ¬V1(e), and thus m 6|= c. Contradiction.
(b) c ≡ ¬V1(e). Then BB is the right successor of the governor gov. This case is
proved similarly as case (a).
(c) c ≡ gBB′ . Then we know that BB′ ∈ Taken and BB is the unique successor
of BB′. Since m(gBB′) = true , then m(gBB) = true . Contradiction.
(d) c ≡ gBBu ∧ V ′u(e) for some u ∈ [1, n]. Since m |= gBBu , we know that BBu ∈
Taken and BB is the left successor of BBu. Without loss of generality, let
BBu be BBij for some j ∈ [1, k]. Then V ′u = V ′ij . Let br e BB BB′ be the
terminating instruction of BBij . Note that sj |= ¬e. Since m|V ′ij = sj , we
have m |= ¬V ′ij (e). Contradiction.
(e) c ≡ gBBu ∧ ¬V ′u(e) for some u ∈ [1, n]. Since m |= gBBu , we know that
BBu ∈ Taken and BB is the right successor of BBu. This case is proved
similarly as case (d).
Now that we have proved for each BB ∈ GR(gov), m |= gBB =
∨
c∈Edges[BB] c and
m |= Blks[BB]. Thus m |= φ. We now prove that m |= gd where gd =
∨
c∈Edges[d] c.
Suppose that the destination d is the unique successor of BBik , then gBBik ∈ Edges[d].
Since m |= gBBik , m |= gd. Suppose that d is the left successor of BBik , that is, the
terminating instruction of BBik is br e d BB2. Since sk |= e and m|V ′ik = sk, we have
m |= V ′ik(e). Since gBBik ∧V ′ik(e) ∈ Edges[d], we havem |= gd. By the similar reasoning,
if d is the right successor of BBik , we also have m |= gd. Hence m |= φ ∧ gd.
Theorem 21. Given a governor gov and a destination d ∈ Dests(gov), the formula φ ∧
gd encodes all executions from gov to d. Moreover, the final version of each variable x in φ
represents the value of x when an execution from gov to d enters d.
Proof. Proved by Lemma 34 and 35.
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